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  ANALYSE, INFORMATIONEN AUS EUROPÄISCHER PERSPEKTIVE 

EMPATIA, RESPEKT, WÜRDE

Der humanistische Ansatz zur Schaffung eines nachhaltigen Dialogs

und einer gemeinsamen Basis

 АНАЛИЗ, ИНФОРМАЦИЯ ИЗ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОЙ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

сопереживание  уважать  достоинство

Гуманистический подход к созданию устойчивого диалога и общей позиции

ANALYSE, INFORMATIONS DE PERSPECTIVE EUROPEENNE

EMPATIA, RESPECT, DIGNITÉ



ANÁLISIS, INFORMACIONES DESDE UNA PERSPECTIVA EUROPEA

EMPATIA, RESPETA, DIGNIDAD

El enfoque humanista para crear undiálogo sostenible y un terreno común

E U R O P E

WELCOME!

  Herzlich willkommen! Bienvenido!

добро пожаловать! 歡迎

 сопереживание  уважать  достоинство

Гуманистический подход к созданию устойчивого диалога и взаимопонимания

EMPATHY RESPECT DIGNITY

THE HUMANISTIC APROACH TO CREATE SUSTAINABLE DIALOGUE AND COMMON GROUND

Oslo, January 2020

 Осло, январь 2020 奧斯陸，2020年1月

The Y-12 National Secuity Complex Tennessee USA

 Harald Dahle-Sladek

Editor-in-Chief

Welcome folks!

I am proud to introduce Americas finest Nuclear Assembly plant, and the world's foremost nuclear industrial center, the Oak Ridge Y-12 in Tennessee. This center is above "state-of-the-art". The men and women who work here every day guarantee our freedom and we owe them our deepest respect and warm thanks. The United States has been and will be the leader of the Free World today and tomorrow. Thank you, and may God bless the United States.

Willkommen Leute!

Ich bin stolz darauf, Amerikas bestes Nuclear Assembly-Werk und das weltweit führende nukleare Industriezentrum, die Y-12 in Tennessee, vorstellen zu können. Dieses Zentrum ist über dem Stand der Technik. Die Männer und Frauen, die hier jeden Tag arbeiten, garantieren unsere Freiheit und wir schulden ihnen unseren tiefsten Respekt und herzlichen Dank. Die Vereinigten Staaten waren und sind heute und morgen die Führer der Freien Welt. Vielen Dank und möge Gott die Vereinigten Staaten segnen.



Добро пожаловать, ребята!

Я горжусь тем, что представляю самый прекрасный в Северной Америке завод по сборке ядерных материалов и крупнейший в мире ядерный промышленный центр Y-12 в Теннесси. Этот центр находится над "современным". Мужчины и женщины, которые работают здесь каждый день, гарантируют нам свободу, и мы выражаем им глубокое уважение и сердечную благодарность. Соединенные Штаты были и будут лидером Свободного мира сегодня и завтра. Спасибо, и пусть Бог благословит Соединенные Штаты.



歡迎大家！

我很自豪地向您介紹美國最好的核大會工廠，以及世界上最重要的核工業中心，田納西州的Y-12。該中心位於“最新技術”之上。每天在這里工作的男人和女人保證我們的自由，我們欠他們最深切的敬意和熱烈的感謝。今天和明天，美國一直並將成為自由世界的領導者。謝謝，願上帝保佑美國。



¡Bienvenidos amigos!

Me enorgullece presentar la mejor planta de ensamblaje nuclear de las Américas y el principal centro industrial nuclear del mundo, el Y-12 en Tennessee. Este centro está por encima de "estado del arte". Los hombres y mujeres que trabajan aquí todos los días garantizan nuestra libertad y les debemos nuestro más profundo respeto y nuestro más sincero agradecimiento. Estados Unidos ha sido y será el líder del Mundo Libre hoy y mañana. Gracias, y que Dios bendiga a los Estados Unidos.

Y-12 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX

Oak Ridge, TN 37830, United States

The Y-12 National Security Complex is a United States Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration facility located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, near the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The Y-12 National Security Complex, operated by Babcock & Wilcox Y-12 (B&W Y-12) and secured by WSI-Oak Ridge

PANTEX EAST

nuclear war head facility

Since 1991, Pantex has safely dismantled thousands of weapons retired from the stockpile by the military and placed the resulting plutonium pits in interim storage. Operations at Pantex are primarily conducted on 2,000 acres of the 18,000-acre site. Pantex has approxi- mately 650 buildings, including specialized facilities in which maintenance, modification, disassembly, and assembly operations are conducted.

PANTEX PLANT

nuclear assembly cell

The Pantex Plant maintains its own water-treatment, sewage, and steam-generating plants. Five wind turbines, each over 400 feet tall, generate enough power to support more than 60 percent of the Pantex Plant’s annual energy.  Bechtel Consolidated Nuclear Security (BCNS) manages and operates the facility along with the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennes- see under a single contract from the U.S. Department of Energy/NNSA. 

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

Mr. Morgan Smith

(Feb. 1, 2016)

President and Chief Executive Officer

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC

Morgan Smith is the president and the chief executive officer of Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC, which is responsible for the management and operation of the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, and the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A Bechtel executive, Smith joined CNS in 2014 to serve as the CNS chief operating officer and manage the operations of both sites.

Smith has more than 36 years of prior technical and managerial leadership experience within the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. He performed significant roles in planning and implementing the consolidation of the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory and Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory into a single organization and, in 2014, applied that experience to initiate the consolidation of Pantex and Y-12 under one U.S. Department of Energy contract. 

Below: The Manhattan Project, Y12 Calutron Operators. The word "Calutron" comes from CALifornia University CycloTRON to recognize that it was designed by Ernest. O. Lawrence.

A calutron is a mass spectrometer originally designed and used for separating the isotopes of Uranium. It was developed by Ernest O. Lawrence during the Manhattan Project and was based on his earlier invention, the Cyclotron. Its name was derived from California University Cyclotron, in tribute to Lawrence's institution, the University of California, where it was invented.

Calutrons were used in the industrial-scale Y-12 Uranium enrichment plant at the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge Tennessee. The enriched Uranium produced was used in the Little Boy atomic bomb that was detonated over Hiroshima, 6 August 1945.

CLICK PICTURE AND PLAY

Berkeley Lab Founder Ernest O. Lawrence Demonstrates

the Cyclotron Concept 

Ernest O. Lawrence, UC Berkeley’s first Nobel Laureate, circa 1950s. The building behind contains the 184-inch cyclotron, an ancestor to the Large Hadron Collider. Today, the same building houses Lawrence Berkeley National Lab’s Advanced Light Source.

LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY

The Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL or LBL), commonly referred to as Berkeley Lab, is a United States National Laboratory located in the Berkely Hills near Berkeley, California that conducts scientific research on behalf of the United States Department of Energy (DOE). It is managed and operated by the University of California.

After the war, Lawrence maintained strong government and military ties at his lab, which became incorporated into the new system of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) now Department of Energy, DOE National Laboratories. For security purposes, classified weapons research was assigned to the more isolated locations, the  Los Alamos National Laboratory, established during the war, in New Mexico.

 Berkeley: The 60-inch cyclotron

The new laboratory at Livermore. Livermore, about an hour's drive southeast of Berkeley, was established at a former navla air station in 1952 by Lawrence and Edward Teller. Weapons-related and collaborative research continued at Berkeley Lab until the 1970s, however. Shortly after the death of Lawrence in August 1958, the UC Radiation Laboratory (both branches) was renamed the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. The Berkeley location became Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in 1971.

Alpha 1 racetrack, Uranium 235 electromagnetic separation plant, Manhattan Project, Y-12 Oak Ridge

           PANTEX NUCLEAR WEAPONS                     PRODUCTION FACILITY AMARILLO TEXAS

The Pantex Plant is the primary United States nuclear weapons assembly and dis- assembly facility and maintains the safety, security and reliability of the nations nu- clear weapons stockpile.

The facility is located on a 16,000 acre 65 km^2, 27 km northeast of Amarillo, in Car- son County, Texas in the Panhandle of Texas.

The plant is managed and operated for the United States Department of Energy by Consolidated Nuclear Security and Sandia National Laboratories.

Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS) is composed of the member companies

BECHTEL CONSOLIDATED NUCLEAR SECURITY, LLC (BCNS) - 2014-17

A Bechtel-led partnership began managing and operating Pantex and Y-12 for the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration in July 2014. Consolidated Nuclear Security was selected last to manage and operate the nuclear security facilities but the transition was put on hold while the contract award was reviewed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
The Bechtel-led Consolidated Nuclear Security,  LLC  has been directed by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration to immediately resume transitioning to take over the management and operation of the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, and the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Lockheed Martin Services Inc.

  Orbital ATK Inc.

SOC LLC

with Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. as a teaming subcontractor.

PANTEX nuclear assembly plant

Nuclear bomb B53 small

Pantex workers with B61-12 Gravity Bomb

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In 1951, at the request of the  Atomic Energy Commission the National Nuclear Secu- rity Administration (NNSA), the Army exercised a recapture clause in the sale contract and reclaimed the main plant and 10,000 acres (40 km²) of surrounding land for use as a nuclear weapons production facility.

The Atomic Energy Commission refurbished and expanded the plant at a cost of $25 million. The remaining 6,000 acres (24 km²) of the original site were leased from Texas Tech in 1989.The Pantex Plant was operated by Procter & Gamble from 1951 to 1956, Mason & Hanger from 1956 to 2001, and Babcock & Wilcox from 2001 to 2014. The plant employed about 3,600 people in 2010 and had a budget of $600 million for fiscal year 2010.

The Pantex Plant

Pantex plant Nuclear Assembly Cell

Guarding a Train Loaded

with Nuclear Warheads

Alexander Grushko

Russian Permanent Representative to NATO 

Alexander Grushko

Question: How does Russia assess the U.S. intention to deploy another armour brigade in Eastern Europe?
 
Alexander Grushko: We need to see how these intentions play out. Nevertheless, we assess these plans not only in terms of what the United States can additionally deploy on NATO’s “eastern flank” but also in the context of the aggregate measures that have already been taken. Regarding the new force deploy-ment pattern on NATO’s “eastern periphery”, this involves a qualitative change in the configuration of this presence and a significant deterioration of the situation in the military sphere.
 
Presently, US forces are constantly rotated in six Eastern European countries and there are continuous exercises with the participation not only of US but also European contingents. The naval grouping in the Baltic has been reinforced. Storage depots have been set up for equipment used by rotation units during joint exercises with national contingents.Troop reinforcement infrastructure continues to be upgraded. Military activity in the airspace along our borders has intensified. The number of reconnaissance flights has drastically increased. There is constant talk about increasing the military presence in the Black Sea.
 
All of this goes to show that the “containment” policy that was initially declared in word is now followed up by specific military-planning decisions. This creates a long-term negative trend not only for regional security but also for European security as a whole. Another problem is that no one knows how far this process will go. The decision to deploy an additional armour brigade is announced at a time when nothing critical is happening with regard to NATO interests on the “eastern flank”. It is becoming increasingly obvious that these military preparations have no basis in reality. There is no direct threat either to Poland or to the Baltic countries but the information campaign continues to gather momentum. Absurd horror stories to the effect that Russia would have attacked the Baltic countries if NATO had not taken measures and deployed its troops in the region continue making the rounds. All indications point to a serious change for the worse in the military situation.
 
Question: Are there grounds to say that NATO actions violate agreements with Russia, in particular the Founding Act of 1997?
 
Alexander Grushko: An additional armour brigade to reinforce the “eastern flank” is in conflict with the spirit of the Founding Act. Meanwhile, NATO alleges that all military efforts are in full compliance with the Russia-NATO Founding Act whereby NATO pledged not to deploy additional significant combat forces on a permanent basis. We have stated more than once that continuous rotation does not differ in any way from constant deployment. I should point out, however, that two bases of the European segment of the global missile defence system are under construction. The base in Romania is now at combat readiness and is due to be placed under NATO command in May. The construction of the facility in Poland is in progress. The bases definitely fall under the definition of “significant” and have a permanent character.
 
Question: In what way will the strengthening of the US contingent impact Russia-NATO collaboration?
 
Alexander Grushko: In no way. There is no collaboration. In April 2014, NATO countries took the decision to halt all collaboration with Russia and all projects were put on hold. Today, we do not have a positive agenda with NATO. We often hear NATO representatives say they are ready for dialogue. Dialogue through the permanent mission continues. We have good contacts with the alliance leadership, with all missions to NATO, but these contacts cannot substitute for the Russia-NATO collaboration that was built over the years to ensure the security of all Russia-NATO Council members in a number of areas. We worked together on Afghanistan. We did a good deal of work in fighting terrorism not only in terms of threat assessment and sharing experience but also in implementing projects designed to rule out tragedies like the one in Brussels.
 
Question: What is the status of the Russia-NATO Council activity?
 
Alexander Grushko: Formally, the council activity has not been halted. Upon our initiative, it was convened for an emergency meeting in June 2014 in connection with the start of a punitive operation by the Kiev authorities in southeastern Ukraine. No meetings have been held since. Work is underway for the next meeting but no decision has been made yet.
 
Question: Can the CFE Treaty be invoked in the present situation?
 
Alexander Grushko: The US military buildup is proceeding amid the erosion of the arms control regime in Europe. The CFE regime was the cornerstone of European security. It set ceilings on the main categories of weapon systems and ensured effective information-sharing and an intrusive verification regime. In the early 1990s, it became clear that the treaty did not measure up to the new political realities and adaptation talks began. These efforts ended up with the signing of the Adapted CFE Treaty. It was more in sync with the new realities. In particular, it envisioned specific mechanisms of using political tools in case forces are deployed above the established quota limits. In 2004, Russia ratified the treaty, but NATO countries dragged their feet on the ratification under contrived pretexts. As a result, it did not come into effect. As the CFE Treaty has lost contact with reality, there is reason to say that the arms control regime in Europe is now dead. This further compounds the security situation. However, this choice was made by the NATO countries themselves.

DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force

REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK 

Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway.

NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers!



A RAND CORPORATION STUDY

Russias's Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO's

NATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY

DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERS

In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous. As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.

THE SUWALKI GAP NATO'S NIGHTMARE

      DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS          A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATO

The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. 

NATO'S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATES

Vladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors.

 After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.

 The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs.

This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.

In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of  Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. . . .

 Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for  Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words.

 MILITARY GEOGRAPHY FAVORS RUSSIA

During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict (see Figure 1). The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact.

 They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack.

 The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway (versus crow-flight) distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure.

 The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment.

 Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District (MD)—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.

 CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS

Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

 The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began.

The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn.

The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals.

 The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours.

 Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field.

Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions.

 Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6

 Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.

France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements.

The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom.

RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES

 Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000.

Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries.

Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia.

NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics.

On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind (or worse), but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications.

 Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself?

 The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances.

The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga.

 Coupled with the general direction of U.S. defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable.

 The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.

Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylon

NATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES

TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY

In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high.

Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above.

Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome.

We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days.

Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga.

What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces.

At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression.

There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.

It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering.

Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units.

This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position.

In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga.

Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced  surface-to-air defenses.

Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign.

This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.

NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.

Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do.

The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.

 Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps.

 THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER

 For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable.

Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior.

The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances.

All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones.

For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main.

Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to  the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of  $13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists.

Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than  $13 billion.

The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.

It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security.

Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide.

 The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so.

Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe.

RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.

NORWAY TOWARDS THE CLIFF

By the Editor-in-Chief

How the new Norwegian is Quislings are betraying the Norwegian population and have painted the country up in a corner it cannot get out of. Under the Solberg government, Norway's polarization to Russia has become clearly and noticeably negative. 

The Norwegian leadership today lives in a technological dream world without ground contact with the Norwegian people's realistic ability to survive. Under the leadership of right-wing Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway, negative polarization between Norway and Russia has increased dramatically.

Prime Minister Erna Solberg

The Norwegian leadership today lives in a technological dream world without ground contact with the Norwegian people's realistic ability to survive. Negative polarization between Norway and Russia has increased dramatically under the leadership of right-wing Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway.

By renouncing power to the United States and the CIA, the leadership has betrayed the Norwegian people, who in a war situation will be completely defeated and largely wiped out by Russia's precise and powerful missiles.

The Norwegian leadership lives in the delusion that a unilateral bond with the US will save the country. The permit for the use of thermonuclear bombs of type B61-12 from Norwegian soil, owned and operated by the Americans, will be a guarantee for Norway, the management believes. Yes, it is a guarantee, but for the collective downfall of the Norwegian people. Norway has around 5.3 million inhabitants in an area swelled in from Oslo to Rome. Only half of Norway's population is strong enough to take the first hours of the war. The rest of the population is elderly, sick, children, pregnant, in prisons and in miserable form.

Norway is a peacetime territory, but it is almost impossible to go to war. To that the country is too far, too cumbersome and too sparsely populated, and with a defense that is as good as defeated already. NATO started as a defense alliance but has become an attack alliance that has called in Russia and sees the country as its greatest enemy. Norway has hung on and gone from being a friendly neighbor to Russia, to becoming an offensive and provocative neighbor. This does not worry today's management in Norway. But it should, because Norway's ability to save its population lies in a good relationship with the neighbor in the east

U.S. Space Fence on Vardo Island, Northern Norway

We welcome U.S. Space Fence in Norway, but will it be to the best of the population who will be caught in the middle? GLOBUS 3 on Vardo Island will be one of the very first targets in a potential new conflict with Russia. Artwork by Petrofilm.

Valery Gerasimov

Valery Grasimov, head of Russia's General Staff, said that Moscow would increase the capabilities of its ground-based strategic nuclear arms. "One of the main destructive factors complicating the international situation is how the US is acting as it attempts to retain its dominant role in the world," he said in comments released by the defense ministry. "It is for these purposes that Washington and its allies are taking comprehensive, concerted measures to contain Russia and discredit its role in international affairs." This is indeed sad news for Europe and the World. Have a good day!

RS-24 Yars: Norway has become prime target, and its population does not stand a chance.

 It is claimed by the Solberg Government that the new F35 aircraft are necessary for Norway's defense capabilities. And I suppose B61-12 is also meant to save the country. Not a single F35 will cross the border with Russia and not a B61-12 will fall on Russian soil.

B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb: Norway is playing with fire

Knowledgeable Vidkun Quisling did the same. He lived in an ideological dream world without ground contact with the Norwegian people's realistic ability to survive in the mind. What we experience in Norway today is betrayal of the Norwegian population. And no one seems to notice what is happening, that the country is moving quickly and safely towards the cliff.

Norge mot Stupet

Av redaktøren

Hvorledes de nye, norske Quislingene forrådte det norske folk og har malt landet opp i et hjørne det ikke kan komme ut i fra. Under Solberg regjeringen er norges polarisering til russland blitt tydelig og merkbart negativ. Ved å frasi seg makt til de forente Stater og CIA har ledelsen forrådt det norske folk, som i en krigssituasjon vil bli fullstendig nedkjempet og i stor grad utryddet av russlands presise og kraftige missiler.

 Den norske ledelsen lever i den vilfarelsen at en ensidig binding til USA vil redde landet. Tillatelsen til bruk av thermonuklære fallbomber av typen B61-12 fra norsk jord, som eies og betjenes av amerikanerne, vil være garanti for Norge mener ledelsen. Ja, det er en garanti, men for det norske folks kollektive undergang. Norge har omlag 5.3 millioner innbyggere fordelt på et område tilsvanede i fra Oslo til Roma. Bare halvparten av norges befolkning er sterke nok til å ta krigens første timer. Resten av befolkningen er eldre, syke, barn, gravide, i fengsler og i dorlig form.

 Norge er et territorium som er der i fredstid, men som det er bortimot umlig å holde i krig. Til det er landet for langt, for krunglete og for tynt befolket, og med et forsvar som er så godt som nedkjempet allerede. NATO startet som en forsvarsallianse, men har blitt en angreps-allianse som har innringet Russland og ser landet som sin største fiende. Norge har hengt seg på og gått fra å være en sindig nabo til Russland, til å bli en offensiv og provokativ nabo. Dette bekymrer ikke dagens ledelse i Norge. Men det burde det, for norges evne til å redde sin befolkning ligger i et godt forhold til naboen i øst.

 Det er hevdet fra Solberg regjeringen at de nye F35-flyene er nødbendig for norges forsvarevne. Og jeg antar at B61-12 også er ment å redde landet. Det vil ikke komme en eneste F35 over grensen til Russland og ikke en B61-12 vil falle på russisk jord. Den norske ledelsen i dag lever i en teknologisk drømmeverden uten bakke-kontakt med det norske folks realistiske evne til å overleve. Vidtkun Quisling gjorde det samme. Han levde i en ideologisk drømmeverden uten bakkekontakt med det norske folks realistiske evne til å overleve i tankene. Det vi opplever i Norge i dag er forræderi mot den norske befolkning. Og ingen synes å iakta hva som skjer, at landet beveger seg hurtig og sikkert mot stupet.

Norway against the falls

By the Editor-in-Chief

How the new Norwegian Quislings betrayed the Norwegian people and have painted the country up in a corner it cannot come from. Under the Solberg government, Norway's polarization to Russia has become clearly and noticeably negative. By renouncing power to the United States and the CIA, the leadership has betrayed the Norwegian people, who in a war situation will be completely defeated and largely wiped out by Russia's precise and powerful missiles.

 The Norwegian leadership lives in the delusion that a unilateral bond with the US will save the country. The permit for the use of thermonuclear bombs of type B61-12 from Norwegian soil, owned and operated by the Americans, will be a guarantee for Norway, the management believes. Yes, it is a guarantee, but for the collective downfall of the Norwegian people. Norway has around 5.3 million inhabitants in an area swelled in from Oslo to Rome. Only half of Norway's population is strong enough to take the first hours of the war. The rest of the population is elderly, sick, children, pregnant, in prisons and in miserable form.

 Norway is a peacetime territory, but it is almost impossible to go to war. To that the country is too far, too cumbersome and too sparsely populated, and with a defense that is as good as defeated already. NATO started as a defense alliance but has become an attack alliance that has called in Russia and sees the country as its greatest enemy. Norway has hung on and gone from being an insane neighbor to Russia, to becoming an offensive and provocative neighbor. This does not worry today's management in Norway. But it should, because Norway's ability to save its population lies in a good relationship with the neighbor in the east.

 It is claimed by the Solberg Government that the new F35 aircraft are necessary for Norway's defense capabilities. And I suppose B61-12 is also meant to save the country. Not a single F35 will cross the border with Russia and not a B61-12 will fall on Russian soil. The Norwegian leadership today lives in a technological dream world without ground contact with the Norwegian people's realistic ability to survive. Knowledge Quisling did the same. He lived in an ideological dream world without ground contact with the Norwegian people's realistic ability to survive in the mind. What we experience in Norway today is betrayal of the Norwegian population. And no one seems to notice what is happening, that the country is moving quickly and safely towards the falls.

Норвегия к утесу

Главным редактором

Как новые норвежские квислинги предали норвежский народ и раскрасили страну в угол, откуда она не может прийти. При правительстве Сольберга поляризация Норвегии в отношении России стала явно и заметно отрицательной. Отказавшись от власти в отношении Соединенных Штатов и ЦРУ, руководство предало норвежский народ, который в ситуации войны будет полностью побежден и в значительной степени уничтожен точными и мощными ракетами России.

 Норвежское руководство живет заблуждением, что односторонняя связь с США спасет страну. Разрешение на использование термоядерных бомб типа B61-12 с норвежской земли, принадлежащих и эксплуатируемых американцами, будет гарантией для Норвегии, считает руководство. Да, это гарантия, но для коллективного падения норвежского народа. В Норвегии проживает около 5,3 млн. Человек, проживающих в Осло и Риме. Только половина населения Норвегии достаточно сильна, чтобы выдержать первые часы войны. Остальная часть населения - пожилые, больные, дети, беременные, в тюрьмах и в жалкой форме.

 Норвегия - территория мирного времени, но воевать практически невозможно. К тому же страна слишком далеко, слишком громоздка и слишком малонаселенна, и ее защита так же хороша, как уже побежденная. НАТО начинала как оборонительный альянс, но превратилась в атакующий альянс, который призвал Россию и считает эту страну своим главным врагом. Норвегия держалась и превратилась из безумного соседа в Россию в агрессивного и провокационного соседа. Это не беспокоит сегодняшнее руководство в Норвегии. Но это должно произойти, потому что способность Норвегии спасти свое население заключается в хороших отношениях с соседом на востоке.

 Правительство Сольберга заявляет, что новый самолет F35 необходим для обороноспособности Норвегии. И я полагаю, что B61-12 также призван спасти страну. Ни один F35 не пересечет границу с Россией, а B61-12 не упадет на российскую землю. Норвежское руководство сегодня живет в мире технологической мечты, не имея наземного контакта с реалистической способностью норвежского народа к выживанию. Знание Quisling сделал то же самое. Он жил в идеологическом мире грез, не имея наземного контакта с реалистической способностью норвежского народа выживать в сознании. То, что мы переживаем сегодня в Норвегии, это предательство норвежского населения. И никто, кажется, не замечает происходящего, что страна быстро и безопасно движется к водопадам.

 Norwegen in Richtung der Klippe

 Vom Chefredakteur

 Wie die neuen norwegischen Quislings das norwegische Volk verraten und das Land in einer Ecke aufgemalt haben, aus der es nicht kommen kann. Unter der Regierung von Solberg ist die Polarisierung Norwegens gegenüber Russland deutlich und deutlich negativ geworden. Durch den Machtverzicht auf die Vereinigten Staaten und die CIA hat die Führung das norwegische Volk betrogen, das in einer Kriegssituation von den präzisen und mächtigen Raketen Russlands völlig besiegt und größtenteils ausgelöscht wird.

 Die norwegische Führung lebt in der Täuschung, dass eine einseitige Bindung an die USA das Land retten wird. Die Genehmigung für den Einsatz von thermonuklearen Bomben des Typs B61-12 aus norwegischem Boden, die sich im Besitz der Amerikaner befinden und von ihnen betrieben werden, ist nach Ansicht des Managements eine Garantie für Norwegen. Ja, es ist eine Garantie, aber für den kollektiven Untergang des norwegischen Volkes. Norwegen hat rund 5,3 Millionen Einwohner in einem von Oslo nach Rom angeschwoll-enen Gebiet. Nur die Hälfte der norwegischen Bevölkerung ist stark genug, um die ersten Stunden des Krieges zu überstehen. Der Rest der Bevölkerung ist alt, krank, Kinder, schwanger, in Gefängnissen und in elender Form.

 Norwegen ist ein Gebiet in Friedenszeiten, aber es ist fast unmöglich, in den Krieg zu ziehen. Dazu ist das Land zu weit, zu schwerfällig und zu dünn besiedelt, und die Verteidigung ist so gut wie schon besiegt. Die NATO begann als Verteidigungsbündnis, wurde jedoch zu einem Angriffsbündnis, das Russland einberufen hat und das Land als seinen größten Feind ansieht. Norwegen hat sich daran gehalten und ist nicht mehr nur ein verrückter Nachbar Russlands, sondern ein offensiver und provokanter Nachbar geworden. Dies ist für das heutige Management in Norwegen kein Problem. Aber es sollte, denn Norwegens Fähigkeit, seine Bevölkerung zu retten, liegt in einem guten Verhältnis zum östlichen Nachbarn.

 Nach Angaben der Regierung von Solberg sind die neuen F35-Flugzeuge für Norwegens Verteidigungsfähigkeiten erforderlich. Und ich nehme an, B61-12 soll auch das Land retten. Keine einzige F35 wird die Grenze zu Russland überschreiten, und keine B61-12 wird auf russischem Boden landen. Die norwegische Führung lebt heute in einer technologischen Traumwelt ohne Bodenkontakt mit der realistischen Überlebensfähigkeit des norwegischen Volkes. Quisling tat dasselbe. Er lebte in einer ideologischen Traumwelt ohne Bodenkontakt mit der realistischen Fähigkeit des norwegischen Volkes, im Kopf zu überleben. Was wir heute in Norwegen erleben, ist Verrat an der norwegischen Bevölkerung. Und niemand scheint zu bemerken, was passiert, dass sich das Land schnell und sicher auf die Fälle zubewegt.

 Ronald Wilson Reagan

The 40th President of the United States, 1981-1989

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THE UNITED STATES

PULLS OUT OF THE 1987 INTERMEDIATE-RANGE

NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY

History. On 8 December 1987, at 1:45 p.m Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev solemnly signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at the White House. The leaders of the world’s super-powers hailed the transition from an era of “mounting risk of nuclear war” to one marked by the “demilitarization of human life.”

История. 8 декабря 1987 года в 13:45 Рональд Рейган и Михаил Горбачев торжественно подписали Договор о ядерных силах средней дальности в Белом доме. Лидеры мировых сверхдержав приветствовали переход от эры «растущего риска ядерной войны» к эпохе, отмеченной «демилитаризацией человеческой жизни».



Geschichte. Am 8. Dezember 1987 unterzeichneten Ronald Reagan und Michail Gorbatschow um 13.45 Uhr feierlich den Vertrag über die Kernenergie der mittleren Reichweite im Weißen Haus. Die Führer der Supermächte der Welt begrüßten den Übergang von einer Ära mit "zunehmendem Risiko eines Atomkrieges" zu einer Ära mit "Demilitarisierung des menschlichen Lebens".



Those were days of responsible men of good character.

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Подписание СОЛИ I Горбаче, Рейган Рейкьявик

 SALT I AND SALT II

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union, the Cold War superpowers, on the issue of armament control. The two rounds of talks and agree- ments were SALT I and SALT II.

Переговоры по ограничению стратегических вооружений (ОСВ) представляли собой два раунда двусторонних конференций и соответствующих международных договоров с участием Соединенных Штатов и Советского Союза, сверхдержав холодной войны, по вопросу контроля над вооружениями. Двумя раундами переговоров и соглашений были СОЛИ I и СОЛИ II.

Negotiations commenced in Helsinki, Finland November 1969. SALT I led to the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II result ed in an agreement in 1979, the United States chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which took place later that year. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985 and was not renewed.

Переговоры начались в Хельсинки, Финляндия, в ноябре 1969 года. СОЛЬ I привела к заключению Договора о противоракетной обороне и временного соглашения между двумя странами. Несмотря на то, что в результате соглашения об ОСВ-2 было заключено соглашение в 1979 году, Соединенные Штаты решили не ратифицировать договор в ответ на советскую войну в Афганистане, которая произошла в конце того же года. Срок действия соглашения истек 31 декабря 1985 года и не был продлен

The exact number of nuclear weapons possessed by the United States is difficult to determ- ine. Different treaties and organizations have different criteria for reporting nuclear weapons, especially those held in reserve, and those being dismantled or rebuilt:As of 1999, the U.S. was said to have 12,000 nuclear weapons of all types stockpiled. In its Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) declaration for 2003, the U.S. listed 5968 deployed warheads as defined by START rules.For 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists listed the U.S. with about 5,400 total nuclear warheads: around 3,575 strategic and 500 nonstrategic war- heads; and about 1,260 additional warheads held in the inactive stockpile. Other warheads are in some step of the disassembly process. The exact number as of Sept. 30, 2009, was 5,113 warheads, according to a U.S. fact sheet released May 3, 2010.

Точное количество ядерного оружия, которым обладают Соединенные Штаты, трудно определить. Различные договоры и организации имеют разные критерии для представления информации о ядерном оружии, особенно о тех, которые находятся в резерве, а также о тех, которые подлежат демонтажу или восстановлению: как сообщалось, в 1999 году в США было накоплено 12 000 единиц ядерного оружия всех типов. В своей декларации по Договору о сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений (СНВ) на 2003 год США перечислили 5968 развернутых боеголовок в соответствии с правилами СНВ. На 2007 год в Бюллетене ученых-атомщиков перечислено около 5400 ядерных боеголовок: около 3575 стратегических и 500 нестратегических. боеголовки; и около 1260 дополнительных боеголовок, хранящихся в неактивных запасах. Другие боеголовки находятся на каком-то этапе процесса разборки. Точное число по состоянию на 30 сентября 2009 года составило 5113 боеголовок, согласно бюллетеню США, опубликованному 3 мая 2010 года.

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Signing of SALT II    Подписание СОЛИ II

Signing of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Treaty in the Kremlin, Moscow, USSR, on May 26th, 1972. Principle signatories: Richard Nixon, President of the United States and Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party.

Подписание Договора об ограничении стратегических наступательных вооружений в Кремле, Москва, СССР, 26 мая 1972 года. Основные подписавшие стороны: Ричард Никсон, президент Соединенных Штатов, и Леонид Брежнев, генеральный секретарь Коммунистической партии.

President Jimmy Carter with Head of the Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev

Президент Джимми Картер с главой Коммунистической партии Леонидом Брежневым

In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed in the SORT treaty to reduce their deployed stockpiles to not more than 2,200 warheads each. In 2003, the U.S. rejected Russian propo- sals to further reduce both nation's nuclear stockpiles to 1,500 each. In 2007, for the first time in 15 years, the United States built new warheads.

These replaced some older war- heads as part of the Minuteman III upgrade program. 2007 also saw the first Minuteman III missiles removed from service as part of the drawdown. Overall, stockpiles and deployment systems continue to decline in number under the terms of the New Start treaty.

In 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists released a report, stating that there are a total of 2,530 warheads kept in reserve, and 2,120 actively deployed. Of the warheads actively dep- loyed, the number of strategic warheads rests at 1,920, subtracting 200 bombs that are de- ployed, but are not considered "strategic". The amount of warheads being actively disabled rests at about 2,700 warheads, which brings the total United States inventory to about 7,400 warheads.

В 2002 году Соединенные Штаты и Россия договорились в договоре СНП сократить свои развернутые запасы до не более 2200 боеголовок каждая. В 2003 году США отклонили предложения России о дальнейшем сокращении ядерных запасов обеих стран до 1500 единиц каждый. В 2007 году впервые за 15 лет Соединенные Штаты создали новые боеголовки.

Они заменили некоторые старые боеголовки в рамках программы обновления Minuteman III. В 2007 году также были сняты с эксплуатации первые ракеты Minuteman III. В целом, запасы и системы развертывания продолжают сокращаться в соответствии с условиями договора о новом старте.

The Stealthy Civil War OF

  the United States

 Polarization of the American society has become more evident under president Donald J Trump.

By the Editor-in-Chief

We have become aware of the violent culture underpinning American politics of today, even though such incidents are usually not acknow-ledged or reported, but often repressed and denied. The outcome of the first American civil war fought from 1861 to 1865 decided who should be included in the winner’s club and steer the new nation into the future.The second American civil war, which is fought in our own time by stealth, is deciding who shall not be included in the winner’s club. It is against these two contradictory scenarios that many of the violent political deaths that has occurred in the United States speak more clearly to us, stand out in a way we have not realized before and warn us. Stay vigilant folks. Help fight terrorism, domestic and foreign. Report suspicious incidents to the authorities. Have a blessed day, cheers!

Скрытая гражданская война Соединенных Штатов

Поляризация американского общества стала более очевидной при президенте Дональде Дж. Трампе.



Нам стало известно о насильственной культуре, лежащей в основе современной американской политики, хотя такие инциденты обычно не признаются и не сообщаются, а часто подавляются и опровергаются. Исход первой американской гражданской войны, которая велась с 1861 по 1865 год, решил, кто должен быть включен в клуб победителя и направить новую нацию в будущее. Вторая американская гражданская война, в которую в наше время ведется хитрость, решает, кого не включать в клуб победителя. Именно против этих двух противоречивых сценариев многие из насильственных политических смертей, произошедших в Соединенных Штатах, говорят нам более четко, выделяются так, как мы не осознавали ранее, и предупреждают нас. Будьте бдительны. Помогите бороться с терроризмом, отечественным и зарубежным. Сообщайте о подозрительных инцидентах властям. Счастливого дня, ура!

THE PERSIAN CARPET

SEISMIC SURVEY (PC2000) I.R. IRAN

The largest 2D seismic survey covering all of Iranian waters from North of the Persian Gulf  to the Oman Sea on the Iranian side and lasted five years from January 1998 till May 2003. We documented the entire project from start to finnish.

China National Petroleum Corporation CNPC was

a major partner in the PC2000 Seismic Survey in Iran.

波斯地毯

地震調查（PC2000）伊朗

 從波斯灣北部到伊朗一側阿曼的所有伊朗水域的最大2D地震勘測，從1998年1月到2003年5月，歷時5年。我們記錄了整個項目從開始到結束



ПЕРСИДСКИЙ КОВРО

СЕЙСМИЧЕСКИЙ ОБЗОР (PC2000) I.R. ИРАН

Крупнейшая 2D сейсмическая съемка, охватывающая все иранские воды от севера Персидского залива до Оманского моря на иранской стороне и продолжавшаяся пять лет с января 1998 года по май 2003 года. Мы задокументировали весь проект от начала до финского



Hussein Adeli PhD

Bellow we can see the deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs, Governor of the Central Bank, Ambassador to Ottawa and Tokyo, His Excellence Hussein Adeli PhD and myself in the Foreign Department in Tehran. As former Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl once pointed out, "Peace must be more than the absence of war."

侯賽因·阿德利博士

在貝婁，我們可以看到德黑蘭外交部副外長，中央銀行行長，駐渥太華和東京大使，侯賽因·阿德利博士和我本人。正如德國前總理赫爾穆特·科爾（Helmut Kohl）曾經指出的那樣，“和平不僅僅應該是沒有戰爭。”

Хусейн Адели

Ниже мы можем видеть заместителя министра иностранных дел по экономическим вопросам, губернатора Центрального банка, посла в Оттаве и Токио, доктора Его Превосходительства Хусейна Адели и меня в министерстве иностранных дел в Тегеране. Как однажды отметил бывший канцлер Германии Гельмут Коль, «мир должен быть больше, чем отсутствие войны».



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From the meeting between His Excellency Hussein Adeli PhD Deputy Foreign Minister of Economic Affairs, Governor of the  Central Bank, Ambassador to Ottawa and Tokyo and Editor-in-Chief Harald Dahle-Sladek in Adeli's office in the Foreign Department Tehran. April 2002. Photo: Sanjanchi Niko.

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Из встречи Его Превосходительства Хуссейна Адели с кандидатом экономических наук, заместителем министра иностранных дел, управляющим Центрального банка, послом в Оттаве и Токио и главным редактором Харальдом Далем-Сладеком в офисе Адели в министерстве иностранных дел Тегерана. Апрель 2002. Фото: Санянчи Нико

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在經濟事務部副外長侯賽因·阿德利博士閣下，中央銀行行長，渥太華大使館和東京大使與德黑蘭外交部阿德利辦公室總編輯哈拉爾德·達勒·斯拉德克總書記之間的會晤中。 2002年4月。照片：Sanjanchi Niko

From left His Excellency Ali Ahani Ambassador to Paris and His Excellency Harald Dahle-Sladek Editor-in-Chief of Petrofilm.com during talks in the Foreign Department Tehran April 2002.

National Iranian Oil Company NIOC Executive 15th Floor May 2003. To the right is the Iranian side. Minister of Oil His Excellency Bijan Namdahr Zangeneh No 3 from right with Iran's Ambassador to Oslo His Excellency Noghrehkar Shirazi No 4 from right. To the left is the Norwegian side with Minister of Petroleum and Energy His Excellency Einar Steensnes No 7 from the left. Photo: Harald Dahle-Sladek.

Национальная иранская нефтяная компания NIOC Executive, 15-й этаж, май 2003 года. Справа - иранская сторона. Министр нефти Его Превосходительство Биджан Намдар Зангене № 3 справа и посол Ирана в Осло Его Превосходительство Ногрехкар Ширази № 4 справа. Слева - норвежская сторона с министром нефти и энергетики Его Превосходительством Эйнаром Стинснесом № 7 слева. Фото: Харальд Дале-Сладек.

Deputy Minister of Petroleum and President of the National Iranian Oil Company NIOC, his excelleny Mehdi Mirmoezi, right and Editor-in-Chief Harald Dahle in Mirmoezi's office in the Headquarter of NIOC during a more than one hour filmed interview on May 19 2002. Photo:Petrofilm (C)2002

Заместитель министра нефти и президент Национальной нефтяной компании Ирана, его превосходительство Мехди Мирмоези, правый и главный редактор Харальд Дал в офисе Мирмоэзи в штаб-квартире NIOC во время более чем одного часа снятого интервью 19 мая 2002 года. Фото : Petrofilm (C) 2002

石油部副部長兼伊朗國家石油公司NIOC總裁，他的外長Mehdi Mirmoezi，右翼和總編輯Harald Dahle在NIOC總部Mirmoezi的辦公室接受了一個多小時的採訪，拍攝於2002年5月19日。 ：Petrofilm（C）2002

 The Editor-in-Chief on TOTAL's South Pars supply Base, Kish Island Iran.

道達爾公司南帕爾斯供應基地伊朗基什島的總編輯。

Главный редактор базы снабжения TOTAL в Южном Парсе, остров Киш, Иран.

As the tide went out, we had six hours to shoot seismic lines; this is line 4471. Here we are on the mudflats at Hendijan with belt driven vehicles carrying floaters on each side, from China National Petroleum Company CNPC and the Bureau of Geophysical Prospecting BGP. Behind on the right side, two kilo of dynamite is pushed down to ten meters and then detonated. Geophones are then picking up the seismic seignals.

Когда поток потух, у нас было шесть часов на съемку сейсмических линий; это линия 4471. Здесь мы на грязевых плоскостях в Хендижане с ременными транспортными средствами, несущими поплавки с каждой стороны, от Китайской национальной нефтяной компании CNPC и Бюро геофизической разведки BGP. С правой стороны два килограмма динамита сбрасывают на десять метров, а затем взрывают. Затем геофоны собирают сейсмические сигналы.



漲潮時，我們有六個小時的時間來拍攝地震線。這是4471號線。在這裡，我們位於Hendijan的泥灘上，兩邊都是皮帶驅動的車輛，這些車輛分別來自中國石油天然氣集團公司（CNPC）和地球物理勘探局（BGP）。在右側的後面，將兩公斤炸藥向下推至十米，然後引爆。然後，地震檢波器開始接收地震信號。

IRAN SANCTIONS

Did the United States Lifting of Sanctions

between 2016 and 2018 really take place?

Dear readers and friends. Although, one can argue that the so-called lifting of US Sanctions between 2016 and 2018 really took place, there is reason to believe that when the Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC takes a sharp and unpleasant look at foreign individuals having done business with Iran and Iranian assets in that same period, it will arrive at the conclusion that the phrase “lifting of sanctions" does not mean a thing. If your intentions are to knowingly circumvent US politics with Iran we think that is a very bad idea and it will have consequences. So, stop hiding behind phrases like "lifting of sanctions" and "the US opens up for trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran." Because it never happened!

Делали ли США отмену санкций

между 2016 и 2018 годами действительно состоятся?

Уважаемые читатели и друзья. Хотя можно утверждать, что так называемое снятие санкций США в период с 2016 по 2018 годы действительно имело место. Тем не менее, есть основания полагать, что, когда Управление по контролю за иностранными активами OFAC резко и неприятно смотрит на иностранных лиц, которые ведут бизнес с Ираном и иранскими активами в тот же период, оно придет к выводу, что выражение «снятие санкции ничего не значат ». Если ваши намерения состоят в том, чтобы сознательно обойти политику США с Ираном, мы думаем, что это очень плохая идея, и она будет иметь последствия.



美國是否解除了製裁

在2016年和2018年之間真的發生了嗎？'

尊敬的讀者和朋友們。雖然，有人可以辯稱，所謂的美國製裁在2016年至2018年間確實發生了。但是，有理由相信，當外國資產控制辦公室OFAC對同一時期與伊朗和伊朗資產有業務往來的外國個人進行尖銳而令人不快的調查時，會得出這樣的結論：制裁併不意味著任何事情。”如果您的意圖是在知情的情況下規避美國與伊朗的政治，我們認為這是一個非常糟糕的主意，並且將產生後果。

President Donald J Trump signed sanctions towards Iran into law

Let's see what the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC, says about this. In accordance with this Statute  a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 

 (A) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

 (B) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

 (C) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.

NORWAY

Johan Sverdrup Comes On Stream

The largest development in Norway for three decades, the mega project has started up more than two months ahead of and NOK 40 billion ($4.4 billion) below the original estimates in the plan for development and operation (PDO).  “Johan Sverdrup coming on stream is a momentous occasion for Equinor, our partners and suppliers. At peak, this field will account for around one third of all oil production in Norway and deliver very valuable barrels with record low emissions. Johan Sverdrup is expected to generate income from production of more than NOK 1400 billion of which more than NOK 900 billion to the Norwegian state and society,” said Eldar Sætre, president and CEO of Equinor.

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 Йохан Свердруп выходит в эфир

«Начало работы Johan Sverdrup - это знаменательное событие для Equinor, наших партнеров и поставщиков. На пике на это месторождение будет приходиться около трети всей добычи нефти в Норвегии и будет поставляться очень ценная нефть с рекордно низким уровнем выбросов. Ожидается, что Йохан Свердруп получит доход от производства более 1400 млрд норвежских крон, из которых более 900 млрд норвежских крон, для норвежского государства и общества », - сказал Эльдар Сотре, президент и исполнительный директор Equinor.

По прогнозам Йохана Свердрупа, извлекаемые запасы составляют 2,7 миллиарда баррелей нефтяного эквивалента, и на месторождении в целом может быть добыто до 660 000 баррелей нефти в день на пике. Поле снабжено электроэнергией с берега, и рекордно низкие выбросы CO2 составляют менее 1 кг на баррель.

Эквинор, оператор с 42,6% рабочей долей. Его партнерами являются Lundin Norway с 20%, Petoro с 17,36%, AkerBP с 11,5733% и Total с 8,44%.

Алекс Шнайтер, президент и главный исполнительный директор Lundin Petroleum, сказал: «Я очень рад объявить о первой нефти от Johan Sverdrup, которая действительно является поворотным моментом для Lundin Petroleum. С тех пор, как мы сделали открытие в 2010 году, эта область превзошла все ожидания с точки зрения выполнения проектов, роста ресурсов и сокращения затрат, и это является свидетельством напряженной работы всех заинтересованных сторон и регулирующих органов, чтобы вывести поле и опередить график и ниже бюджета. »

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 Johan Sverdrup上線

“對於Equinor，我們的合作夥伴和供應商而言，Johan Sverdrup的出現是一個重要時刻。高峰時，該油田將佔挪威石油總產量的約三分之一，並提供排放量極低的非常有價值的桶。 Equinor總裁兼首席執行官Eldar Sætre表示：“約翰·斯維爾德魯普（Johan Sverdrup）預計將從生產中產生超過14000億挪威克朗的收入，其中超過9000億挪威克朗給挪威國家和社會。

約翰·斯維爾德魯普（Johan Sverdrup）預計可採儲量為27億桶石油當量，整個油田在高峰期每天可生產多達660,000桶石油。該油田採用岸上電力供電，二氧化碳排放量創歷史新低，低於每桶1千克。

Equinor是運營商，擁有42.6％的工作權益。它的合作夥伴是挪威的Lundin（佔20％），Petoro（佔17.36％），AkerBP（佔11.5733％）和Total（佔8.44％）。

隆丁石油公司總裁兼首席執行官亞歷克斯·施耐特（Alex Schneiter）表示：“我非常高興地宣布，約翰·斯維爾德魯普（Johan Sverdrup）推出了第一批石油，這對隆丁石油公司而言確實是一個轉型時刻。自2010年發現以來，該領域在項目執行，資源增長和成本降低方面超出了所有期望，這證明了所有利益相關者和監管機構的辛勤工作，使該領域得以領先並領先進度並低於預算。”

 Johan Sverdrup

Johan Sverdrup has expected recoverable reserves of 2.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent and the full field can produce up to 660,000 barrels of oil per day at peak. Powered with electricity from shore, the field has record-low CO2 emissions of well-below 1 kg per barrel.

Equinor, is operator with a 42.6% working interest. Its partners are Lundin Norway with 20%, Petoro with 17.36%, AkerBP with 11.5733% and Total with 8.44%.

Alex Schneiter, President and CEO of Lundin Petroleum, said, “I am very pleased to announce first oil from Johan Sverdrup, which is truly a transformational moment for Lundin Petroleum. Since we made the discovery in 2010, this field has exceeded all expectations in terms of project execution, resources growth and cost reduction and it is a testament to the hard work from all stakeholders and regulatory authorities, to get the field up and running ahead of schedule and below budget.”

Karl Johnny Hersvik, CEO of Aker BP, said, “This is a milestone for Aker BP. The production from this giant oil field wl be a major contributor to Aker BP’s production and earnings growth in the years to come.

“We are extremely pleased with the work that the operator has done on behalf of the partnership in developing this field. Johan Sverdrup represents massive value creation for Aker BP and the other partners, as well as for the Norwegian society.”

“Johan Sverdrup is one of the major developments that were added to Total’s portfolio through the value adding acquisition of Maersk Oil in 2018. It is one of the largest oil fields of the Norwegian Continental Shelf and illustrates our ongoing commitment to Norway – a country that represents about 8% of Total’s global annual production – and to the North Sea where we are the second largest operator,” said Arnaud Breuillac, President Exploration & Production of Total.

           FIGHT FOR EUROPEAN CONTROL              OVER TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, GERMANY JOINS  FRANCE FOR NEW EUROPEAN ARMY

180 B61-12's in Europe by 2020

The B61 nuclear bomb is one of the primary thermonuclear veapon in the US nuclear arse- nal. Enduring stockpile following the end of the Cold War It is an intermediate-yield strate- gic and tactical nuclear veapon featuring a two-stage radiation implotion design.

The B61 is a variable yeld bomb, 0.3 to 340 kiloton yield in various versions and settings, de- signed for carriage by high-speed aircraft. It has a streamlined casing capable of withstand- ing sup- ersonic flight speeds.

The weapon is 3.58 m long, with a diameter of about 33 cm. Basic weight is about 320 kg although the weights of individual weapons may vary depending on version and fuze/retar- dation configuration.

180 B61-12 в Европе к 2020 году

Ядерная бомба B61 является одним из основных термоядерных бомб в ядерном арсенале США. Устойчивые запасы после окончания холодной войны Это стратегическое и тактическое ядерное оружие средней мощности с двухступенчатой ​​схемой радиационной имплозии.

B61 - бомба с переменным выходом, мощностью от 0,3 до 340 килотонн в различных версиях и настройках, предназначенная для перевозки высокоскоростными самолетами. Он имеет обтекаемый корпус, способный выдерживать сверхзвуковые скорости полета.

Длина оружия - 3,58 м, диаметр - около 33 см. Базовый вес составляет около 320 кг, хотя масса отдельного оружия может варьироваться в зависимости от версии и конфигурации взрывателя / замедлителя.

歐洲新軍

НОВАЯ АРМИЯ ЕВРОПЫ

   EUROPE'S NEW ARMY   

 Europe must take control over it's own future and responsibilities

  Merkel joins Macron for European Army

Deep schism between Europe and the United States and NATO cannot be trusted as guardian over tactical nuclear weapons on European soil. Must be controlled by Europe, not by the United States.

Глубокий раскол между Европой и Соединенными Штатами и НАТО нельзя доверять в качестве опекуна над тактическим ядерным оружием на европейской земле. Должен контролироваться Европой, а не Соединенными Штатами.

歐洲和美國以及北約之間的深刻分裂不能成為歐洲土地上戰術核武器的守護者。必須由歐洲控制，而不是由美國控制。

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Frau Doktor Angela Merkel Chancellor of Germany

 Angela Merkel has said EU leaders should one day consider “a real, true European army” shortly after Donald Trump ramped up a Twitter attack on Emmanuel Macron over the same idea. Speaking to the European parliament in Strasbourg, the German chancellor backed the bold step in European defense policy, as part of a speech extolling the need for EU cooperation in migration, climate change and counter-terrorism. “The times when we could rely on others is past,” she said.

To a mix of applause and jeers from Eurosceptic MEPs, she said: “We have to look at the vision of one day creating a real, true European army.” The chancellor said the idea would complement NATO, but gave no details on when the ambitious idea could become reality. Her words echoed those of the French president, who in an interview said Europe needed to better defend itself.

Фрау Доктор Ангела Меркель Канцлер Германии

 Ангела Меркель заявила, что лидеры ЕС должны однажды рассмотреть «настоящую, настоящую европейскую армию» вскоре после того, как Дональд Трамп усилил атаку в Твиттере на Эммануила Макрона по той же идее. Выступая перед Европейским парламентом в Страсбурге, канцлер Германии поддержал смелый шаг в европейской оборонной политике как часть речи, в которой подчеркивается необходимость сотрудничества ЕС в области миграции, изменения климата и борьбы с терроризмом. «Время, когда мы могли положиться на других, прошло», - сказала она.

Под сочетание аплодисментов и насмешек членов Европарламента она сказала: «Мы должны взглянуть на видение одного дня создания настоящей, настоящей европейской армии». Канцлер сказала, что идея дополнит НАТО, но не уточнила, когда это произойдет. Амбициозная идея может стать реальностью. Ее слова повторили слова французского президента, который в интервью сказал, что Европе нужно лучше защищаться.



  President Macron, the Visionary European Leader

Macron, an ardent advocate of closer European integration, said a joint European Union military force was needed to wean Europe off American might, not least after Trump announced he was pulling out of a Cold War-era nuclear treaty. "We have to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia and even the United States," he told Europe 1 broadcaster, suggesting for the first time that Europe might need to defend itself from America. The French president, who has enacted major defense spending hikes to bring France in line with NATO spending-targets, is spearheading the creation of a nine-country European rapid reaction force, independent from NATO.

Президент Макрон, дальновидный европейский лидер

 Макрон, горячий сторонник более тесной европейской интеграции, заявил, что для того, чтобы отучить Европу от американской мощи, необходимы совместные вооруженные силы Европейского союза, не в последнюю очередь после того, как Трамп объявил о выходе из ядерного договора эпохи холодной войны. «Мы должны защищать себя в отношении Китая, России и даже Соединенных Штатов», - сказал он телекомпании «Европа 1», впервые предположив, что Европе, возможно, потребуется защитить себя от Америки. Президент Франции, который ввел крупные повышения расходов на оборону, чтобы привести Францию ​​в соответствие с целевыми показателями расходов НАТО, возглавляет создание европейских сил быстрого реагирования из девяти стран, независимых от НАТО.



Belgia, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Luxembourg, France 

President of France: European Army by 2024

Бельгия, Германия, Италия, Нидерланды, Люксембург, Франция

Президент Франции: Европейская армия к 2024 году

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 The Rome Statute

of the International Criminal Court

Article 25 Individual criminal responsibility

The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.

In accordance with this Statute  a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person: 

 (A) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

 (B) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

 (C) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission.

Helmut Kohl

CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY'S UNITY AND THE EURO

Click and PlayHelmut Kohl, the Chancellor who created dialogue and common ground and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Helmut Josef Michael Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and 1992.

Гельмут Коль

Канцлер единства германии и евро

Гельмут Коль, канцлер, создавший диалог и взаимопонимание и объединивший Германию вместе с Михаилом Горбачевым. Гельмут Йозеф Майкл Коль был немецким государственным деятелем, который был канцлером Германии с 1982 по 1998 год и председателем Христианско-демократического союза с 1973 по 1998 год. С 1969 по 1976 год Кол был министром-президентом государства Рейнланд-Пфальц. Коля возглавлял Группу семи в 1985 и 1992 годах.