EUROPE

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EMPATHY  RESPECT  DIGNITY

EUROPE  ЕВРОПА

Helmut Kohl

CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY'S UNITY AND THE EURO

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Helmut Kohl was the Chancellor who voted for the Euro, created dialogue and common ground with Russa and united Germany together with Mikhail Gorbachev. Kohl was a German statesman who served as Chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998 and as the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union from 1973 to 1998. From 1969 to 1976, Kohl was minister president of the state Rhineland-Palatinate. Kohl chaired the Group of Seven in 1985 and again in 1992.

ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION FROM A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

PETROFILM.COM

Institute for Empathic Dialogue Creation and Conflict Resolution

Harald Dahle-Sladek

Founder and Editor-in-chief

Основатель и главный редактор

بنیانگذار و مدیرمسئول

創始人兼主編

Is Norway a Country

the United States can Trust?

By the Editor-iin-chief

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My deep and accurate examination of the European peace movement and its protest against the deployment of the American neutron bomb in Europe between 1977 and 1983 convinced me that high up in the Norwegian bureaucracy were people who were apparently protectors of Western defense interests, but who in reality had a completely different agenda.

It was my view at the time - something I expressed in the newspaper Morgenbladet - that the surveillance did a bad job and to divert attention from this, the same surveillance chose to unfold and enlarge, put the light on and highlight insignificance. I became such an insignificant one eagerly chose to prioritize.

It is still my conviction today - forty-five years after the neutron bomb - that high up in the Norwegian political power structure are individuals who purposefully work for a different and defined agenda. Kongsberg / Toshiba, Norsk Data and Berg support this.

How can one trust an intelligence and a police force that travels land and beach around Europe and on other continents and willingly unfolds their "invisible" and well-preserved working methods, routines, people and materials and behaves like a bunch of spoiled, knowledgeable , naughty, lying and drug addicted teens?

Norway is a haven for extremist, foreign political organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is therefore forced to strike a balance between bilateral issues and the interests of integrated terrorist organizations. Is this what former State Secretary Pål Lønseth in the political section of the Ministry of Justice referred to when he in connection with the revelations of US interception in Europe through PRISM, freshly and freely stated that, "The relationship between Norway and the US is close and good"?

The question is: Is Norway a country the United States can trust? In Washington people have long been sitting and biting nails And they are now becoming very short!

American Woman Who Led ISIS Battalion Pleads Guilty

Allison Fluke-Ekren Admits

to Providing Military Training to Over 100 Women and Young Girls in Syria on Behalf of ISIS and Numerous Other Terrorist Acts

A U.S. citizen pleaded guilty today in the Eastern District of Virginia to organizing and leading an all-female military battalion in Syria on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), a designated foreign terrorist organization.

According to court documents, Allison Fluke-Ekren, aka Allison Ekren, aka Umm Mohammed al-Amriki and aka Umm Mohammed, 42, a former resident of Kansas, traveled overseas and from in or about September 2011 through in or about May 2019, engaged in terrorism-related activities in multiple countries, including Syria, Libya and Iraq. Fluke-Ekren ultimately served as the leader and organizer of an ISIS military battalion, known as the Khatiba Nusaybah, where she trained women on the use of automatic firing AK-47 assault rifles, grenades and suicide belts. Over 100 women and young girls, including as young as 10 or 11-years-old, received military training from Fluke-Ekren in Syria on behalf of ISIS.

In or around 2008, Fluke-Ekren departed the United States and moved to Egypt with her second husband, a now-deceased former member of the terrorist organization Ansar al-Sharia. Fluke-Ekren resided in Egypt until in or around 2011, at which point she moved to Libya. Near the end of 2011, Fluke-Ekren resided with her second husband, among others, in Benghazi, Libya. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attack on the U.S. Special Mission and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Fluke-Ekren’s second husband claimed that he removed at least one box of documents and at least one electronic device from the U.S. compound in Benghazi. He brought the items to the residence where he resided with Fluke-Ekren and others at that time. Fluke-Ekren assisted her second husband with reviewing and summarizing the contents of the stolen U.S. government documents. The stolen documents and electronic device, along with the summaries that Fluke-Ekren helped prepare, were provided to the leadership of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi.

In or around late 2012, Fluke-Ekren, her second husband and others traveled from Libya to Turkey. Shortly thereafter, they traveled from Turkey to Syria. After approximately six weeks, Fluke-Ekren returned to Turkey while her second husband remained in Syria. Fluke-Ekren’s second husband ascended through the ranks of ISIS and ultimately became the “emir” (leader) of ISIS snipers in Syria. In or around mid-2014, Fluke-Ekren and others were smuggled back into Syria. While residing in Syria, Fluke-Ekren told a witness about her desire to conduct an attack in the United States. To conduct the attack, Fluke-Ekren explained that she could go to a shopping mall in the United States, park a vehicle full of explosives in the basement or parking garage level of the structure, and detonate the explosives in the vehicle with a cell phone triggering device. Fluke-Ekren also spoke about learning how to make bombs and explosives. Fluke-Ekren further said that she considered any attack that did not kill a large number of individuals to be a waste of resources. Fluke-Ekren would hear about external attacks taking place in countries outside the United States and would comment that she wished the attack had occurred on U.S. soil instead.

In 2014, ISIS officials sent a female member of ISIS, who traveled from Central America, to Ablah, Syria, where she resided in an adjoining residence to Fluke-Ekren for approximately 18 days. This witness visited Fluke-Ekren at her residence in Syria on multiple occasions. During those visits, Fluke-Ekren discussed ideas for an attack involving the use of explosives on the campus of a U.S.-based college in the Midwest.

In or around 2015, Fluke-Ekren, her second husband, and others moved from Syria to Mosul, Iraq, where they temporarily resided inside an ISIS-controlled compound within the University of Mosul. When Fluke-Ekren arrived in Mosul, she met with ISIS personnel who were in charge of homes for widowed women whose husbands died while fighting for ISIS. Fluke-Ekren assisted the ISIS personnel by providing ideas for how the homes should function and operate.

In or around mid-2016, Fluke-Ekren led and organized an effort to establish a Women’s Center in Raqqa, Syria. Fluke-Ekren obtained authorization from the “Wali”, the ISIS-appointed mayor of Raqqa, in order to establish the center. There, Fluke-Ekren and others provided medical services, educational services about the Islamic State, childcare, and various training to women and young girls. As the center’s leader, Fluke-Ekren also provided and assisted other female ISIS members in providing training to numerous women and young girls on the use of automatic firing AK-47 assault rifles, grenades and explosive suicide belts.

In or around late 2016, the ISIS “Wali” of Raqqa approved the creation of the “Khatiba Nusaybah” – a military battalion to be comprised solely of female ISIS members. The Khatiba Nusaybah began operations on behalf of the terrorist organization in or around February 2017. Fluke-Ekren’s main objective as the leader and organizer of the Khatiba Nusaybah battalion was to teach female ISIS members how to defend themselves against ISIS’s enemies, including helping male fighters defend ISIS-controlled Raqqa. Fluke-Ekren sought to motivate her trainees by explaining how female fighters can ensure the Islamic State is kept alive by “helping ISIS expand and to remain” through the use of weapons, including automatic firing AK-47 assault rifles, grenades, and suicide belts packed with explosives. In addition, witnesses with first-hand knowledge stated that the Khatiba Nusaybah also provided certain members with instruction on physical training ­including martial arts, medical training, VBIED driving courses, ISIS religious classes, and how to pack and prep a “go bag” with rifles and other military supplies.

In 2018, Fluke-Ekren informed another witness that she had instructed an individual in Syria to send a message to one of her family members stating that Fluke-Ekren was dead so that the U.S. government would not attempt to locate her. Fluke-Ekren informed this same witness that it was important to kill the “kuffar” (disbelievers) and die as martyrs on behalf of ISIS in Syria. Fluke-Ekren was located outside the United States since on or about Jan.  8, 2011, until she was transferred in custody to the Eastern District of Virginia on Jan. 28.    

Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, U.S. Attorney Jessica D. Aber for the Eastern District of Virginia and Assistant Director in Charge Steven M. D’Antuono of the FBI’s Washington Field Office made the announcement after U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema accepted the plea.

Fluke-Ekren pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization and is scheduled to be sentenced on Oct. 25. She faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

First Assistant U.S. Attorney Raj Parekh and Assistant U.S. Attorney John Gibbs for the Eastern District of Virginia are prosecuting the case, with assistance from the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section.



RUSSIAN OLIGARCHS

United States Obtains Warrant for Seizure of Two Airplanes of Russian Oligarch Roman Abramovich

Worth Over $400 Million.

Picture by Dailymail.co.uk  The billionaire and Russian model Daria Zhukova.

The United States of America has been authorized to seize a Boeing 787-8 aircraft and a Gulfstream G650ER aircraft owned and controlled by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, pursuant to a seizure warrant from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which found that the airplanes are subject to seizure and forfeiture based on probable cause of violations of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and the recent sanctions issued against Russia.

According to the seizure warrant and affidavit unsealed today:

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued various sanctions against Russia that impose export controls and license requirements to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. These Russia sanctions include expanded prohibitions on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of U.S.-manufactured aircraft and aircraft parts and components to or within Russia without a BIS license, and eliminate the availability of any license exception for aircraft owned or controlled, or under charter or lease, by Russia or a Russian national.

The Boeing and the Gulfstream each were reexported to Russia (i.e., flown from a foreign country to Russia) in violation of the ECRA and regulations issued thereunder, including the recent Russia sanctions. The Boeing was flown to Russia on March 4, 2022 without a BIS license, and is now in the United Arab Emirates. The Gulfstream was flown to Russia on March 12 and 15, 2022 without a BIS license, and remains in Russia. The Boeing and Gulfstream are owned and controlled by Roman Abramovich, a Russia national, through a series of shell companies in Cyprus, Jersey, and the British Virgin Islands.

The Boeing (pictured below), bearing tail number P4-BDL and serial number 37306, is believed to be worth approximately $350 million.

A side profile of the Boeing, bearing tail number P4-BDL and serial number 37306, parked on the ground.

The Gulfstream (pictured below), bearing tail number LX-RAY and serial number 6417, is believed to be worth approximately $60 million.

A side profile of the Gulfstream, believed to be worth approximately $60 million.

Task Force KleptoCapture Director Andrew C. Adams, U.S. Attorney Damian Williams for the Southern District of New York, Special Agent in Charge Michael J. Driscoll of the FBI’s New York Field Office, and Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod of the Department of Commerce made the announcement.

U.S. Attorney Williams praised the outstanding work of the FBI and BIS. In a charging letter that separately issued today, BIS initiated administrative proceedings against Roman Abramovich, seeking penalties of up to twice the value of the Boeing and the Gulfstream.  U.S. Attorney. Williams further thanked the Justice Department’s National Security Division and Office of International Affairs, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and Her Majesty’s Attorney General for the Bailiwick of Jersey for their assistance in this investigation.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Joshua A. Naftalis, Anden Chow, Michael D. Lockard, and Kaylan E. Lasky for the Southern District of New York are investigating the case.

The investigation was coordinated through the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export controls, and economic countermeasures that the United States, along with its foreign allies and partners, has imposed in response to Russia’s unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine.  Announced by the Attorney General on March 2 and run out of the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the task force will continue to leverage all of the Department’s tools and authorities to combat efforts to evade or undermine the collective actions taken by the U.S. government in response to Russian military aggression.



IRAN

FULL INTERVIEW WITH

Mohammad Hussein Adeli PhD.

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Ambassador to Japan 1987-1989

Ambassador to Canada 1995-1999

Ambassador to the United Kingdom 2004-2005

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs

At the age of 36 he was appointed Governor of the Central Bank

 Founder of the Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies.

THE UNITED STATES

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland

Delivers Commencement Address to the Harvard Classes of 2020 and 2021

Cambridge, MA

Sunday, May 29, 2022

Thank you, President Bacow, for this extraordinary honor. And for your kind, but overly generous introduction.

And thank you to my wife, Lynn, Harvard Class of 1982 (Applause), for listening to President Bacow’s introduction without laughing out loud at the overly generous parts.

It truly is an honor to be here today to offer my own “welcome back” to the patient and indomitable Classes of 2020 and 2021.

And it is an honor to be here with your families and loved ones to celebrate with you.

I know it must be a little strange to be back here: not as soon-to-be graduates anxious about the future, but as actual graduates – anxious about the future. (Laughter.)

It does relieve the pressure on me, though, knowing that today I am speaking at your 10-year reunion instead of your graduation. Yes, 2020 through 2021 was a long decade for all of us. (Laughter and Applause.)

And it is a great comfort to see all of you in your robes. You look like little judges. I feel right at home. (Laughter.)

I know that because of the pandemic, your experience was not entirely what you had expected. Life does not always turn out the way you expect. Trust me on that. (Laughter.)

But it is a great honor to recognize the extraordinary resilience you have shown. We are all very, very proud of you.

I also want to acknowledge an additional, impossible kind of resilience that your generation has been asked to weather.

As we gather today to celebrate this milestone in your life, we are also holding onto an enormous amount of grief because of yet another mass shooting at another school in our country.

An unspeakable act of violence has devastated families and an entire community in Uvalde, Texas. I know I speak for all of us here that our hearts are broken.

Before that horrific attack – and before the horrific attack in Laguna Woods and the horrific attack in Buffalo – I had decided I wanted to make this speech about public service. About what each of us owes to each other, and about what we all owe as residents of a democracy.

I still want to talk about public service today because these tragedies only underscore how urgent the call to public service for your generation truly is. And because of a promise I made when I first came to Harvard.

Standing on this stage today would have been a great surprise to the 17-year-old me who first set foot on this campus. In my mind, I am still the scholarship kid whose parents drove him all the way to Cambridge from Illinois in a car bulging with suitcases and excitement.

I had no idea what a Final Club was. (Laughter.) I assumed it was a group of students who got together to study for final exams. (Laughter.)

When I arrived at Harvard, I hoped to become a doctor because I saw it as the best way to help people directly.

I had a pre-med scholarship provided by a company in my hometown, which the University generously supplemented.

But despite many personal tutorials by my roommate and best friend, it eventually became clear that the pre-med prerequisites were not my forte. (Laughter.)

So, I went to my scholarship advisor to say I was switching fields and would have to give up the scholarship. I was sorry I had let him down, I said. Sorry that I did not know how I would be able to continue without the financial support.

And even sorrier that my goal of a career in service had been thwarted.

To my astonishment, he said I could keep the scholarship. There are lots of ways to serve the public, he explained. And you should choose the way that you are best at.

There was only one requirement, he said. I would have to promise to devote some part of my life to public service.

I have tried to keep that promise.

And in doing so, I have also tried to repay a debt that I feel I owe.

Before World War I, this country gave my family a refuge from religious persecution that allowed them to survive the Holocaust when World War II arrived. (Applause.)

My grandmother was one of five children born in what is now Belarus. Four of the siblings tried to come to the United States. Three made it. The fourth was turned back at Ellis Island. And the fifth did not try.

The two who stayed behind died in the Holocaust.

So, for me, public service is a way to repay the debt my family owes to this country for our very lives. (Applause.)

I know that you all worked very hard to get here. So did I. But for different reasons, the fact that we are all here today makes us lucky. So I hope you will make a promise similar to the one that I made: to devote some part of your life to public service.

As my advisor said, there are many ways to serve the public.

Some of you will decide to devote your entire lives to providing service to others.

And on this Memorial Day weekend, I particularly want to recognize those among you who have served, or will be serving, or are serving our country in uniform. We all owe you our gratitude.

I also want to recognize those of you who are preparing already to begin your service in fields as wide ranging as working in government or NGOs, teaching, running for office, and dozens of others.

And to those of you who found chemistry easier than I did, I am in awe. (Laughter.) As we worry about the possibility of future pandemics, we need people to devote their lives to medicine and scientific research. (Applause.)

Fulfilling this promise can also mean devoting parts of your career to service, depending on the other obligations you incur as you go through life.

Or it can mean serving others directly by volunteering to provide one-on-one services to those who need them. And here, I want to give a shoutout to the students at Harvard Law School and other area law schools whom I met with yesterday. You and other students answered my call to provide legal representation for families threatened by eviction during the pandemic. (Applause.) Your work kept those families safe. I am grateful for your service.

Earlier in my career, I spent weeks in Oklahoma City investigating the bombing of a federal building, as the president said. I saw – and I felt – how consequential an outpouring of volunteer services could be. Oklahomans lined up to offer care and comfort to those who were hurting – survivors and first responders, neighbors and strangers alike.

But it should not take a tragedy to prompt us to look for ways, that day in and day out, we can help those who need our help.

And from my personal experience, I can tell you that public service benefits not just those you serve, but you as well. When you are facing life’s unanticipated twists and turns – and I assure you, they will come – it can be a great solace to get outside of yourself. To focus on helping someone else.

So, don’t let your generation be defined by the pandemic. Let it be defined by public service. (Applause.)

There is one particular reason that makes my call to public service especially urgent for your generation. It is an urgency that should move each of you, regardless of the career you choose. It is the urgent need to defend democracy. (Applause.)

Both at home and abroad, we are seeing the many ways in which democracy is under threat.

I want to start with democracy abroad, as I am well aware of the international students in this audience. Harvard has come a long way since my day – when you were counted as geographically diverse if you came from the Midwest. (Laughter.)

When I was graduating from college, there were many things to worry about in the outside world, including the threat of another land war in Europe. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, that threat seemed to recede from the possible to the improbable.

Now that land war is upon us. Russia’s unprovoked and unjust invasion of Ukraine this February has been accompanied by heart-breaking atrocities: murders of civilians, the shelling of hospitals, the bombing of a theater in Mariupol where hundreds had sought shelter, the demolished residential apartment buildings of Bucha and other cities.

There are, and there will be, many lessons to draw from the current conflict.

But if anything can pull us together as a country and as an international community – and make clear the stake we all have in the success of democracy both at home and abroad – this heinous invasion by an authoritarian government is it. (Applause.)

At home, we are also facing threats to democracy – different in kind, but threats, nonetheless.

We see them in efforts to undermine the right to vote.

We see them in the violence and threats of violence that are directed at people because of who they are or how they serve the public.

We saw them when a violent mob stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to prevent the peaceful transfer of power.

First, I want to talk to you about the right to vote.

Shortly before I started high school, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act, thanks to the persistent calls to action of the Civil Rights Movement. That Act gave the Justice Department important tools to protect the cornerstone of our democracy – the right of all eligible citizens to vote.

But while many of you were in high school, the Supreme Court significantly weakened those protections. And while you were in college or graduate school, court decisions weakened them even further.

Following those decisions, there has been a dramatic increase in legislative efforts that make it harder for millions of eligible voters to vote and to elect representatives of their own choice.

Those efforts threaten the foundation of our system of government. And there may be worse to come.

Some have even suggested giving state legislatures the power to set aside the choice of the voters themselves.

That is not the way a representative democracy is supposed to work.

As I said before, when I was sitting where you are sitting today, there were many things to worry about. But it never occurred to me that the right to vote would again be threatened in this country.

At the same time that we are witnessing efforts to undermine the right to vote, we are also witnessing violence and threats of violence that undermine the rule of law upon which our democracy is based. 

We have all seen the violence and threats of violence that have been directed at people solely because of who they are, where they are from, what they look like, whom they love, how they worship, or what they believe.

Just weeks ago, we witnessed the horrific attack that took the lives of 10 Black Americans, and injured three others, in Buffalo, New York. The Justice Department is investigating that act as a hate crime and an act of racially motivated violent extremism. (Applause.)

We have also seen the violence and threats of violence directed against Americans who serve and interact with the public at every level — many of whom make our democracy work every day.

These are our fellow citizens — who administer our elections, ensure our safe travel, treat the sick, teach the children, report the news, represent their constituents, ensure the rule of law, and keep our communities safe.

These threats and acts of violence are permeating so many parts of our national life that they are becoming normalized and routine.

This is deeply dangerous for our democracy.

In a democracy, people vote, argue, and debate – often loudly – in order to achieve the policy outcome they desire.

But the promise of democracy is that people will not employ violence to affect that outcome.

And yet, we saw that promise tested on January 6, 2021.

On that day, as the United States Congress was meeting to certify the vote count of the Electoral College, a large crowd violently forced entry into the Capitol.

We all watched as police officers were punched, dragged, tased, and beaten.

We saw journalists targeted, assaulted, tackled, and harassed.

Members of Congress had to be evacuated.

And proceedings were disrupted for hours — interfering with a fundamental element of American democracy: the peaceful transfer of power from one administration to the next.

Like the threat to voting rights, this kind of direct attack on an American institution is something I never worried about as I was graduating from college. There had been such attacks on foreign capitals in foreign lands. But a storming of the U.S. Capitol itself had not taken place since the War of 1812.

Our country’s institutions – like the Department I lead – are central to the effort to defend our democracy.

The Justice Department was founded for exactly that purpose in the midst of Reconstruction following the Civil War. Its first principal task was to battle with white supremacists – particularly the Ku Klux Klan – who violently sought to prevent Black Americans from exercising their constitutional rights.

Defending democracy remains our urgent charge today.

Today, we are assisting international efforts to identify and hold accountable those responsible for the atrocities in Ukraine.

And we have launched a task force to freeze and seize the assets of those who enable the Russian government to continue its unjust war.

Here at home, we are undertaking one of the largest investigations in our history to hold accountable everyone who was criminally responsible for the January 6 assault on our democracy. (Applause.) We will follow the facts wherever they lead.

We are doing everything within our power to stop the hate crimes that terrorize entire communities.

We will hold accountable those who direct violence and illegal threats of violence against those who serve the public.

And we will continue to use every tool we have left to protect the right to vote. At the same time, we will continue to ask Congress to pass legislation to ensure that every eligible voter can cast a vote that counts. (Applause.)

We will never stop working to fulfill our founding purpose to defend democracy.

But we cannot do this work alone. We need you. The responsibility to preserve democracy, and to maintain faith in its legitimacy, lies with all of us.

And that brings me back to the promise I made here at Harvard many years ago, and to what I am asking of you today – to devote some part of your lives to service.

Those who will spend all or parts of your career in public service can build and rebuild the institutions upon which a functioning democracy depends.

Those of you who will dedicate a part of your lives to community service can stitch back together the fabric of our civil society. You can overcome the polarization that is tearing us apart.

And all of us must take care in the way we treat each other. We must persuade our neighbors and our communities to reject the idea that violence or threats of violence are acceptable. We must work to dissipate the hatred that fuels such violence.

A democracy cannot survive if its citizens forsake the rule of law in favor of violence or threats of violence. We are all in this together. We must protect each other. (Applause.)

Finally, the preservation of democracy requires our willingness to tell the truth. Together, we must ensure that the magnitude of an event like January 6th is not downplayed or understated. The commitment to the peaceful transfer of power must be respected by every American. Our democracy depends upon it. (Applause.)

In an editorial published shortly after his death, the great civil rights leader and Congressman John Lewis recalled an important lesson taught by Dr. Martin Luther King: “Democracy is not a state….It is an act. And each generation must do its part ….” (Applause.)

Now you are that generation.

You are the next generation that must devote part of your lives to public service.

You are the next generation that must devote yourselves to preserving our democracy and helping others protect theirs.

And although what I am asking of you is daunting, I know that you are the next generation that will fulfill the promise this country represents.

I know that our democracy will be stronger by the time it is your turn to pass the baton.

Now go out there and use your hard-earned degrees to make the world a better place. After a raucous – but of course legal – celebration. (Laughter and Applause.)

Congratulations, again, Classes of 2020 and 2021. (Applause.)

Assistant Attorney General for National Security Matthew G. Olsen Delivers Remarks at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence

Tallinn, Estonia, AE

Thursday, June 2, 2022

Good afternoon. I’m Matt Olsen and I am the Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the United States Department of Justice.

I’m very pleased to be here at CyCon. Thank you to Lucas for moderating this panel, to my esteemed fellow panelists, and to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence for hosting this important conference.

This is a crucially important moment for us to gather together, as NATO allies and our partners beyond the alliance. I know for all of us the crisis in Ukraine is front of mind, in particular the inspiring bravery of the Ukrainian people who are fighting to defend their families, their homes, and their democracy.

It is a profound reminder of our shared values and commitments, as we discuss difficult and important legal and policy questions over the course of this conference.

I will begin with a brief background about the U.S. Justice Department and our role in the law enforcement and intelligence communities, focusing on cybersecurity. I will then talk about the cyber threat landscape from our perspective, and how the U.S. is responding.

As many of you know, the Department of Justice is the primary agency responsible for enforcing federal laws in the United States.

There are different parts to the Department of Justice. There is Main Justice in Washington, D.C., where I work, along with the Attorney General and department leadership. We also have 94 United States Attorneys’ Offices throughout the country, which are responsible for prosecuting cases within their districts. DOJ includes our leading investigative agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as well.

Within DOJ, I am the head of the National Security Division. NSD was created in 2006 to lead and integrate DOJ’s core mission of combatting terrorism, espionage, and other threats to U.S. national security.

We play a key role in bridging the federal law enforcement and intelligence communities.

Today, many of our gravest national security threats manifest in cyberspace. The National Security Division is responsible for going after malicious cyber activity by nation-state actors and their proxies. This is an area where we have seen a dramatic increase in the complexity and intensity of threats.

I’ll talk a little bit about what we are seeing in terms of the threat landscape.

It will not come as a surprise to this audience that we see nation-states and their proxies increasingly use cyber-enabled means in ways that threaten our democratic and economic institutions. These include efforts:

    To steal technology, trade secrets and intellectual property,

    To amass personal information about U.S. citizens,

    To exert malign and covert influence over our democratic processes, and

    To hold our critical infrastructure at risk to destructive or disruptive attacks.

We face threats from multiple adversaries, including China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.

Here are just a few examples:

Last year, the government of China engaged in a malicious cyber campaign exploiting vulnerabilities in the Microsoft Exchange Server in order to compromise victims in a massive operation that resulted in significant remediation costs for its mostly private sector victims.

Iranian government actors have interfered with the systems of a broad range of victims in critical infrastructure sectors.

And North Korean actors have robbed cryptocurrency exchanges and central banks alike, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars and evading international sanctions designed to limit their weapons programs.

At DOJ, we’re particularly focused right now on the cyber threat from Russia.

Take the recent cyberattack on satellite internet systems in Europe.

As Russian troops moved into Ukraine during the early hours of February 24, satellite internet connections were suddenly disrupted.

Russia’s cyberattack against the satellite’s ground infrastructure plunged tens of thousands of people in Europe into internet darkness. According to public reports, this hit part of Ukrainian defenses.

A month later, thousands of people in Europe were reportedly still offline, and this includes 2,000 wind turbines in Germany.

In the U.S., the FBI issued a warning that — given the geopolitical situation — satellite communications providers should take steps to increase their cyber defenses.

That’s just one of numerous recent examples. Russia’s Solar Winds attack last year compromised tens of thousands of networks globally, including those of U.S. federal, state, and local governments.

And we are bracing for the possibility of more attacks. The White House recently reiterated the warning of the potential for Russia “to conduct malicious cyber activity against the United States, including as a response to the unprecedented economic costs we’ve imposed on Russia alongside our allies and partners.”

The Department of Justice is working with law enforcement partners and the private sector to prevent and respond to threats. We are determined to hold accountable those who target and attempt to destroy the computer systems that support our critical infrastructure.

Our strategy is to use all the legal tools and authorities we have available.

One of our core authorities is the enforcement of U.S. criminal laws and we continue to aggressively investigate and prosecute individuals for malicious cyber activity.

We do this because it is essential to hold these individuals accountable, and because it is one way we can inform the public about the nature of the threats we face.

In March, we announced charges against four Russian nationals who worked for the Russian government for their involvement in two campaigns targeting critical infrastructure in the energy sector between 2012 and 2018.

One case charges a Russian national and member of a Russian military research institute with a multi-year effort to hack into the industrial control systems of companies overseas and in the United States.  The goal was to physically damage the safety functions of these systems.

In the other case, the US charged three Russian intelligence officers with targeting software and hardware control systems of companies in the energy sector to gain surreptitious and persistent access.

This is the kind of activity that vividly demonstrates the intent and capability of the Russian government — it has global reach and ambition.

So that is one benefit of these indictments. It isn’t the only one. Just because we haven’t arrested anyone to date, doesn’t mean we won’t. We have very long memories at DOJ and the FBI, and we can be patient when necessary.

But we know that prosecutions are only part of what the DOJ can contribute and that we must utilize all our law enforcement tools to disrupt and deter cyber threats.

This is why even where arrest is unlikely, the department prioritizes the disruption of criminal activity that poses a threat to national security through other legal tools like search and seizure.

Recently, DOJ has taken more proactive steps to disrupt nation-state cyber threats before a significant attack or intrusion can occur and using tools beyond traditional criminal charges.

For example, I mentioned earlier the exploitation of the Microsoft Exchange Server zero-day vulnerabilities by a Chinese government hacking group known as Hafnium. That happened in March of last year.

Through the vulnerabilities, Hafnium actors were able to place web shells on mail servers, which allowed for access to the content of the mail servers as well as the ability to place further malicious files.

While private sector mitigation efforts had some success, nearly a month after the vulnerabilities were disclosed, hundreds of web shells remained on certain U.S.-based computers running Microsoft Exchange Server software.

So, in April 2021, the Justice Department obtained authorization from a federal court to conduct an operation to remove Hafnium’s remaining web shells, which could have been used to maintain and escalate persistent, unauthorized access to U.S. networks.

And a few weeks ago, we carried out a significant court-authorized operation to disrupt a global botnet that had infected thousands of computers.

We had identified malware connected to the Russian military intelligence organization, the GRU — malware known as Cyclops Blink.

We then obtained legal authorization to remove the malware from the command-and-control (C2) level infected devices and change their firewall rules to prevent remote access to manage the devices. This prevented the malicious actors from accessing the C2 devices which, in turn, prevented them from managing and using the bot level devices.

This technique did not involve any communications with the bot level devices, although it disrupted the malicious actors’ ability to communicate with them.

This operation is a very good example of how we are leveraging our existing legal authorities in new ways to empower operational activity with real impact.

Those are examples of how we seize criminal instrumentalities as part of our all-tools approach. We also rely on civil forfeiture authorities and targeted sharing of unclassified threat intelligence gathered as a result of our investigations.

We also recognize that law enforcement tools are only one part of a government-wide response. We see a force multiplier effect when we use DOJ’s unique authorities in conjunction with the specific tools of partner agencies – for example, pairing DOJ criminal charges with Treasury Department sanctions.

Similarly, the U.S. government response is most impactful when we coordinate our actions with the private sector and foreign partners to empower technical operations, leverage sanctions and trade remedies, and join in diplomatic efforts with like-minded countries.

Those examples really only scratch the surface of the work of the Justice Department in this space, and I would be happy to talk more about our approach later.

Thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you all. I’m looking forward to hearing from the other panelists and to the rest of the conversation this afternoon.

 Monuments Carved in Stone on Barren Fields

By Harald Dahle-Sladek

When one talks about Life, it is pertinent to ask, what life does one mean? The entire life, or just selected parts of it? The parts that we like and prefer and leave the rest not to be mentioned? The person who says she “loves me”, but ignore everything that I have achieved after I came out of the hospital?

The people who will walk a mile with me, but say “no thank you” to carry my burden and walk another mile? The ones who never invited me for a cup of tea, but proclaim seriously that I am a “friend”? The ones who admire their own achievements highly, but never had time to visit me once? What life are they adhering to? The one in parts, or the one in totality?

Stonehenge: A warning sign for our time.



I want to be seen in totality; I do not want that my life be selectively butchered and twisted into something it is not. My articles are monuments in stone in a barren landscape devoid of humanism. They are there to warn and to encourage, but not to be neglected.

In today’s vain world, where it has become so increasingly popular to talk IN a mobile phone, instead of empathizing WITH and showing human DIGNITY; where one is accustomed to appreciating media hype, political lies, lack  of responsibilities leading to mass starvations and mass death; in such a world and coldness between people, the abnormal has become the trend, and sadly this is what we adhere to.

In such an inter human setting, the message is clear, why bother to respect the other person right in front of ourselves. It is so much easier to babble because the spoken word carries no longer any commitment, it is free, it does not cost anything to say this or the other. Life is easy when one is free not to engage in another person’s life-and-death experiences, when it is so much more convenient to look at a movie.

People who ignore monuments carved out in granite on barren fields are confirming themselves to the believes of death and destruction. We who write and warn have the humanistic right to say this. It is our task in life. Not to be kind to death and destruction, but to admire and encourage Life. We expect the same from others as we expect from ourselves. And if “the other” fail, we must go forward alone, and warn. That is our destiny.

VIDEO CLIK TEXT LINK

Attorney General Merrick B. Garland

Announces Enforcement Actions to Disrupt and Prosecute Russian Criminal Activity

TEXT LINK TO VIDEO

Glencore Entered Guilty Pleas

to Foreign Bribery and Market Manipulation Schemes

Swiss-Based Firm Agrees to Pay Over $1.1 Billion

Glencore International A.G. (Glencore) and Glencore Ltd., both part of a multi-national commodity trading and mining firm headquartered in Switzerland, each pleaded guilty today and agreed to pay over $1.1 billion to resolve the government’s investigations into violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and a commodity price manipulation scheme.

These guilty pleas are part of coordinated resolutions with criminal and civil authorities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil.

“The rule of law requires that there not be one rule for the powerful and another for the powerless; one rule for the rich and another for the poor,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “The Justice Department will continue to bring to bear its resources on these types of cases, no matter the company and no matter the individual.”

The charges in the FCPA matter arise out of a decade-long scheme by Glencore and its subsidiaries to make and conceal corrupt payments and bribes through intermediaries for the benefit of foreign officials across multiple countries. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Glencore has agreed to a criminal fine of more than $428 million and to criminal forfeiture and disgorgement of more than $272 million. Glencore has also agreed to retain an independent compliance monitor for three years. The department has agreed to credit nearly $256 million in payments that Glencore makes to resolve related parallel investigations by other domestic and foreign authorities.

Separately, Glencore Ltd. admitted to engaging in a multi-year scheme to manipulate fuel oil prices at two of the busiest commercial shipping ports in the U.S. As part of the plea agreement, Glencore Ltd. agreed to pay a criminal fine of over $341 million, pay forfeiture of over $144 million, and retain an independent compliance monitor for three years. The department has agreed to credit up to one-half of the criminal fine and forfeiture against penalties Glencore Ltd. pays to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in a related, parallel civil proceeding.

Sentencing has been scheduled in the market manipulation case for June 24, and a control date for sentencing in the FCPA case has been set for Oct. 3.

“Glencore’s guilty pleas demonstrate the Department’s commitment to holding accountable those who profit by manipulating our financial markets and engaging in corrupt schemes around the world,” said Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A. Polite, Jr. of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “In the foreign bribery case, Glencore International A.G. and its subsidiaries bribed corrupt intermediaries and foreign officials in seven countries for over a decade. In the commodity price manipulation scheme, Glencore Ltd. undermined public confidence by creating the false appearance of supply and demand to manipulate oil prices.”

VIDEO LINK

Glencore CEO Glasenberg on the New Commodity Economy

Glencore copper mine.

“The scope of this criminal bribery scheme is staggering,” said U.S. Attorney Damian Williams for the Southern District of New York. “Glencore paid bribes to secure oil contracts. Glencore paid bribes to avoid government audits. Glencore bribed judges to make lawsuits disappear. At bottom, Glencore paid bribes to make money – hundreds of millions of dollars. And it did so with the approval, and even encouragement, of its top executives. The criminal charges filed against Glencore in the Southern District of New York are another step in making clear that no one – not even multinational corporations – is above the law.”

“Glencore’s market price manipulation threatened not just financial harm, but undermined participants’ faith in the commodities markets’ fair and efficient function that we all rely on,” said U.S. Attorney Vanessa Roberts Avery of the District of Connecticut. “This guilty plea, and the substantial financial penalty incurred, is an appropriate consequence for Glencore’s criminal conduct, and we are pleased that Glencore has agreed to cooperate in any ongoing investigations and prosecutions relating to their misconduct, and to strengthen its compliance program company-wide.  I thank both our partners at the U.S. Postal Inspection Service for their hard work and dedication in investigating this sophisticated set of facts and unraveling this scheme, and the Fraud Section, with whom we look forward to continuing our fruitful partnership of prosecuting complex financial and corporate criminal cases.”

“Today’s guilty pleas by Glencore entities show that there is no place for corruption and fraud in international markets,” said Assistant Director Luis Quesada of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division. “Glencore engaged in long-running bribery and price manipulation conspiracies, ultimately costing the company over a billion dollars in fines. The FBI and our law enforcement partners will continue to investigate criminal financial activities and work to restore the public’s trust in the marketplace.”

“The idea of fair and honest trade is at the bedrock of American commerce. It is insult to our shared traditions and values when individuals and corporations use their power, wealth, and influence to stack the deck unfairly in their own favor,” said Chief Postal Inspector Gary Barksdale of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. “The resulting guilty plea by Glencore Limited demonstrates the tenacity of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and its law enforcement partners in holding criminals accountable who try to enrich themselves by undermining the forces of supply and demand.”

The FCPA Case

According to admissions and court documents filed in the Southern District of New York, Glencore, acting through its employees and agents, engaged in a scheme for over a decade to pay more than $100 million to third-party intermediaries, while intending that a significant portion of these payments would be used to pay bribes to officials in Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Brazil, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Between approximately 2007 and 2018, Glencore and its subsidiaries caused approximately $79.6 million in payments to be made to intermediary companies in order to secure improper advantages to obtain and retain business with state-owned and state-controlled entities in the West African countries of Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, and Equatorial Guinea. Glencore concealed the bribe payments by entering into sham consulting agreements, paying inflated invoices, and using intermediary companies to make corrupt payments to foreign officials. For example, in Nigeria, Glencore and Glencore’s U.K. subsidiaries entered into multiple agreements to purchase crude oil and refined petroleum products from Nigeria’s state-owned and state-controlled oil company. Glencore and its subsidiaries engaged two intermediaries to pursue business opportunities and other improper business advantages, including the award of crude oil contracts, while knowing that the intermediaries would make bribe payments to Nigerian government officials to obtain such business. In Nigeria alone, Glencore and its subsidiaries paid more than $52 million to the intermediaries, intending that those funds be used, at least in part, to pay bribes to Nigerian officials.

In the DRC, Glencore admitted that it conspired to and did corruptly offer and pay approximately $27.5 million to third parties, while intending for a portion of the payments to be used as bribes to DRC officials, in order to secure improper business advantages. Glencore also admitted to the bribery of officials in Brazil and Venezuela. In Brazil, the company caused approximately $147,202 to be used, at least in part, as corrupt payments for Brazilian officials. In Venezuela, Glencore admitted to conspiring to secure and securing improper business advantages by paying over $1.2 million to an intermediary company that made corrupt payments for the benefit of a Venezuelan official.

In July 2021, a former senior trader in charge of Glencore’s West Africa desk for the crude oil business pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Under the terms of the plea agreement, which remains subject to court approval, Glencore pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, agreed to a criminal fine of $428,521,173, and agreed to criminal forfeiture and disgorgement in the amount of $272,185,792. Glencore also had charges brought against it by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and reached separate parallel resolutions with the Brazilian Ministério Público Federal (MPF) and the CFTC. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the department has agreed to credit nearly $256 million in payments that the company makes to the CFTC, to the court in the U.K., as well as to authorities in Switzerland, in the event that the company reaches a resolution with Swiss authorities within one year.

The department reached its agreement with Glencore based on a number of factors, including the nature, seriousness, and pervasiveness of the offense conduct, which spanned over a 10-year period, in numerous countries, and involved high-level employees and agents of the company; the company’s failure to voluntarily and timely disclose the conduct to the department; the state of Glencore’s compliance program and the progress of its remediation; the company’s resolutions with other domestic and foreign authorities; and the company’s continued cooperation with the department’s ongoing investigation. Glencore did not receive full credit for cooperation and remediation, because it did not consistently demonstrate a commitment to full cooperation, it was delayed in producing relevant evidence, and it did not timely and appropriately remediate with respect to disciplining certain employees involved in the misconduct. Although Glencore has taken remedial measures, some of the compliance enhancements are new and have not been fully implemented or tested to demonstrate that they would prevent and detect similar misconduct in the future, necessitating the imposition of an independent compliance monitor for a term of three years.

The Commodity Price Manipulation Case

According to admissions and court documents filed in the District of Connecticut, Glencore Ltd. operated a global commodity trading business, which included trading in fuel oil. Between approximately January 2011 and August 2019, Glencore Ltd. employees (including those who worked at Chemoil Corporation, which was majority-owned by Glencore Ltd.’s parent company and then fully-acquired in 2014) conspired to manipulate two benchmark price assessments published by S&P Global Platts (Platts) for fuel oil products, specifically, intermediate fuel oil 380 CST at the Port of Los Angeles (Los Angeles 380 CST Bunker Fuel) and RMG 380 fuel oil at the Port of Houston (U.S. Gulf Coast High-Sulfur Fuel Oil). The Port of Los Angeles is the busiest shipping port in the U.S. by container volume. The Port of Houston is the largest U.S. port on the Gulf Coast and the busiest port in the United States by foreign waterborne tonnage.

As part of the conspiracy, Glencore Ltd. employees sought to unlawfully enrich themselves and Glencore Ltd. itself, by increasing profits and reducing costs on contracts to buy and sell physical fuel oil, as well as certain derivative positions that Glencore Ltd. held. The price terms of the physical contracts and derivative positions were set by reference to daily benchmark price assessments published by Platts — either Los Angeles 380 CST Bunker Fuel or U.S. Gulf Coast High-Sulfur Fuel Oil — on a certain day or days plus or minus a fixed premium. On these pricing days, Glencore Ltd. employees submitted orders to buy and sell (bids and offers) to Platts during the daily trading “window” for the Platts price assessments with the intent to artificially push the price assessment up or down.

For example, if Glencore Ltd. had a contract to buy fuel oil, Glencore Ltd. employees submitted offers during the Platts “window” for the express purpose of pushing down the price assessment and hence the price of the fuel oil that Glencore Ltd. purchased. The bids and offers were not submitted to Platts for any legitimate economic reason by Glencore Ltd. employees, but rather for the purpose of artificially affecting the relevant Platts price assessment so that the benchmark price, and hence the price of fuel oil that Glencore Ltd. bought from, and sold to, another party, did not reflect legitimate forces of supply and demand.

Between approximately September 2012 and August 2016, Glencore Ltd. employees conspired to and did manipulate the price of fuel oil bought from, and sold to, a particular counterparty, Company A, through private, bilateral contracts, by manipulating the Platts price assessment for Los Angeles 380 CST Bunker Fuel. Between approximately January 2014 and February 2016, Glencore Ltd. employees also undertook a “joint venture” with Company A, which involved buying fuel oil from Company A at prices artificially depressed by Glencore Ltd.’s manipulation of the Platts Los Angeles 380 CST Bunker Fuel benchmark. Finally, between approximately January 2011 and August 2019, Glencore Ltd. employees conspired to and did manipulate the price of fuel oil bought and sold through private, bilateral contracts, as well as derivative positions, by manipulating the Platts price assessment for U.S. Gulf Coast High-Sulfur Fuel Oil.

A former Glencore Ltd. senior fuel oil trader, Emilio Jose Heredia Collado, of Lafayette, California, pleaded guilty in March 2021 to one count of conspiracy to engage in commodities price manipulation in connection with his trading activity related to the Platts Los Angeles 380 CST Bunker Fuel price assessment. Heredia’s sentencing is scheduled for June 17, 2022.

Glencore Ltd. pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to engage in commodity price manipulation. Under the terms of Glencore Ltd.’s plea agreement regarding the commodity price manipulation conspiracy, which remains subject to court approval, Glencore Ltd. will pay a criminal fine of $341,221,682 and criminal forfeiture of $144,417,203. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the department will credit over $242 million in payments that the company makes to the CFTC. Glencore Ltd. also agreed to, among other things, continue to cooperate with the department in any ongoing investigations and prosecutions relating to the underlying misconduct, to modify its compliance program where necessary and appropriate, and to retain an independent compliance monitor for a period of three years.

A number of relevant considerations contributed to the department’s plea agreement with Glencore Ltd., including the nature and seriousness of the offense, Glencore Ltd.’s failure to fully and voluntarily self‑disclose the offense conduct to the department, Glencore Ltd.’s cooperation with the department’s investigation, and the state of Glencore Ltd.’s compliance program and the progress of its remediation.

Additionally, the CFTC today announced a separate settlement with Glencore and its affiliated companies in connection with its investigation into FCPA and market manipulation conduct in a related, parallel proceeding. Under the terms of the CFTC resolution, Glencore agreed to pay over $1.1 billion, which includes a civil monetary penalty of over $865 million, as well as disgorgement totaling over $320 million.

The FCPA case is being prosecuted by Trial Attorneys Leila Babaeva and James Mandolfo of the Justice Department’s Fraud Section, Trial Attorney Michael Khoo of the Justice Department’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, and Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael McGinnis and Juliana Murray of the Southern District of New York. The case is being investigated by the FBI.

The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs provided significant assistance in this case. The department also expresses its appreciation for the assistance provided by law enforcement authorities in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Cyprus, and Luxembourg

The commodity price manipulation case is being prosecuted by Deputy Chief Avi Perry and Trial Attorneys Matthew F. Sullivan and John J. Liolos of the Justice Department’s Fraud Section, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jonathan Francis of the District of Connecticut. The case is being investigated by the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

The Fraud Section is responsible for investigating and prosecuting FCPA matters. Additional information about the Justice Department’s FCPA enforcement efforts can be found at www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act.

The Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative is led by a team of dedicated prosecutors in the Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section, in partnership with federal law enforcement agencies, and often with U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, to forfeit the proceeds of foreign official corruption and, where appropriate, to use those recovered assets to benefit the people harmed by these acts of corruption and abuse of office.

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Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli PhD

Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs

Governor of the Central Bank - Ambassador to Tokyo and Ottawa

Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countriers Forum

INTERVIEWED APRIL 2002 IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TEHRAN

THE SUCCESS OF

THE UNITED STATES

IN AFGHANISTAN  ALSO COMES AS THE ACTIVE SUPPORT FROM IRAN

Revolutionary icon Khomeini, Leader Khamenei



A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY

For Washington to better its relations with Tehran

Went out of the window!

Seal of the Foreign Ministry Tehran

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Dr. Adeli explains Iran's view regarding Afghanistand and the U.S.

Dr. Adeli: "Great disappointment!"



This interview was conducted in Dr. Hussein Adeli's office in the Foreign Ministry in Tehran. It was the first of two meetings that Harald Dahle had with Dr. Adeli. The first was in April 2002, and the second meeting was held in May 2003.

During the interview made in April of 2002  it became quite clear to the Editor-in-Chief, that the rejection of the United Sates to appreciate what Iran had done for the country in Afghanistan, neither did not sit well with the upper echelon of the Islamic Republic of Iran, nor was it well received by the Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs. This would have been a Golden Opportunity for the United States to better the relations with Iran, but in wain. Washington was not ready to hand Tehran a firm handshake.

Dahle: -Tehran has sent an invitation to Washington for a meeting and better the relations between the two sides. I understand that the United States has rejected this initiative. How do you view the current relations with the U.S. after this disappointment?

Adeli: -Well, actually our relations with the West in general has improved a lot during the last, may be four, five years.

Dahle: -Yes.

Adeli: -Specially with the policies that have been followed by President Khatami, Dialogue among Civilization, the Rule of Law, the Principles of Civil Society, the elimination of tensions between Iran or other countries, the elimination of misunderstanding. All of these policies have been seriously followed by Iran in its Foreign Policy and has contributed to the relations with all countries except the United States. And with the West in general we have been able to exchange delegations on the level of Foreign Minister and head of Governments.

Dahle: -Aren't the operations of the United States in Afghanistan very much based on the early assistance from Iran?

Adeli: -But with the United States, it is unfortunately to see, that even developments in Afghanistan, which owes a lot to understanding and effective assistance from Iran, has not, I believe, been able to penetrate into the hearts or the minds of decision makers in the United States.

Dahle: -Without the help from Iran in Afghanistan, you say that the United States would not have been where they are now?

Adeli: -I think that there is no doubt, even in the American eyes, that what we now see in the situation in Afghanistan owes a lot to Iranian assistance, Iranian understanding. The military success of the United States owes a lot to understanding and appreciation from Iran, and also the political process in Afghanistan owes the same thing. 

Adeli: -And may be that was a very unique opportunity for the United Sates to reciprocate these kinds of understanding, and to seize and stop those kinds of policies that are pursued by them, in the past couple of decades. But apparently there is still not a very strong sign from that side.

Dahle: -Iran has friendly relations with many countries in the world, so why not also with the United States?

Adeli: -Off course, the general policy of Iran is to have friendly relations with every country in the world, including the United States, provided that this kind of relationship would be based on an equal footing, on a mutual beneficial sort of relationship. So, this is why I think that, as the policies of the United States, which are normally a unilateral policy, we hope that one time they would join the other countries of the West and developing countries, and would join that kind of understanding of Iran. That the developments in the region would open their eyes, and that they would adopt a new policy towards our country!

Dahle: -Thank you Dr. Adeli.

 TEHERAN

The Ravand Institute for Economic

  and International Studies

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Dubbed by the media as the Davos of Iran, Ravand Conference is an international forum, held annually, where Iranian and international officials, corporate and business executives, international organi-zations, NGOs, the media, and academics are invited to participate and interact and to debate on a diversity of political and economic subjects with a view to contributing to the shaping of policies. The conference is also an opportune setting for networking and for meeting potential partners.

Notable people who attended Ravand conference are:

Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Iranian MP and Vice Speaker in

Islamic Consultative Assembly;

Adel Abdul Mahdi, Iraqi Vice President;

Gholam Hossein Nozari, Managing Director, National Iranian Oil Company; 

Mohammadreza Nematzadeh, Deputy Minister of Oil and president of National Iranian Oil Company;

Rosemary Hollis, Director of Research in Royal Institute of

International Affairs, Chatham House;

Ali Shamkhani, Centre for Strategic Defense Research;

Mohammad Nahavandian, Head of National Globalization Center;

Vera de Ladoucette, Senior Vice President in Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA).

Конференция Раванд, названная СМИ Иранским Давосом, является ежегодным международным форумом, на котором иранские и международные официальные лица, руководители корпораций и бизнеса, международные организации, НПО, СМИ и ученые приглашаются для участия, взаимодействия и обсуждения. по разнообразию политических и экономических вопросов с целью содействия формированию политики. Конференция также является подходящей площадкой для нетворкинга и встречи с потенциальными партнерами.

拉萬德會議被媒體稱為伊朗的達沃斯會議，每年舉行一次國際論壇，邀請伊朗和國際官員，企業和商業主管，國際組織，非政府組織，媒體和學者參加，並與他們進行互動和辯論。涉及各種政治和經濟主題，以促進政策制定。這次會議也是建立社交網絡和與潛在合作夥伴會面的契機。

 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY FORUM, IEF

Dr. Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli

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Qatar

GAS EXPORTING COUNTRIES FORUM

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H.E. Hossein Adeli PhD

Secretary General

 2nd International Gas Seminar | 5th GECF Summit Keynote: H.E. Dr. Seyed Mohammed Hossein Adeli 

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Gas and Alternative Fuels: Present and Future Shares and Challenges | H.E. Seyed Hossein Adeli

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H.E. Seyed Hossein Adeli PhD

Crans Montana Forum Brussels 2018

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H.E. Seyed Hossein Adeli PhD

Crans Montana Forum Vienna 2016

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Explaining Iran’s Nuclear Position:

An Interview With Iranian Ambassador

to the United Nations

Majid Takht Ravanchi

In May 2018, the Trump administration announced the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and reimposed U.S. sanctions waived by the deal. One year later, Iran announced it would begin reducing its compliance with the JCPOA in response. This August, the Trump administration sought more stringent sanctions against Iran, and Iran agreed to enable International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to two controversial sites.

As the sanctions debate was unfolding at the United Nations and the IAEA Director General prepared to travel to Tehran, Arms Control Today discussed these and other nuclear issues on August 6 with Majid Takht Ravanchi, Iran’s permanent representative to the UN since April 2019. Prior to that, he served as deputy chief of staff for political affairs in the Iranian Office of the President beginning in 2017, and as deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs from 2013 to 2017. While serving as deputy foreign minister, Ravanchi participated in the multilateral negotiations on the JCPOA.

Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations Majid Takht Ravanchi speaks to the media at UN headquarters in New York in June 2019. (Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Arms Control Today: Iran announced in May 2019 that it would begin reducing compliance with limits imposed by the JCPOA in response to the deal’s failure to deliver on sanctions relief envisioned by the nuclear agreement after the United States. withdrew and re-imposed sanctions. In January 2020, Tehran announced that its nuclear program would no longer be subject to any limits. Does Iran intend to take any additional steps to breach its JCPOA obligations in the next several months? If so, what would be the intended purpose of those moves?

Amb. Majid Takht Ravanchi: The United States withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018 in contravention of its obligations under international law because the JCPOA is part of Resolution 2231. It is an annex to the resolution. The resolution has endorsed the JCPOA, and Resolution 2231 was adopted unanimously by the whole Security Council. So that shows that the whole international community was behind Resolution 2231.

The U.S. move was against international law and against the international obligations of the United States. After the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA Iran waited for almost a year to see what the other members of the JCPOA could do in order to give Iran the benefits of the JCPOA. We were told by some members of the JCPOA that Iran would be compensated for the losses that it has received as a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. But unfortunately, after a year we did not receive any tangible benefits from implementing our obligations under the JCPOA. Then at that time in 2019, after a year, we were left with no other option but to reduce our commitments. This is in line with Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, so our action is totally in line with our commitments in the JCPOA.

Regarding whether Iran is going to move further from what we have done, as you know after taking the fifth steps, Iran said it would no longer take any action, and that has been our position since. As far as our future action is concerned, it depends very much on the way that the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are going to be treated. Our actions will be corresponding to whatever happens with Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA.

ACT: Until recently, Iran still benefited from cooperative nuclear projects in the JCPOA. However, in July, U.S. sanctions waivers for several activities required by the JCPOA, including modifications of the Arak reactor, were terminated. What is the status of the Arak conversion project? What are Iran’s plans for the future of the reactor?

Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations Majid Takht Ravanchi speaks to the media at UN headquarters in New York in June 2019. (Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

Ravanchi: The U.S. move a few months ago was another act in contravention of U.S. obligations, as they put sanctions on the nuclear cooperation between Iran and other countries. So that is the basis of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. And then they started violating their obligations in May 2018. They just put aside the nuclear cooperation with other countries, and now they put the final nail in the way the JCPOA is being treated. So that shows the real intention of the United States when it really does not want Iran to have advancement in high technology, and that shows that the U.S. is not interested in seeing the Iranian people enjoy the benefits of scientific achievements. As far as the Arak nuclear facility is concerned, we are in talks with our partners, and the talks are ongoing. At the same time, we have said that if we are faced with a situation when Iran cannot advance this part of its nuclear facilities, we will go back to the old design, which was something of our creation. So that is an option for Iran, and we will decide at the right time when to go back to the old design. This is a very good option for Iran.

ACT: In July, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif announced that Tehran triggered the JCPOA’s dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) to address what Iran views as a violation of the deal by the France, Germany and the United Kingdom. What specifically does Iran hope to achieve with this move?

Ravanchi: That was not the first time that we initiated the DRM. In fact, since 2016 we have invoked the DRM mechanism on different occasions that the JCPOA was violated. The last time that we invoked the DRM was in response to lack of commitments by the EU partners. So this is a mechanism that every member of the JCPOA can apply, and we have used our rights in accordance with the JCPOA to benefit from the dividends that are supposed to be given to Iran. Our main purpose is to show that we have a complaint and the Joint Commission of the JCPOA has to study this complaint. We have sent our letter to the head of the EU Commission, and we hope that our concerns and our complaints will be taken into account by the Joint Commission.

ACT: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued two reports in 2020 detailing its investigation into past, possible undeclared nuclear activities and materials and its unmet requests to inspect two facilities in Iran. After these reports were issued, the agency’s Board of Governors passed a resolution calling on Iran to cooperate with the agency’s inquiries. Iran told the agency in June it is “willing to satisfy the agency’s requests” but certain “legal ambiguities” must be addressed first. What are the specific legal ambiguities that Iran wants addressed and how?

U.S. President Donald Trump displays his order reinstating sanctions on Iran after he announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in the Diplomatic Room at the White House on May 8, 2018. (Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Ravanchi: First of all, Iran has continuously cooperated with the IAEA. Just look at the figures the IAEA produces. In 2019 almost 20 percent of all inspections, all over the world, have been done in Iran. That figure shows by itself that Iran is cooperating with the IAEA, so inspectors can go and visit different places in Iran. To say Iran is called to cooperate is not really an interesting argument, because Iran is cooperating with the IAEA. As for those specific places that they wanted to see, we were discussing with IAEA people in Iran, in fact the deputy director-general was in Iran, and we were discussing the issue with him. And our talks were advancing, and all of a sudden we witnessed a move in the IAEA Board of Governors to issue a resolution against Iran. That was very counterproductive because we were about to resolve the issue of the visits.

We have said time and again that the IAEA is a technical body. It should not be politicized, but unfortunately some countries, headed by the United States, are politicizing this organization. We think that the best way to address the problem is to adhere to the technical nature of this body. We are in contact with the IAEA, we are in contact with members of the Board of Governors in Vienna, and we hope that we can resolve this issue.

There are certain principles that we need to adhere to. We cannot rely on fake information or fake intelligence to conduct the business of the IAEA. Information given to the agency by the Israeli regime cannot be relied on because they have been very adamant in providing fake information, particularly with regards to Iran. So that is something that needs to be considered by the agency. If the agency has its own evidence, it has to show its evidence to Iran, not just duplicating what it was given by others.

Another point is that we have already closed the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) file back in 2015. We cannot allow this file to open again because we have already closed that, and the agency has issued a resolution on this. The Board of Governors has already issued a resolution for the closure of PMD. And alleged activities going back to 17 years ago is not something that the Board of Governors should be spending time to issue a resolution on. So these are the politicized activities I was referring to. Therefore, we think that we should continue our talks with the agency and with the members of the Board of Governors so that we can find a solution to the problem.

ACT: As you know, the Trump administration is seeking to extend the UN restrictions on Iran’s conventional arms sale that are set to expire in October per Security Council Resolution 2231 and U.S. officials say they will use the snapback mechanism in that resolution if necessary. A number of countries, including those still party to the JCPOA, oppose U.S. efforts and disagree with the U.S. legal interpretation that it is still entitled to use snapback. How do you expect this debate will play out in the Security Council? How would Iran respond if the Council agrees to extend the arms embargo or if the United States tries and somehow succeeds in snapping back UN sanctions under UNSC 2231?

Ravanchi: First of all, any move by the security Council to impose sanctions, military sanctions against Iran, is illegal, is against Resolution 2231. So, there's no legal room for the adoption of any resolution by the security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. The second issue is that the U.S. attempt is going to fail because the members of the Security Council are not prepared to accept the violation of Resolution 2231. As I said before, 2231 was adopted by consensus, by unanimity, in the Security Council, and that is part of international law. So, members of the Security Council today should be the last ones to adopt something against international law.

U.S. President Donald Trump displays his order reinstating sanctions on Iran after he announced his decision to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal in the Diplomatic Room at the White House on May 8, 2018. (Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

As far as the snap-back is concerned, it is really a very ridiculous proposition to consider the United States as a JCPOA participant because the U.S. is not a member. It has already said that it ceased its participation in the JCPOA, and it said this at the highest level. Just look at the announcement by the White House on May 8, 2018. It says the U.S. has ceased participation in the JCPOA. And high officials in the United States government have said that they are not going to refer to the JCPOA because they are not members of the JCPOA. At times the U.S. officials claimed that JCPOA and Resolution 2231 are two separate documents. While the U.S. has withdrawn from the JCPOA, it still claims to be a member of 2231. Apparently, they have not read resolution 2231. Resolution 2231 endorses the JCPOA, and the JCPOA is an annex to Resolution 2231. We are not talking about two separate documents. We are talking about one document and that is resolution 2231.

Resolution 2231 talks about JCPOA participants. It is not talking about 2231 participants, it talks about JCPOA participants. There are certain rights and certain obligations for JCPOA participants. Because the U.S. has withdrawn from the JCPOA, it cannot be considered a JCPOA participant. So, there is no legal basis for the U.S. claim to be a JCPOA participant. We believe that the United States cannot invoke the relevant provision in 2231 for bringing back the old resolutions. We have said very clearly that if arms embargoes are going to be back against Iran, Iran’s reaction will be harsh. We have different options available to us, and we do not rule out any political options that are available to Iran.

ACT: Iran maintains that it will return to compliance with the JCPOA, if other parties meet their obligations. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has said he would reenter the JCPOA. If Biden is elected, or if the Trump administration were to express interest in rejoining the JCPOA, how quickly could such a return to compliance be accomplished once and if both sides agree to such an approach? Would Iran be open to follow-on talks with Washington and other JCPOA parties regarding the future of Iran’s nuclear program and other issues of mutual concern? What is the range of issues would Iran be willing to discuss in such a scenario?

Ravanchi: First of all, we are not interested to involve ourselves in U.S. domestic politics, so it is for the American people to decide who the next president should be. What is important for Iran, and for other countries, is the respect for international agreements, international law, that should be provided for by the U.S. government. It doesn't matter if it’s a Republican government or a Democratic government in the White House, the U.S. obligations should be respected by all U.S. governments. So, Resolution 2231 is part of international law, and the U.S. government has a legal obligation to observe the provisions of Resolution 2231. If the next administration, whoever that might be, is going to accept Resolution 2231 and implement the provisions of the JCPOA in all honesty, I believe there is room for the United States to join the other members of the JCPOA within the context of the Joint Commission to talk about different issues related to the Iran deal. That is something that we have to wait and see whether the U.S. will take that decision or not.

Another point I also have to emphasize is that Iran has suffered a lot after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. In the last couple of years, we have suffered a lot in terms of losing precious Iranian lives as a result of the U.S. sanctions, even on food and medicine. We have lost a lot in terms of economic issues. So, there is a good argument by Iran to seek compensation from the United States. There are the things that have to be borne in mind when we were talking about future moves by the United States to join the JCPOA again.

Iranian workers stand at the heavy water production plant in Arak when it opened in August 2006. The plant was to provide heavy water for the site's research reactor, which was later modified by the terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. (Photo: Atta Kenare/AFP/Getty Images)

ACT: The rescheduled 10th review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is planned for early 2021 and many states believe that this is a key opportunity to reaffirm international support for the treaty and the full and timely implementation of its goals and objectives. Will Iran use this opportunity to reaffirm its commitment as an NPT state party to forswear nuclear weapons and to meet its NPT safeguards obligations?

Ravanchi: Iran was the first country back in 1974 to initiate a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Iran has also been observing its International obligations based on the NPT, so Iran is in good standing in terms of its respect for international law. We are going to have the opportunity in January 2021 to discuss different aspects of the NPT within the review mechanism. Definitely, Iran and other non-nuclear-weapon states will stress the fact that nuclear-weapon states have not been up to their obligations based on the relevant provision of the NPT.

Another point is in regard to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and free from other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. As you know for the last couple of years, the UN General Assembly has been seized of this matter. Last year we had the first conference on this important issue. But unfortunately, Israel, with a known stockpile of nuclear warheads, has not shown any interest to join the effort to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. I believe the next NPT review conference is also a good opportunity for all member states to call on the Israeli regime to join others in putting all of their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under the supervision of the IAEA.

Iranian workers stand at the heavy water production plant in Arak when it opened in August 2006. The plant was to provide heavy water for the site's research reactor, which was later modified by the terms of 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

ACT: Back to the question of Iran’s approach to the 10th NPT Review Conference, do you plan to use this particular conference—an important one, the 10th review, 50 years after the treaty’s entry into force—to reaffirm Iran’s commitment to the NPT and all of its goals and to Iran’s future safeguards obligations. And on the zone issue, there will also be another meeting on the UN conference in November convened by the secretary-general. What specifically do you believe could and should be achieved at that November meeting and at the NPT review conference in the context of the objective of advancing the discussions toward the zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East?

Ravanchi: On the first question, Iran’s position remains the same that there are certain obligations that nuclear-weapon-states have to honor. And the non-nuclear-weapon states are of the conviction that the nuclear-weapon-states have not observed their obligations. This is an important issue for non-nuclear-weapon states, and that issue will be brought up in the review conference. Regarding the nuclear-weapon-free zone, I believe that while we have a conference dealing specifically with this issue, we are of the opinion that the NPT review conference is also another avenue that should be considered to discuss this important issue because some countries were not eager to participate in or support the conference for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Therefore, in the NPT review conference there is another opportunity for all members to discuss this important issue and try to support the establishment of such a zone and first and foremost to force the Israeli regime to accept joining others to discuss the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

ACT: Is it your expectation that the 10th review conference will still be taking place in January?

Ravanchi: It's too early to predict what exactly will happen in January. It depends on the situation at the time, because nobody can predict what the situation related to the pandemic is in January. If the situation is the same as what we had in March, I believe we can expect another postponement. But I suppose the way things are developing in New York City, I think and hope that the conference will convene as scheduled.

GASPROM

EUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN GAS



 FINLAND

FINLAND AND SWEDEN TO JOIN NATO. RUSSIA COUNTRES WITH PUTTING NUCLEAR MISSILES IN KALININGRAD. IS NATO REALY DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM OR JUST THINKING THAT IT IS?

Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor is a fifth-generation, single-seat, twin-engine, all-weather stealth tactical fighter aircraft developed for the United States Air Force.

REINFORCING DETERRENCE ON NATO'S EASTERN FLANK 

Hello friends! The US think-tank RAND with close ties to the military, just completed a very important study with regards to NATO allies defence of the Baltic states Estonia and Latvia. And the result is pretty darn gloomy reading. For my own part I will also ad Norway.

NATO today is not able to defend it's most vulnerable states! Please read the report yourself and make up your own opinion. We must fight ISIS and terrorism in all it's uglyness. Keep your eyes and ears wide open and repport anything suspicious. Cheers!

A RAND CORPORATION STUDY

Russias's Planned Expansion Dwarfs NATO's

NATO CANNOT SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THE TERRITORY OF ITS MOST EXPOSED MEMBERS

In a series of wargames conducted between summer 2014 and spring 2015, the RAND Corporation examined the shape and probable outcome of a near term Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The games’ findings are unambiguous.

As currently postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members. Across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 hours.

THE SUWALKI GAP NATO'S NIGHTMARE

      DEFENDING THE BALTIC REPUBLICS          A STRATEGIC CHALLENGE FOR NATO

The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours. 

NATO'S WAR GAMES ANACONDA 2016: PROTECTION OF THE BALTIC STATES

Vladimir Putin has now attacked neighboring countries three times, with his second invasion of Ukraine still unfolding. His pursuit of greater Russian influence along Moscow’s periphery has ended what was nearly a generation of post–Cold War peace and stability in Europe and revived legitimate fears of Moscow’s intentions among its neighbors.

 After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Like Ukraine, all three spent many years as component republics of the Soviet Union, gaining independence only on its dissolution.

 The three are also contiguous to Russian territory. Also like Ukraine, Estonia and Latvia are home to sizable ethnic Russian populations that have been at best unevenly integrated into the two countries’ postindependence political and social mainstreams and that give Russia a self-justification for meddling in Estonian and Latvian affairs.

This storyline is disturbingly familiar. Unlike Ukraine, the Baltic states are members of NATO, which means that Russian aggression against them would trigger Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty —the collective defense provision according to which an at- tack against any signatory is considered to be an attack against all. This creates an obligation on the part of the United States and its alliance partners to be prepared to come to the assistance of the Baltic states, should Russia seek to actively and violently destabilize or out-and-out attack them.

In a September 2014 speech in the Estonian capital of  Tallinn, President Barack Obama articulated and strongly affirmed that commitment: [W]e will defend our NATO Allies, and that means every Ally. . . . And we will defend the territorial integrity of every single Ally. . . . Because the defense of Tallinn and Riga and Vilnius is just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London. .

 Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. . . . We’ll be here for  Estonia. We will be here for Latvia. We will be here for Lithuania. You lost your inde- pendence once before. With NATO, you will never lose it again.2 Unfortunately, nei- ther the United States nor its NATO allies are currently prepared to back up the Presi- dent’s forceful words.

 MILITARY GEOGRAPHY  FAVORS RUSSIA

During the Cold War, NATO positioned eight Allied corps along the border between West Germany and its Warsaw Pact neighbors to the east. More than 20 allied divisions were stationed to defend that frontier, with many more plan- ned to flow in as reinforcements before and during any conflict (see Figure 1). The borders that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania share with Russia and Belarus are roughly the same length as the one that separated West Germany from the Warsaw Pact.

 They are, however, defended only by the indigenous forces of the three Baltic states, which muster the rough equivalent of a light infantry brigade each. Since Russia’s invasion of Crimea, other NATO countries, including the United States, have rotated forces through the Baltics, but these have typically been in battalion strength or smaller—hardly enough to defend the republics against a plausible Russian attack.

 The distances in the theater also favor Russia. From the border to Tallinn along the main highways is about 200 km; depend- ing on the route, the highway (versus crow-flight) distance to Riga is between about 210 and 275 km. From the Polish border to Riga, on the other hand, is about 325 km as the crow flies; to Tallinn, almost 600 km. And to get anywhere from Poland, NATO forces would have to transit the “Kaliningrad corridor,” a 110- to 150-km-wide stretch of territory between the Russian enclave and Belarus that could be subject to long-range artillery and flank attacks from both sides and would require a commitment of (scarce) NATO forces to secure.

 The terrain in the theater is a mix, with large open areas interspersed with forested regions; lakes; and, in some places, sizeable wetlands. Off-road mobility in parts of all three Baltic countries could be difficult, especially for wheeled vehicles. There is, however, a fairly rob- ust network of roads and highways throughout, and there are few large rivers to serve as natural defensive lines and barriers to move- ment.

 Our analysis sought to account for the effects on movement and combat of this variability in terrain. To be sure, Russia’s army is much smaller than its Soviet predecessor. Today, it can muster for operations in its Western Military District (MD)—the region adjacent to the Baltic states—about 22 battalions, roughly the same number of divi- sions forward deployed in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in 1990. These forces appear more than ade- quate, however, to overwhelm whatever defense the Baltic armies might be able to present.

 German Army

CURRENT NATO POSTURE CANNOT SUPPORT ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS

Despite President Obama’s bold words in Tallinn, a series of RAND wargames clearly indicates that NATO’s current posture is inadequate to defend the Baltic states from a plausible Russian conven- tional attack. The games employed Russian forces from the Western MD and the Kaliningrad oblast—a chunk of sovereign Russian territory that sits on the northeastern border of Pol- and, along the Baltic Sea coast—totaling approx- imately 27 maneuver battalions in a short-warning attack to occupy either Estonia and Latvia or both and present NATO with a rapid fait accompli.

 The strategic goal of the invasion was to demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance, reducing the threat it presents from Moscow’s point of view. The scenario assumed about a week of warning, which en- abled NATO to flow some reinforcements into the Baltics— mainly light infantry units that could be speed- ily air transported, along with airpower. Tables 1–4 list the forces with which both sides were credited at D-Day—when the hostilities began.

The two sides adopted strategies that were generally similar across the games played. The Red players typically made a main effort toward the Latvian capital of Riga, with a secondary attack that quickly secured the predominantly ethnic Russian areas of northeast Estonia, and then proceeded toward Tallinn.

The NATO players, recognizing that they had woefully inadequate forces to mount anything resembling a forward defense, sought instead to use indigenous forces to delay Red’s advance along major axes while positioning the bulk of their forces in and around Tallinn and Riga in an attempt to sustain a minimal lodgment in and around the two capitals.

 The outcome was, bluntly, a disaster for NATO. Across multiple plays of the game, Russian forces eliminated or bypassed all resistance and were at the gates of or actually entering Riga, Tallinn, or both, between 36 and 60 hours.

 Four factors appeared to contribute most substantially to this result. First and obviously, the overall correlation of forces was dramatically in Russia’s favor. Although the two sides’ raw numbers of maneuver battalions—22 for Russia and 12 for NATO —are not badly disprop- ortionate, seven of NATO’s are those of Estonia and Latvia, which are extremely light, lack tactical mobility, and are poorly equipped for fighting against an armored opponent. Indeed, the only armor in the NATO force is the light armor in a single Stryker battalion, which is credited with having deployed from Germany during the crisis buildup prior to the conflict. NATO has no main battle tanks in the field.

Meanwhile, all Russia’s forces are motorized, mechanized, or tank units. Even their eight airborne battalions are equipped with light armored vehicles, unlike their U.S. counterparts. Second, Russia also enjoys an overwhelming advantage in tactical and operational fires. The Russian order of battle includes ten artillery battalions.

 Type Location Qty Maneuver battalions Tank Mechanized infantry Motorized infantry Airborne Naval infantry Total Western MD Western MD Western MD Western MD Kalin- ingrad oblast 4 5 5 8 3 25 Artillery battalions Tube artillery Heavy rocket launcher Medium rocket launcher Total Western MD Western MD Western MD 3 2 5 10 Surface-to-surface missile battalions Iskander short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Tochka very short-range ballistic missile Total Western MD Western MD Kaliningrad oblast 2 2 1 5 Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter battalion 6.

 Each Russian brigade or regiment in the Western MD or Kaliningrad was assumed to be able to produce one deployable battalion tactical group for the attack. This is consistent with the pattern observed in Russian Army operations in Ukraine. The majority of Russian ground forces in Kaliningrad were assumed to be held in reserve for defense of the enclave, and were not available for offensive operations; they are not listed in this table.

France, Poland, Rafale B/C 1, Norway, Stockholm F-16C 1 Canada, Poland CF-18C/D 0.5 Denmark Poland F-16C 1 Total 18.5 a Deployed from Spangdahlem, Germany. Deployed from Aviano Air Base, Italy. We allowed some NATO combat aircraft to be based in Sweden, based on discussions with RAND colleagues who have had informal discussions with Swedish defense officials about scenarios similar to this one. Analytically, this allowed us to explore the possible value of such arrangements.

The relative abundance of bases available in Central and Western Europe, especially relative to the size of the deployed force, makes our results relatively insensitive to this assumption, although Swedish basing proved valuable insofar as it allowed NATO combat aircraft access to the battlespace that largely avoided the concentration of modern air defenses located in Kaliningrad. Deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom. One deployed from Lakenheath Air Base, United Kingdom.

RUSSIAN FAIT ACCOMPLI CONFRONTS NATO WITH UNPALATABLE CHOICES

 Russian forces knocking on the gates of Riga and Tallinn in two or three days would present NATO leaders with a set of highly unattractive options. The leaders and people of the Baltic states, who would need to decide whether to defend their capitals, would confront the first quandary. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high, as the residents of Grozny learned at the hands of the Russian Army in 1999–2000.

Furthermore, these forces likely could not be resupplied or relieved before being over- whelmed. Whether Estonia’s or Latvia’s leaders would choose to turn their biggest cities into battlefields—indeed, whether they should—is, of course, uncertain. The second and larger conundrum would be one for the U.S. President and the leaders of the other 27 NATO countries.

Under the best of circumstances, this would require a fairly prolonged buildup that could stress the cohesion of the alliance and allow Russia opportunities to seek a political reso- lution that left it in possession of its conquests. Even a successful counteroffensive would almost certainly be bloody and costly and would have political consequences that are unforeseeable in advance but could prove dramatic. Any counteroffensive would also be fraught with severe escalatory risks. If the Crimea experience can be taken as a precedent, Moscow could move rapidly to formally annex the occupied territories to Russia.

NATO clearly would not recognize the legitimacy of such a gambit, but from Russia’s per- spective it would at least nominally bring them under Moscow’s nuclear umbrella. By turning a NATO counterattack aimed at liberating the Baltic republics into an “invasion” of “Russia,” Moscow could generate unpredictable but clearly dangerous escalatory dynamics.

On a tactical level, a counteroffensive campaign into the Baltics would likely entail the desire, and perhaps even the necessity, of striking targets, such as long-range surface-to-air defenses and surface-to-surface fires systems, in territory that even NATO would agree constitutes “Russia.” Under Russian doctrine, it is unclear what kinds or magnitudes of conventional attacks into Russian territory might trigger a response in kind (or worse), but there would certainly be concern in Washington and other NATO capitals about possible escalatory implications.

 Finally, it is also unclear how Russia would react to a successful NATO counteroffensive that threatened to decimate the bulk of its armed forces along its western frontier; at what point would tactical defeat in the theater begin to appear like a strategic threat to Russia herself?

 The second option would be for NATO to turn the escalatory tables, taking a page from its Cold War doctrine of “massive retaliation,” and threaten Moscow with a nuclear response if it did not withdraw from the territory it had occupied. This option was a core element of the Alliance’s strategy against the Warsaw Pact for the duration of the latter’s existence and could certainly be called on once again in these circumstances.

The deterrent impact of such a threat draws power from the implicit risk of igniting an escalatory spiral that swiftly reaches the level of nuclear exchanges between the Russian and U.S. homelands. Unfortunately, once deterrence has failed—which would clearly be the case once Russia had crossed the Rubicon of attacking NATO member states—that same risk would tend to greatly undermine its credibility, since it may seem highly unlikely to Moscow that the United States would be willing to exchange New York for Riga.

 Coupled with the general direction of U.S. defense policy, which has been to de-emphasize the value of nuclear weapons, and the likely unwillingness of NATO’s European members, especially the Baltic states themselves, to see their continent or countries turned into a nuclear battlefield, this lack of believability makes this alternative both unlikely and unpal- atable.

 The third possibility would be to concede, at least for the near to medium term, Russian control of the territory they had occupied. Under this scenario, the best outcome would likely be a new cold war, with the 21st century’s version of the old “inner German border” drawn somewhere across Lithuania or Latvia. The worst be would be the collapse of NATO itself and the crumbling of the cornerstone of Western security for almost 70 years.

Cruice missiles attached to a B52 pylon

NATO NEEDS HEAVY FORCES TO DENY RUSSIA A QUICK VICTORY

In addition to assessing the viability of NATO’s current posture, our games explored enhancement options for creating a force that could deny Russia a swift victory in the first three days. Quality light forces, like the U.S. airborne infantry that the NATO players typically deployed into Riga and Tallinn, can put up stout resistance when dug into urban terrain. But the cost of mounting such a defense to the city and its residents is typically very high.

Avoiding the fait accompli is valuable because it begins to present Russia with the risk of a conventional defeat and thereby is at least the beginning of a more credible deterrent. On the one hand, Russia today looks to its northwest and sees little between its forces and the Baltic Sea but highway and the prospect of forcing NATO into the three-sided corner described above.

Our goal was to devise a posture that would present an alternative landscape: one of a serious war with NATO, with all the dangers and uncertainties such an undertaking would entail, including the likelihood of ultimate defeat at the hands of an alliance that is mater- ially far wealthier and more powerful than Russia. Nations can be tempted or can talk themselves into wars that they believe will be quick, cheap, victories that are “over by Christmas” but, historically, are far less likely to choose to embark on conflicts that they expect to be protracted, costly, and of uncertain outcome.

We set out to identify at least one plausible NATO posture that would change Moscow’s calculus in this scenario from the former to the latter. Our results strongly suggest that a posture that could credibly deny the fait accompli can be achieved without fielding anything like the eight corps that defended NATO’s Cold War border with the Warsaw Pact. A total force of six or seven brigades, including at least three heavy brigades, backed by NATO’s superior air and naval power and supported by adequate artillery, air defenses, and logistics capabilities, on the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities appears able to avoid losing the war within the first few days.

Not all these forces would need to be forward stationed. Given even a week of warning, NATO should be able to deploy several brigades of light infantry to the Baltics. Soldiers from the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team in Italy and the 82nd Airborne Division in North Carolina could be airlifted in within a few days, as could similar units from other NATO countries, including the United Kingdom and France. U.S. Army combat aviation assets rotationally based in Germany could self-deploy to provide some mobile antiarmor firepower, but by and large, these fast-arriving forces would be best suited to digging in to defend urban areas. In our games, the NATO players almost universally chose to employ them in that way in and immediately around Tallinn and Riga.

What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to more frequent and more-effective attacks from air and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks. Coming from the United States, such units would take, at best, several weeks to arrive, and the U.S. Army currently has no heavy armor stationed in Europe. America’s European allies have minimal combat-ready heavy forces.

At the height of the Cold War, West Germany fielded three active corps of armored and mechanized units; today, its fleet of main battle tanks has shrunk from more than 2,200 to around 250. The United Kingdom is planning on removing all its permanently stationed forces from Germany by 2019; currently, only one British brigade headquarters, that of the 20th Armoured Infantry, remains in continental Europe, and the British government is committed to its withdrawal as a cost-saving measure. The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days.

Providing adequate heavy armor early enough to make a difference is the biggest challenge to NATO’s ability to prevent a rapid Russian overrun of Estonia and Latvia. It is critical to emphasize that this relatively modest force is not sufficient to mount a forward defense of the Baltic states or to sustain a defense indefinitely. It is intended to keep NATO from losing the war early, enabling but not itself achieving the Alliance’s ultimate objectives of restoring the territorial integrity and political independence of its members. But it should eliminate the possibility of a quick Russian coup de main against the Baltic states, enhancing deter- rence of overt, opportunistic aggression.

There are several options for posturing the necessary heavy forces, each carrying different combinations of economic costs and political and military risks. For example, NATO could permanently station fully manned and equipped brigades forward in the Baltic states; could preposition the equipment in the Baltics, Poland, or Germany and plan to fly in the soldiers in the early stages of a crisis; could rely on rotational presence; or could employ some combination of these approaches. The next phase of our analysis will explore a range of these options to begin assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses.

It is unclear whether denial of the prospect for a rapid victory would suffice to deter Russia from gambling on an attack on the “Baltic three,” were it inclined to contemplate one. What seems certain is that NATO’s current posture, which appears to offer Moscow the opportunity for a quick and relatively cheap win, does not. It is also important to point out that, critical though they are, maneuver brigades are insufficient in and of themselves. Armor and infantry battalions must be adequately supported with artillery, air defense, logistics, and engineering.

Over the past 15 years, the Army has reduced the amount of artillery organic to its divisions and has essentially stripped out all air defense artillery from its maneuver forces. Further, there are presently no fires brigades in Europe able to augment the modest number of guns at the brigade and battalion level. This is in marked contrast to Russian tables of organization and equipment, which continue to feature substantial organic fires and air defense artillery, as well as numerous independent tube and rocket artillery and surface-to-air missile units.

This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position.

In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to re- treat to avoid the same fate. The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counter- attack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga.

Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superi- ority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers.

The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counter- attack. This highlights a critical finding from our analysis: A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

The games have repeatedly identified the necessity for allied ground forces to maneuver within the envelope of friendly air cover and air support and for ground fires to play an integral role in the suppression campaign against Russia’s advanced  surface-to-air defenses.

Against an adversary, such as Russia, that poses multidimensional threats, airpower must be employed from the outset of hostilities to enable land operations, and land power must be leveraged to enable airpower. Preventing a quick Russian victory in the Baltics would also require a NATO command structure able to plan and execute a complex, fast-moving, highly fluid air-land campaign.

This is not something that can safely be left to a pickup team to “do on the day”; it requires careful preparation. What cannot get there in time are the kinds of armored forces required to engage their Russian counterparts on equal terms, delay their advance, expose them to morefrequent and more-effective attacks from air- and land-based fires, and subject them to spoiling counterattacks.

NATO corps that defended the inner German border during the Cold War each possessedadmittedly to different degrees in some cases, the ability to plan for and fight the forces they would command in wartime. Tactical and operational schemes of maneuver were developed and rehearsed; logistics support was planned; the reception, staging, and onward integration of reinforcing forces were laid out and, if never practiced in full, tested to an extent that lent confidence that procedures would work reasonably well when called upon.

Traditionally, the level of planning called for in the initial phase of the defense has been the province of a U.S. corps. At the height of the Cold War, two Army corps under the operational command of 7th Army had planning responsibilities for Europe; today, none do.

The Army should consider standing up a corps headquarters in Europe to take responsibility for the operational and support planning needed to prepare for and execute this complex combined arms campaign, as well as a division headquarters to orchestrate the initial tac- tical fight, to be joined by others as forces flow into Europe.

 Follow-on operations to rel- ieve and reinforce the initial defense and restore the prewar borders could well require at least one additional corps headquarters, which could be provided by a NATO partner or drawn from one of the Alliance’s nine preexisting corps.

 THE PRICE OF DETERRING DISASTER

 For more than 40 years, NATO’s member states made enormous investments to deter a potential Soviet attack on Western Europe. Today, the West confronts a Russia that has violently disrupted the post–Cold War European security order. Led by a man who has characterized the fall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, Russia has at the very least put on hold the vision of a “Europe whole and free.” To the extent that Moscow believes that NATO poses a threat to its ability to exercise necessary influence along its periphery, the presence of the Baltic NATO members along its borders may well seem unacceptable.

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Since the early 1990s, the United States and its NATO partners have shaped their forces based on the belief that Europe had become an exporter of security, and for more than two decades that assumption held true. Unfortunately, the usually unspoken accompanying assumption—that the West would see any disruption to that status quo coming far enough in advance to reposture itself to meet any challenge that might emerge—appears to have missed the mark. Instead, Russia’s aggressiveness and hostility have caught NATO still resetting itself in a direction that is making it less prepared to deal with Moscow’s behavior.

The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so. While some ongoing actions may be too far advanced to stop, the United Kingdom and the United States should evaluate whether additional withdrawals of forces from Germany are wise, given the changed circumstances.

All members should reassess their force structures and postures with an eye toward deter- mining whether there are affordable near-term actions that can be taken that could in- crease the Alliance’s capability to respond to a threat to the Baltics and thereby strengthen deterrence of such a threat. These measures need not be limited to strictly military ones.

For example, one challenge NATO would face in the event of a Baltic crisis would be moving heavy equipment and supplies from storehouses and ports in Western Europe east to Pol- and and beyond. A successful defense of the Baltics will call for a degree of air-ground synergy whose intimacy and sophistication recalls the U.S. Army–U.S. Air Force “AirLand Battle” doctrine of the 1980s.

Substantial investments may be necessary to facilitate these flows, investments that becau- se they also benefit the civilian economy— may prove more politically palatable than direct expenditures on troops and weapons. But troops and weapons are also needed, and it verg- es on disingenuous for a group of nations as wealthy as NATO to plead poverty as an excuse for not making the marginal investments necessary to field a force adequate at the very least to prevent the disaster of a Russian coup de main.

Buying three brand-new ABCTs and adding them to  the U.S. Army would not be inexpen- sive—the up-front costs for all the equipment for the brigades and associated artillery, air defense, and other enabling units runs on the order of  $13 billion. However, much of that gear—especially the expensive Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles—already exists.

Some is available due to recent cuts in Army force structure; there is also equipment in long-term storage, and some could be transferred from Reserve Component units, if needed. So, although there may be some costs to procure, upgrade, or make serviceable existing equipment—as well as to transition units from one type to another—it is likely much less than  $13 billion.

The annual operating and support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are roughly $2.7 billion.23 That is not a small number, but seen in the context of an Alliance with an aggregate gross domestic product of more than $35 trillion and combined yearly defense spending of more than $1 trillion, it is hard to say that it is a fortiori unaffordable,24 especially in comparison to the potential costs of failing to defend NATO’s most exposed and vulnerable allies—of potentially inviting a devastating war, rather than deterring it.

It can be hoped that Russia’s double aggression against Ukraine is the result of a unique confluence of circumstances and that it does not portend a more generally threatening approach to the West. However, President Putin clearly appears to distrust NATO and harbor resentments toward it. His rhetoric suggests that he sees the Alliance’s presence on Russia’s borders as something approaching a clear and present danger to his nation’s security.

Aggressive acts, angry—even paranoid— rhetoric, and a moderate but real military buildup combine to signal a situation where it may be less than prudent to allow hope to substitute for strategy. Taking measured steps to bolster NATO’s defensive posture in the Baltic states is not committing the United States and Europe to a new Cold War and does not signal irreversible hostility toward Russia. It is instead due diligence that sends a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all U.S. allies and partners worldwide.

 The first step to restoring a more-robust deterrent is probably to stop chipping away at the one that exists. If NATO wishes to position itself to honor its collective security commitment to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, its members should first hit the pause button on further steps that reduce its ability to do so.

Methodology and Data: The research documented in this report was conducted in a series of wargames conducted between the summer of 2014 and early spring 2015. Players included RAND analysts and both uniformed and civilian members of various Department of Defense organizations, including the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, Joint Staff, U.S. Army in Europe, and U.S. Air Forces, Europe, as well as NATO Naval Command, Europe.

RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.