CLICK HERE ORE RESOURCE CENTER BELOW

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

EUROPE

PETROFILM.COM

EMPATHY  RESPECT  DIGNITY

EUROPE  ЕВРОПА

Helmut Kohl

CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY'S UNITY AND THE EURO

  Click picture Play video

Helmut Kohl was the Chancellor who voted for the Euro, created dialogue and common ground with Russa and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and again in 1992.

ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

PETROFILM.COM

Institute for Empathic Dialogue Creation and Conflict Resolution

Harald Dahle-Sladek

Founder and Editor-in-chief

Основатель и главный редактор

بنیانگذار و مدیرمسئول

創始人兼主編

Want a larger picture? Press Ctrl + scroll wheel.

Хотите большую картинку? Нажмите Ctrl + колесо прокрутки.

想要更大的圖片？按 Ctrl + 滾輪

Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli PhD

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs

Governor of the Central Bank - Ambassador to Tokyo and Ottawa

Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countriers Forum

INTERVIEWED APRIL 2002 IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TEHRAN

THE SUCCESS OF

THE UNITED STATES

IN AFGHANISTAN  ALSO COMES AS THE ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM IRAN

Revolutionary icon Khomeini, Leader Khamenei



A GOLDEN OPORTUNITY

for Washington to better its relations with Teheran

went out of the window!

Seal of the Foreign Ministry Tehran

 CLICK PICTURE PLAY VIDEO

Dr. Adeli explains Iran's view regarding Afghanistand and the U.S.

Dr. Adeli: "Great disappointment!"



This interview was conducted in Dr. Hussein Adeli's office in the Foreign Ministry in Tehran. It was the first of two meetings that Harald Dahle had with Dr. Adeli. The first was in April 2002, and the second meeting was held in May 2003.

During the interview made in April of 2002  it became quite clear to the Editor-in-Chief, that the rejection of the United Sates to appreciate what Iran had done for the country in Afghanistan, neither did not sit well with the upper echelon of the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor was it well received by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs. This would have been a Golden Opportunity for the United States to better the relations with Iran, but in wain. Washington was not ready to hand Tehran a firm handshake.

Dahle: -Tehran has sent an invitation to Washington for a meeting and better the relations between the two sides. I understand that the United States has rejected this initiative. How do you view the current relations with the U.S. after this disappointment?

Adeli: -Well, actually our relations with the West in general has improved a lot during the last, may be four, five years.

Dahle: -Yes.

Adeli: -Specially with the policies that have been followed by President Khatami, Dialogue among Civilization, the Rule of Law, the Principles of Civil Society, the elimination of tensions between Iran or other countries, the elimination of misunderstanding. All of these policies have been seriously followed by Iran in its Foreign Policy and has contributed to the relations with all countries except the United States. And with the West in general we have been able to exchange delegations on the level of Foreign Minister and head of Governments.

Dahle: -Aren't the operations of the United States in Afghanistan very much based on the early assistance from Iran?

Adeli: -But with the United States, it is unfortunately to see, that even developments in Afghanistan, which owes a lot to understanding and effective assistance from Iran, has not, I believe, been able to penetrate into the hearts or the minds of decision makers in the United States.

Dahle: -Without the help from Iran in Afghanistan, you say that the United States would not have been where they are now?

Adeli: -I think that there is no doubt, even in the American eyes, that what we now see in the situation in Afghanistan owes a lot to Iranian assistance, Iranian understanding. The military success of the United States owes a lot to understanding and appreciation from Iran, and also the political process in Afghanistan owes the same thing. 

Adeli: -And may be that was a very unique opportunity for the United Sates to reciprocate these kinds of understanding, and to seize and stop those kinds of policies that are pursued by them, in the past couple of decades. But apparently there is still not a very strong sign from that side.

Dahle: -Iran has friendly relations with many countries in the world, so why not also with the United States?

Adeli: -Off course, the general policy of Iran is to have friendly relations with every country in the world, including the United States, provided that this kind of relationship would be based on an equal footing, on a mutual beneficial sort of relationship. So, this is why I think that, as the policies of the United States, which are normally a unilateral policy, we hope that one time they would join the other countries of the West and developing countries, and would join that kind of understanding of Iran. That the developments in the region would open their eyes, and that they would adopt a new policy towards our country!

Dahle: -Thank you Dr. Adeli.

Explaining Iran’s Nuclear Position:

An Interview With Iranian Ambassador

to the United Nations

Majid Takht Ravanchi

In May 2018, the Trump administration announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimposed U.S. sanctions waived by the deal. One year later, Iran announced it would begin reducing its compliance with the JCPOA in response. This August, the Trump administration sought more stringent sanctions against Iran, and Iran agreed to enable International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to two controversial sites.

As the sanctions debate was unfolding at the United Nations and the IAEA Director General prepared to travel to Tehran, Arms Control Today discussed these and other nuclear issues on August 6 with Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s permanent representative to the UN since April 2019. Prior to that, he served as deputy chief of staff for political affairs in the Iranian Office of the President beginning in 2017, and as deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs from 2013 to 2017. While serving as deputy foreign minister, Ravanchi participated in the multilateral negotiations on the JCPOA.

Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations Majid Takht Ravanchi speaks to the media at UN headquarters in New York in June 2019. (Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Arms Control Today: Iran announced in May 2019 that it would begin reducing compliance with limits imposed by the JCPOA in response to the deal’s failure to deliver on sanctions relief envisioned by the nuclear agreement after the United States. withdrew and re-imposed sanctions. In January 2020, Tehran announced that its nuclear program would no longer be subject to any limits. Does Iran intend to take any additional steps to breach its JCPOA obligations in the next several months? If so, what would be the intended purpose of those moves?

Amb. Majid Takht Ravanchi: The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 in contravention of its obligations under international law because the JCPOA is part of Resolution 2231. It is an annex to the resolution. The resolution has endorsed the JCPOA, and Resolution 2231 was adopted unanimously by the whole Security Council. So that shows that the whole international community was behind Resolution 2231.

The U.S. move was against international law and against the international obligations of the United States. After the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA Iran waited for almost a year to see what the other members of the JCPOA could do in order to give Iran the benefits of the JCPOA. We were told by some members of the JCPOA that Iran would be compensated for the losses that it has received as a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. But unfortunately, after a year we did not receive any tangible benefits from implementing our obligations under the JCPOA. Then at that time in 2019, after a year, we were left with no other option but to reduce our commitments. This is in line with Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, so our action is totally in line with our commitments in the JCPOA.

Regarding whether Iran is going to move further from what we have done, as you know after taking the fifth steps, Iran said it would no longer take any action, and that has been our position since. As far as our future action is concerned, it depends very much on the way that the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are going to be treated. Our actions will be corresponding to whatever happens with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

ACT: Until recently, Iran still benefited from cooperative nuclear projects in the JCPOA. However, in July, U.S. sanctions waivers for several activities required by the JCPOA, including modifications of the Arak reactor, were terminated. What is the status of the Arak conversion project? What are Iran’s plans for the future of the reactor?

Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations Majid Takht Ravanchi speaks to the media at UN headquarters in New York in June 2019. (Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Ravanchi: The U.S. move a few months ago was another act in contravention of U.S. obligations, as they put sanctions on the nuclear cooperation between Iran and other countries. So that is the basis of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. And then they started violating their obligations in May 2018. They just put aside the nuclear cooperation with other countries, and now they put the final nail in the way the JCPOA is being treated. So that shows the real intention of the United States when it really does not want Iran to have advancement in high technology, and that shows that the U.S. is not interested in seeing the Iranian people enjoy the benefits of scientific achievements. As far as the Arak nuclear facility is concerned, we are in talks with our partners, and the talks are ongoing. At the same time, we have said that if we are faced with a situation when Iran cannot advance this part of its nuclear facilities, we will go back to the old design, which was something of our creation. So that is an option for Iran, and we will decide at the right time when to go back to the old design. This is a very good option for Iran.

ACT: In July, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced that Tehran triggered the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) to address what Iran views as a violation of the deal by the France, Germany and the United Kingdom. What specifically does Iran hope to achieve with this move?

Ravanchi: That was not the first time that we initiated the DRM. In fact, since 2016 we have invoked the DRM mechanism on different occasions that the JCPOA was violated. The last time that we invoked the DRM was in response to lack of commitments by the EU partners. So this is a mechanism that every member of the JCPOA can apply, and we have used our rights in accordance with the JCPOA to benefit from the dividends that are supposed to be given to Iran. Our main purpose is to show that we have a complaint and the Joint Commission of the JCPOA has to study this complaint. We have sent our letter to the head of the EU Commission, and we hope that our concerns and our complaints will be taken into account by the Joint Commission.

ACT: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued two reports in 2020 detailing its investigation into past, possible undeclared nuclear activities and materials and its unmet requests to inspect two facilities in Iran. After these reports were issued, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate with the agency’s inquiries. Iran told the agency in June it is “willing to satisfy the agency’s requests” but certain “legal ambiguities” must be addressed first. What are the specific legal ambiguities that Iran wants addressed and how?

U.S. President Donald Trump displays his order reinstating sanctions on Iran after he announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in the Diplomatic Room at the White House on May 8, 2018. (Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Ravanchi: First of all, Iran has continuously cooperated with the IAEA. Just look at the figures the IAEA produces. In 2019 almost 20 percent of all inspections, all over the world, have been done in Iran. That figure shows by itself that Iran is cooperating with the IAEA, so inspectors can go and visit different places in Iran. To say Iran is called to cooperate is not really an interesting argument, because Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. As for those specific places that they wanted to see, we were discussing with IAEA people in Iran, in fact the deputy director-general was in Iran, and we were discussing the issue with him. And our talks were advancing, and all of a sudden we witnessed a move in the IAEA Board of Governors to issue a resolution against Iran. That was very counterproductive because we were about to resolve the issue of the visits.

We have said time and again that the IAEA is a technical body. It should not be politicized, but unfortunately some countries, headed by the United States, are politicizing this organization. We think that the best way to address the problem is to adhere to the technical nature of this body. We are in contact with the IAEA, we are in contact with members of the Board of Governors in Vienna, and we hope that we can resolve this issue.

There are certain principles that we need to adhere to. We cannot rely on fake information or fake intelligence to conduct the business of the IAEA. Information given to the agency by the Israeli regime cannot be relied on because they have been very adamant in providing fake information, particularly with regards to Iran. So that is something that needs to be considered by the agency. If the agency has its own evidence, it has to show its evidence to Iran, not just duplicating what it was given by others.

Another point is that we have already closed the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) file back in 2015. We cannot allow this file to open again because we have already closed that, and the agency has issued a resolution on this. The Board of Governors has already issued a resolution for the closure of PMD. And alleged activities going back to 17 years ago is not something that the Board of Governors should be spending time to issue a resolution on. So these are the politicized activities I was referring to. Therefore, we think that we should continue our talks with the agency and with the members of the Board of Governors so that we can find a solution to the problem.

ACT: As you know, the Trump administration is seeking to extend the UN restrictions on Iran’s conventional arms sale that are set to expire in October per Security Council Resolution 2231 and U.S. officials say they will use the snapback mechanism in that resolution if necessary. A number of countries, including those still party to the JCPOA, oppose U.S. efforts and disagree with the U.S. legal interpretation that it is still entitled to use snapback. How do you expect this debate will play out in the Security Council? How would Iran respond if the Council agrees to extend the arms embargo or if the United States tries and somehow succeeds in snapping back UN sanctions under UNSC 2231?

Ravanchi: First of all, any move by the security Council to impose sanctions, military sanctions against Iran, is illegal, is against Resolution 2231. So, there's no legal room for the adoption of any resolution by the security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. The second issue is that the U.S. attempt is going to fail because the members of the Security Council are not prepared to accept the violation of Resolution 2231. As I said before, 2231 was adopted by consensus, by unanimity, in the Security Council, and that is part of international law. So, members of the Security Council today should be the last ones to adopt something against international law.

U.S. President Donald Trump displays his order reinstating sanctions on Iran after he announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in the Diplomatic Room at the White House on May 8, 2018. (Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

As far as the snap-back is concerned, it is really a very ridiculous proposition to consider the United States as a JCPOA participant because the U.S. is not a member. It has already said that it ceased its participation in the JCPOA, and it said this at the highest level. Just look at the announcement by the White House on May 8, 2018. It says the U.S. has ceased participation in the JCPOA. And high officials in the United States government have said that they are not going to refer to the JCPOA because they are not members of the JCPOA. At times the U.S. officials claimed that JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are two separate documents. While the U.S. has withdrawn from the JCPOA, it still claims to be a member of 2231. Apparently, they have not read resolution 2231. Resolution 2231 endorses the JCPOA, and the JCPOA is an annex to Resolution 2231. We are not talking about two separate documents. We are talking about one document and that is resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231 talks about JCPOA participants. It is not talking about 2231 participants, it talks about JCPOA participants. There are certain rights and certain obligations for JCPOA participants. Because the U.S. has withdrawn from the JCPOA, it cannot be considered a JCPOA participant. So, there is no legal basis for the U.S. claim to be a JCPOA participant. We believe that the United States cannot invoke the relevant provision in 2231 for bringing back the old resolutions. We have said very clearly that if arms embargoes are going to be back against Iran, Iran’s reaction will be harsh. We have different options available to us, and we do not rule out any political options that are available to Iran.

ACT: Iran maintains that it will return to compliance with the JCPOA, if other parties meet their obligations. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has said he would reenter the JCPOA. If Biden is elected, or if the Trump administration were to express interest in rejoining the JCPOA, how quickly could such a return to compliance be accomplished once and if both sides agree to such an approach? Would Iran be open to follow-on talks with Washington and other JCPOA parties regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear program and other issues of mutual concern? What is the range of issues would Iran be willing to discuss in such a scenario?

Ravanchi: First of all, we are not interested to involve ourselves in U.S. domestic politics, so it is for the American people to decide who the next president should be. What is important for Iran, and for other countries, is the respect for international agreements, international law, that should be provided for by the U.S. government. It doesn't matter if it’s a Republican government or a Democratic government in the White House, the U.S. obligations should be respected by all U.S. governments. So, Resolution 2231 is part of international law, and the U.S. government has a legal obligation to observe the provisions of Resolution 2231. If the next administration, whoever that might be, is going to accept Resolution 2231 and implement the provisions of the JCPOA in all honesty, I believe there is room for the United States to join the other members of the JCPOA within the context of the Joint Commission to talk about different issues related to the Iran deal. That is something that we have to wait and see whether the U.S. will take that decision or not.

Another point I also have to emphasize is that Iran has suffered a lot after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. In the last couple of years, we have suffered a lot in terms of losing precious Iranian lives as a result of the U.S. sanctions, even on food and medicine. We have lost a lot in terms of economic issues. So, there is a good argument by Iran to seek compensation from the United States. There are the things that have to be borne in mind when we were talking about future moves by the United States to join the JCPOA again.

Iranian workers stand at the heavy water production plant in Arak when it opened in August 2006. The plant was to provide heavy water for the site's research reactor, which was later modified by the terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. (Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

ACT: The rescheduled 10th review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is planned for early 2021 and many states believe that this is a key opportunity to reaffirm international support for the treaty and the full and timely implementation of its goals and objectives. Will Iran use this opportunity to reaffirm its commitment as an NPT state party to forswear nuclear weapons and to meet its NPT safeguards obligations?

Ravanchi: Iran was the first country back in 1974 to initiate a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iran has also been observing its International obligations based on the NPT, so Iran is in good standing in terms of its respect for international law. We are going to have the opportunity in January 2021 to discuss different aspects of the NPT within the review mechanism. Definitely, Iran and other non-nuclear-weapon states will stress the fact that nuclear-weapon states have not been up to their obligations based on the relevant provision of the NPT.

Another point is in regard to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and free from other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. As you know for the last couple of years, the UN General Assembly has been seized of this matter. Last year we had the first conference on this important issue. But unfortunately, Israel, with a known stockpile of nuclear warheads, has not shown any interest to join the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. I believe the next NPT review conference is also a good opportunity for all member states to call on the Israeli regime to join others in putting all of their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under the supervision of the IAEA.

Iranian workers stand at the heavy water production plant in Arak when it opened in August 2006. The plant was to provide heavy water for the site's research reactor, which was later modified by the terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

ACT: Back to the question of Iran’s approach to the 10th NPT Review Conference, do you plan to use this particular conference—an important one, the 10th review, 50 years after the treaty’s entry into force—to reaffirm Iran’s commitment to the NPT and all of its goals and to Iran’s future safeguards obligations. And on the zone issue, there will also be another meeting on the UN conference in November convened by the secretary-general. What specifically do you believe could and should be achieved at that November meeting and at the NPT review conference in the context of the objective of advancing the discussions toward the zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East?

Ravanchi: On the first question, Iran’s position remains the same that there are certain obligations that nuclear-weapon-states have to honor. And the non-nuclear-weapon states are of the conviction that the nuclear-weapon-states have not observed their obligations. This is an important issue for non-nuclear-weapon states, and that issue will be brought up in the review conference. Regarding the nuclear-weapon-free zone, I believe that while we have a conference dealing specifically with this issue, we are of the opinion that the NPT review conference is also another avenue that should be considered to discuss this important issue because some countries were not eager to participate in or support the conference for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Therefore, in the NPT review conference there is another opportunity for all members to discuss this important issue and try to support the establishment of such a zone and first and foremost to force the Israeli regime to accept joining others to discuss the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

ACT: Is it your expectation that the 10th review conference will still be taking place in January?

Ravanchi: It's too early to predict what exactly will happen in January. It depends on the situation at the time, because nobody can predict what the situation related to the pandemic is in January. If the situation is the same as what we had in March, I believe we can expect another postponement. But I suppose the way things are developing in New York City, I think and hope that the conference will convene as scheduled.



GASPROM

EUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS



 FINLAND

FINLAND AND SWEDEN TO JOIN NATO. RUSSIA COUNTRES WITH PUTTING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN KALININGRAD. IS NATO REALY DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM OR JUST THINKING THAT IT IS?

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force.

REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK 

Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway.

NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers!

A RAND CORPORATION STUDY

Russias's Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO's

NATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERS

In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous.

As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.

THE SUWALKI GAP NATO'S NIGHTMARE

      DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS          A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATO

The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. 

NATO'S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATES

Vladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors.

 After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.

 The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs.

This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.

In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of  Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. .

 Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for  Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words.

 MILITARY GEOGRAPHY  FAVORS RUSSIA

During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict (see Figure 1). The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact.

 They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack.

 The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway (versus crow-flight) distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure.

 The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment.

 Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District (MD)—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.

 German Army

CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS

Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

 The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began.

The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn.

The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals.

 The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours.

 Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field.

Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions.

 Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6.

 Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.

France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements.

The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom.

RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES

 Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000.

Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries.

Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia.

NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics.

On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind (or worse), but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications.

 Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself?

 The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances.

The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga.

 Coupled with the general direction of U.S. defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable.

 The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.

Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylon

NATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY

In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high.

Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above.

Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome.

We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days.

Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga.

What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces.

At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression.

There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.

It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering.

Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units.

This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position.

In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga.

Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced  surface-to-air defenses.

Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign.

This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.

NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.

Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do.

The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.

 Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps.

 THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER

 For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable.

.

Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior.

The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances.

All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones.

For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main.

Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to  the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of  $13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists.

Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than  $13 billion.

The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.

It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security.

Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide.

 The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so.

Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe.

RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.



THE UNITED STATES

DangeroU.S. Polarization!

"We believe that the United States might not be able to control it's internal emotions as a Nation (6.1.21) and therefore risk taking the wrong decitions in foreign politics. This dangerous polarization can have a catastrophic concequence for the people of the world. It happened in Vietnam and with Afghanistan and it can happen again with the Peoples republic of China!"



In the name of Human Dignity.

The Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was an orderly and dignified affair. In sharp contrast to the withdrawal of the United States and NATO forces withdrawal of the same country 31.8.2021 which is a shameful and degrading experience which left thousands of people stranded waiting for their certain execution by the Taliban. Afghanistan became the mountain on which Western logic was pulverized.

Warning lamps Flashing!

And now. Warnings lamps are flashing, as  nuclear powered nations seek to preserve an imagined threshold over an even more imaginary  enemy. The people who brought us complete shame in Afghanistan are the very same people who now have control over the keys to the depots in Europe that store B61-12 thermo nuclear bombs. The collapse of Western logic in Afghanistan is the fuse which can bury Human Dignity.



Dear friends and readers,

The U.S. Federal Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic exposes incompetence and decay. The conse-quences will play out over years to come. The COVID-19 crisis augurs three water-sheds: the end of Europe’s inte-gration project, the end of a united, functional America, and the end of the implicit social compact between the Chinese state and its citizens. As a result, all three powers will em-erge from the pandemic internally weakened, undermining their ability to provide global leadership.

CLICK ON FLAG PLAY ANTHEM

 The Corona Virus is Accelerating America’s Decline!

We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China.

Europe

Start with Europe. As with the 2010-12 eurozone crisis, the bloc’s fault line today runs through Italy. Drained over decades of dynamism and fiscally fragile, it is too big for Europe to save and too big to let fail. During the pandemic, Italians have felt abandoned by their European partners at a moment of existential crisis, creating fertile ground for populist politicians to exploit. The images of Bergamo’s COVID-19 victims being carried in body bags by military convoy to their anonymous, unaccompanied burials, will long remain etched in the Italian collective psyche.

Meanwhile, when addressing how to help pandemic-stricken member states, the European Union’s technocratic, ostrich-like elites lapse into the institutional alphabet soup — ECB, ESM, OMT, MFF and PEPP — that has become their default language. The continent’s leaders have faltered and dithered, from European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde’s apparent gaffe in March — when she said that the ECB was “not here to close spreads” between member states’ borrowing costs — to the bickering over debt mutualization and COVID-19 rescue funds and the reluctant, grudging incrementalism of the latest agreement.

Suppose, as seems likely, that the successful economies of the EU core recover from the crisis while those on the bloc’s periphery falter. No political integration project can survive a narrative featuring a permanent underclass of countries that do not share their neighbors’ prosperity in good times and are left to their own devices when calamity strikes.

The U.S.

The United States’ decline, meanwhile, is over-predicted and under-believed. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, key U.S. institutions signaled decay: the incontinent presidency of Donald Trump, a gerrymandered Congress, a politicized Supreme Court, fractured federalism and captured regulatory institutions (with the U.S. Federal Reserve being an outstanding exception).

Deep down, however, many of those Americans who see the decay reject the thesis of decline. They remain convinced that the country’s thick web of non-state institutions and underlying strengths including its universities, media, entrepreneurial spirit, and technological prowess, as well as the global supremacy of the dollar — provide the resilience America needs to maintain its pre-eminence.

But so far, the world’s richest country has been by far the worst at coping with the pandemic. Although the US has less than 5% of the world’s population, it currently accounts for about 24% of total confirmed COVID-19 deaths and 32% of all cases.

In rapid succession, therefore, America’s credibility and global leadership have been buffeted by imperial overreach (the Iraq war), a rigged economic system (the global financial crisis), political dysfunction (the Trump presidency), and now staggering incompetence in tackling COVID-19. The cumulative blow is devastating, even if it is not yet fatal.

Many of these pathologies in turn stem from the deep and poisonous polarization in US society. Indeed, Trump is now goading his supporters into insurrection. Come November, even the basic democratic criterion of holding free and fair elections could end up being flouted. Of course, it would be alarmist and premature to see America’s far-reaching failures in the face of the COVID-19 crisis as threatening U.S. democracy or nationhood. But clinging adamantly to American exceptionalism at such a time seems like dangerous denialism.

P.R.China

Finally, there is China. Since the time of Deng Xiaoping, the country has thrived on a simple, implicit agreement: citizens remain politically quiescent, accepting curbs on freedom and liberties, and the state — firmly under the control of the Communist Party of China — guarantees order and rising prosperity. But the COVID-19 crisis threatens that grand bargain in two ways.

First, the Chinese authorities’ terrible initial handling of the pandemic, and in particular their catastrophic suppression of the truth about the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, has called the regime’s legitimacy and competence into question. After all, the social contract looks less attractive if the state cannot guarantee citizens’ basic well-being, including life itself. China’s true COVID-19 death toll, which is almost certainly higher than the authorities are admitting, will eventually come to light. So, too, will the stark contrast with the exemplary response to the pandemic by the freer societies of Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Second, the pandemic could lead to an external squeeze on trade, investment, and finance. If the world deglobalizes as a result of COVID-19, other countries will almost certainly look to reduce their reliance on China, thus shrinking the country’s trading opportunities. Similarly, more Chinese companies will be blocked from investing abroad, and not just on security grounds — as India has recently signaled, for example. And China’s Belt and Road Initiative — its laudable effort to boost its soft power by building trade and communications infrastructure from Asia to Europe — is at risk of unraveling as its pandemic-ravaged poorer participants start defaulting on onerous loans.

The COVID-19 crisis will therefore probably hurt China’s long-term economic prospects. Widespread internal rumblings have begun, even if they are less evident externally. Domestic disorder is unlikely, because President Xi Jinping could ratchet up repression even more ruthlessly and effectively than he already has. But the current social contract will seem increasingly Faustian to the average Chinese citizen.

Command of resources is a prerequisite for power. But, as international-relations theory reminds us, projecting power beyond one’s borders requires a modicum of cohesion and solidarity within them. Weak, fractured societies, no matter how rich, cannot wield strategic influence or provide international leadership — nor can societies that cease to remain models worthy of emulation.

We have been living for some time in a G-minus-2 world of poor leadership by the U.S. and China. Both have been providing global public “bads” such as trade wars and erosion of international institutions, instead of public goods such as stability, open markets, and finance. By further weakening the internal cohesion of the world’s leading powers, the COVID-19 crisis threatens to leave the world even more rudderless, unstable, and conflict-prone. The sense of three endings in Europe, America, and China is pregnant with such grim geopolitical possibilities.

中國的法律權利

親愛的朋友和讀者們。 治安是中國的基石。 祖國擁有在其自己的領土後院香港實施法律和秩序的合法權利。 無需徵得任何其他國家的許可。 在西方，這既不是很好理解也不是很受歡迎。 西方天真的從“民主”和“權利”的角度講是政治上的壓迫，是宣傳。 香港是祖國； 只有一個。 美國在製裁世界“每個其他”國家之前，應照顧好自己的人權和黑人公民問題。 祝你有美好的一天，乾杯

China's Legal Rights

Dear friends and readers. Public security is the cornerstone of China. The Motherland has the legal right to enforce law and order in the backyard of Hong Kong in its own territory. No permission from any other country is required. In the West, this is neither well understood nor popular. The naivety of the West is political oppression and propaganda from the perspective of "democracy" and "rights." Hong Kong is the motherland, and there is only one! The United States should take care of its own human rights and black citizen issues before sanctioning "every other" country in the world. Have a nice day, cheers!

FASCISM IN AMERICA

"That which has happened is a warning!"

Karl Jaspers

"To forget it is guilt. It must be continually remembered. It was possible for this to happen. And it remains possible for it to happen again at any minute. Only in knowledge can it be prevented." 

Karl Theodor Jaspers German, Born 23 February 1883, passed away on  26 February 1969, was a German-Swiss psychiatrist and philo-sopher who had a strong influence on modern theology psychiatry, and philosophy. After being trained in and practicing psychiatry, Jaspers turned to philosophical inquiry and attempted to discover an innovative philosophical system. He was often viewed as a major exponent of existentialism in Germany, though he did not accept the label.

The Stealthy Civil War OF

  the United States

 Polarization of the American society has become more evident under president Donald J Trump.

Dear friends and readers!

We have become aware of the violent culture underpinning American politics of today, even though such incidents are usually not acknowledged or reported, but often repressed and denied. The outcome of the first American civil war fought from 1861 to 1865 decided who should be included in the winner’s club and steer the new nation into the future.

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

The second American civil war, which is fought in our own time by stealth, is deciding who shall not be included in the winner’s club. It is against these two contradictory scenarios that many of the violent political deaths that has occurred in the United States speak more clearly to us, stand out in a way we have not realized before and warn us.

Stay vigilant folks. Help fight terrorism, domestic and foreign. Report suspicious incidents to the authorities. Have a blessed day, cheers!

NEVILLE AT CAPITOL HILL

THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF

THE AMERICAN PARTITOCRACY

He came, went, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nent’s narrative, naively showing off a piece of paper which had the support of the parties and his Government. People rejoiced little Adolf's signature. Surrounded by the masses, Prime Minister Chamberlain appeared confident indeed!

A deal was reached on 29 September, and at about 1:30 a.m. on 30 September 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Édouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. On 30 September, upon his return to Britain, Chamberlain delivered his controversial "peace for our time" speech to crowds in London.

With a typical laid-back self-reassuring British flair, the parties had for years argued back and forth weather little Adolf on the other side of the secure Channel was worth taking seriously. And in the meantime, little Adolf released a few tricks himself, he had hidden upon his sleeves; a provocative gesture here, a threat there. Never mind that, the parties said, we have enough Port to ride off that. The dictatorship of the self-reassuring, democratic partitocracy was in swing! The very safety valve which Democracy was dependent on, failed to open. And as a result, thousand of Londoners perished in flames, and all hell brought lose. Neville’s ghost!

He came, stayed, and lost. Gravely misunderstanding his oppo-nents narrative, naively showing off his ball-cap with the inflammatory message, “Make America Great Again”. The masses rejoiced! On the Capitol Hill, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch meant it well; with paper in hand each side proclaimed a moment of victory, futile as it was. Nine days after the Capitol was nearly burned down to the ground, these same representatives of the United States self-proclaimed, dysfunctional Democracy are still debating what to do with little Adolf, who just might have another trick hidden upon his sleeves. We have no guarantee that he has not.

Capitol Hill, the very safety valve which the Democracy of the United States is dependent on has not opened. It imploded. Neville’s shadow again! The German-Swiss psychiatrist and philosopher Karl Jaspers once uttered, “If it has happened once, it can happen again. To forget it guilt.”

In these desperate days, when we failed Democracy, we know for certain that it did happen again! You can’t blame little Adolf. It was the system that failed, Tom and Nancy, Chuck, and Mitch. Every one of them held up a piece of signed paper in their hands. And with it, brought Capitol down. Little Adolf will disappear, and Capitol must be rebuilt from the inside out. Ore, we might all go down in flames!

 01/07/2021 12:00 AM EST

Statement of Acting Attorney General

Jeffrey A. Rosen

“Yesterday, our Nation watched in disbelief as a mob breached the Capitol Building and required federal and local law enforcement to help restore order. The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that those responsible for this attack on our Government and the rule of law face the full consequences of their actions under the law. Our criminal prosecutors have been working throughout the night with special agents and investigators from the U.S. Capitol Police, FBI, ATF, Metropolitan Police Department, and the public to gather the evidence, identify perpetrators, and charge federal crimes where warranted. Some participants in yesterday’s violence will be charged today, and we will continue to methodically assess evidence, charge crimes and make arrests in the coming days and weeks to ensure that those responsible are held accountable under the law.”

Our leaders are not qualified to bring Mankind safely forward

1938 REVISITED?

One mistake, and the world as we know it is gone. One slightest error, and the civilization that we so proudly and arrogantly cling to will dissolve into fine dust encircling our desolated planet.

But, that fact does not seem to bother anyone. Wrapped in hyper-logic exasperations of the most desolated sort, mankind is rapidly drifting towards its own disintegration; proclaimed by rational world leaders as “a sustainable future” with “zero emission”. It is all a lie!

There is no “sustainable future” and “zero emission” is a fantasy product presented, while death and destruction are filling our lungs.

 And I am not referring to the ongoing pandemic. Not at all. That, after all, is a minor incident in the Grand drama. In 1993 I went with the Norwegian-owned buoy-tanker Anna Knutsen from Antwerp in the Netherlands to the Statfjord C buoy on the Norwegian side. We collected 200.000tons of crude and brought it back to Teesside in England. There are twenty and more tankers shuttling up to Norway every month collecting crude. Each of these giants evaporate enough carbon-gas to destroy life in a small town. Multiply that with 2000, because that is the daily gift of poisonous vapor which Norway, in all it’s green, self-proclaimed hype, gives back to mankind. Just a thought.

Here is another one. In 2003 I visited Fushun in North-East China. What’s so interesting about Fushun, you might ask? Fushun is the place of the Ping Ding Massacre. The one that Japan committed towards the local, Chinese population there. But, again, that is a minor incident in the Grand drama. For centuries Fushun’s West Pit has been the largest open-pit coal mine in Asia. It contributed greatly to China’s new prosperity, before it was shut down in 2019.

 We will accept any solution – and I underline “any” – to advance the economy. We will even burn down the Rain Forrest in Brazil. The common longue of renewable oxygen in the world. While lame European Union and the United States watch by and do nothing.

 We are on the edge of an unfathomable deep abyss. From where there is no hope of survival. Just as it was in 1938 in the German Reich. They believed in the cause and failed. We believe in our cause, and we are failing. Again. These days as we are living are the days of 1938 revisited.

Our leaders are not qualified to bring mankind safely forward. Covid-19 has proved that. We are going down on a first-class ticket with no possibility of return.

PAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

CONTINUES BELOW EMPTY SPACE