U.S. SPACE FENCE

Lockheed Martin, AMEC Foster Wheeler, General Dynamics, SATCOM, Northrop Grumman

 In the 1960'ies, '70ies and ''80ies there was something called "Early Warning" which should give us some time to calculate a proper response. Not anymore! Today we have "instant-detection-send-and-response" phased array-radars. They give us an even better and more accurate situation report. What took minutes before, take seconds and fraction of a second today?  U.S. Space Fence is protecting our freedom in a much more reliable and sophistical way than before, and the best part it's here to stay! We thank the United States of America! Remain alert folks, and keep your eyes and ears open! Fight terrorism, domestic and foreign - at least in your spirit.

Globus III Vardo Norway

Eglin AFB

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Harris Corporation - AN/FPS-85 Radar Cover Replacement Time Lapse, Eglin Air Force Base

INSTANT RESPONSE RADARS  

Globus III, Eglin FPS-85, Cobra Dane, Kwajalein Altair &  Millstone Hill are just five of the most valuable sensors today.

US Ohio Class submarine at Kings Bay Georgia

Russia

PLESETSK COSMODROME

Plesetsk is used especially for military satellites placed into high inclination and polar orbits since the range for falling debris is clear to the north which is largely uninhabited Arctic and polar terrain. It is situated in a region of taiga, or flat terrain with boreal pine forests.

Coat of Arms Archangelsk

On October 26, 2017 Russia conducted its annual strategic forces exercise. The exercise invol-ved a launch of a Topol/SS-25 ICBM from Plesetsk. The warhead is said to successfully reach its target at Kura.

            BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCH               from Plesetsk in Arkhangelsk region Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense

CLIC PICTURE AND PLAY

The exercise involved a launch of a Topol/SS-25 ICBM from Plesetsk. The warhead is said to successfully reach its target at Kura. Below Plesets Cosmodrome.

Coat of Arms Palana Kamchatka

Greater Coat of Arms of Alaska

COBRA DANE, SHEMYA ISLAND

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The Cobra Dane Phased Array Radar on Shemya Island

Shemya Island about 2,414 kilometers from Anchorage, Alaska, and is part of the Near Islands group at the tip of the Aleutian Island chain. Shemya Island occupies approximately 1,425 hectares and is part of the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and is operated by the U.S. Air Force. A person who worked there says,

"I did my overseas deployment on Shemya from January 1963 to January 1964. It was a very unusual place. It is the only place I have ever heard of where one can experience heavy fog, tremendous winds, and snow, sleet, or rain all at once. We once endured a storm where the wind speed was measured at 105 mph when the anemometer blew away."

He continues with his story,

"The work we did was fascinating. I would not have traded my experience there for anything, although I did not appreciate it nearly as much then as I do now. The Army, Air Force, and Navy people working on Shemya can be justifiably proud of what they contributed to our winning the Cold War." 

Electrical equipment in the subarray face of the Cobra Dane radar system

The computer room for the Cobra Dane radar system during the Cold war.

Shemya Island has been developed by the military and continues to operate as an Intelligence Radar site whose principal purpose involves monitoring space and mis-sile activities. The base is under control of the Eareckson Air Station Program Man-agement Office, part of the 611th Air Support Group at Elmendorf Air Force Base Alalska. Eareckson Air Station is an isolated self-contained military installation, and it has no surrounding communities. 

DEFENDING OUR FREEDOM

COBRA DANE RADAR COVERAGE

Eareckson Air Station, Shemya Island

The Cobra Dane Phased Array Radar on Eareckson Air Station Shemya Island

Eareckson Air Station is a United States Air Force military airport located on the island of Shemya, in the Alaskan Aleutian Islands. Established in May of 1943 as a forward operating base for long-range bomber aircraft of the US Army Air Force to conduct bombing missions on Japanese positions in the Kurile Islands, the base was heavily utilized until war's end, with the present-day runway being added to the airfield to sup-port the operations a planned squadron of B-29 Superfortresses flying missions ag-ainst mainland Japan as part of Operation Downfall. 

"From its establishment in early 2002 through the end of 2010, the Missile Defense Agency is fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System consisting of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors for long-range homeland defense. Aegis warships capable of long-range surveillance and tracking and missile intercepts. Standard Missile-3 interceptors for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense warships. Upgraded Cobra Dane radar in the Aleutian Islands."

Upgraded early warning radars, currently Beale Air Force Base, Calif., Fylingdales, U.K., and Thule, Green-land. 11 transportable X-band radars for operations and testing. Sea-based X-band radar now located in the Pacific Ocean to support flight testing and actual defensive operations. Integrated Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications element across the BMDS.

COBRA DANE

The certain principal use of this X-band radar, along with a second one for Eareckson Air Station on Shemya Island, some 2414Km southwest of An-chorage, will be to collect detailed intelligence data on Russia¹s long-range ballistic missiles. This data will cover the entire trajectory of the missiles, and will be of primal value to a U.S. NMD system.

THE COBRA DANE PHASED ARRAY RADAR ON SHEMYA ISLAND

The 21st Operations Group was reactivated on 15 May 1992 as a component of the redesig-nated and reactivated 21st Space Wing, providing command management of Air Force Space Command's worldwide network of assigned missile warning, space surveillance, and communications units.

The 21st Operations Group assumed the Cobra Dane Radar mission at Eareckson Air Station, Shemya Island, Alaska, April 1. Eareckson AS is located on the western tip of Alaska's Aleutian islands. The radar has the ability to detect objects about 2,000 miles away, and provides data for the Space Surveillance Network and the Ballistic Missile Defense System. Cobra Dane will continue to be operated by a contract workforce, and no military personnel will be assigned to the unit at Eareckson Air Station.

Full cover of Russian missile testing

Cobra Dane security patrol

Norway

 Traveling in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region

 Along the Norwegian coast from Bergen via Nordkapp to Kirkenes and back, 12 days.

Seal of the arctic city of Tromsø, Norway

Travel log by Harald Dahle

The region in question here is called the Barents Euro-Arctic Region. This northern-most region sweeps through Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia with its northern borders pointed directly towards the humongous Barents Sea.

The region is the arctic part of the European Mainland Continent where it suddenly drops down in the ocean and disappears. This abrupt ending of mainland Europe into the ice cold and deep Barents Sea, is a dramatic confirmation of the geological processes that once have taken place here, and a stern reminder to us uber civilized souls that all things must come to an end.

The Barents Euro-Arctic Region comprises the countries Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia

Suddenly, and with no warning, Europe as we know it, is finished! Experiencing this first hand oneself will make a considerable psychological impact on the traveler, daring to approach this “ghostly” area. Particularly during the winter months between November, December and January. Why travel in the winter? I did the round trip on board the coastal ferry "Richard With",from December 23 to January 6 in 1993. And as such I claim to have “hands-on” winter experience.

The Polar Circle is located between the two stops Nesna in the south and Ørnes further north. Traveling in the winter is a traveling in the gray scale of light. Up at Honningsvåg, I remember the sun as “fragile streams of soft light bouncing through layers of woolen clouds". At an angle of 12-15 degrees, bearing West-North-East – lasting three hours maximum, before gray turned to pitch-black darkness again.

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  Watch: "Hunting the Northern Lights in Norway!"

The majestic coastal ferry, "MS Richard With" plowing through the sea at full speed ahead!

 And to be there and to experience it, is "to be on the Moon" – Gone are the modern metropolises in shining glass, towering concrete and beaming lights of all kinds, from all directions at the same time. Here, up north at the very edge of civilization, nature speaks directly to you - and you listen carefully! And so it goes. From one stop northwards to the next stop. Snow falling, ship maneuvering slowly through sometimes shallow straits.

The captains on these coastal ferries are themselves sons of captains, who also maneuvered these ships. Big sand banks outstretched beneath the hull move around, and the narrow passages above are maneuvered with maximum alertness.

 “Fragile streams of soft light bouncing through layers of woolen clouds"

The light is there. But it’s a different kind of light. Passing North Cape, there is nothing between the edge of the European continent and the North Pole. The wind sweeps over, the light must follow nature’s cycle. Suddenly, the little human being is “taken” by the colossal meeting with something so much bigger than oneself. This is a spectacle to observe, not to argue with. Traveling in the winter along the Norwegian coast is an investment in psychological awareness and depth, a unique chance to experience life in shades of gray and faint-color light.

  U.S. Defense Secretary    Robert M. Gates at Elmendorf AFB

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and wife Becky are greeted by Air Force Lt. Gen. Dana T. Atkins, commander of Alaskan Command, during his visit to Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, June 1, 2009.

ELMENDORF AFB

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson

That importance was further recognized when the F-15E Strike Eagle equip-ped 90th Tactical Fighter Squadron was reassigned to Elmendorf Air Force Base from Clark Air Base in the Philppines in May 1991. The Pacific Regional Medical Center moved from Clark to Elmendorf and construction of a new, greatly expanded hospital began in 1993.

The early 1990s also saw major organizational changes and an expansion of Elmendorf's imp-ortance. In 1991, the 21st Tactical Fighter Wing was reorganized as an objective wing and all the major tenant units on Elmendorf were placed under it. The 21st Wing was inactivated and the 3d Wing was reassigned from Clark Air Base to Elmendorf Air Force Base on 19 December 1991. This was in keeping with the Air Force's polices of retaining the oldest and most illustrious units during a period of major force reductions. It was also an alternative landing site for the Space Shuttle. The base also contains the headquarters of the Alaska Wing of the Civil Air Patrol.

Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson

 Below, Boeing C-17 Globemaster III from Elmendorf AFB

FORT GREELY

GROUND BASED INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FACILITIES

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to U.S. Army Col. George Bond, Missile Defense Agency's top officer at the ground based interceptor missile facilities in Alaska, June 1, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates climbs down into a ground-based interceptor missile silo on Fort Greely, Alaska, June 1, 2009.

FORT GREELY ALASKA

INTERCEPTOR MISSILE FIELD

the Groundbased Midcourse Defense system

 GUARD - ENGAGE - DESTROY

It is the largest, fastest, and most intelligent projectile available to the US Army. Despite this you probably never heard of it nor the Army National Guard Soldiers who "pull the lanyard." If you think a 155mm howitzer shell is big, the M21 rifle is accurate, the MLRS can fire over a long distance, or that the PATRIOT air defense system is sophisticated, you are correct on all accounts.

There is one system operated by the Army National Guard however, that dwarfs any of its nearest competitors. That system is the Groundbased Midcourse Defense system and it has been operational for more than a decade with Army National Guard Soldiers from Colorado, Alaska, and California's 100th Missile Defense Brigade. 

The tip of the spear for the GMD system is its Groundbased Interceptor, or simply "GBI." While it may not be the most awe-inspiring name for a defensive weapon system, its performance in conjunction with its fire control system will certainly leave you in awe. The GMD system is the ultimate "smart weapon."

The GBI consists of a 3-stage solid rocket boost vehicle which can place it's payload of an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle outside the earth's atmosphere. In order to do this the missile must reach an escape velocity of more than 6.9 miles per second. This hypersonic speed is several times what a 7.62mm bullet travels leaving the muzzle of a gun. To put it another way, it reaches a speed of approximately Mach 33. Groundbased Interceptor being emplaced at the Missile Defense Complex, Fort Greely, Alaska 

MULTI SENSORS

Once outside the atmosphere and at distances thousands of miles from the launch facilities at Vandenberg AFB, Calif, or Fort Greely, Alaska, the boost vehicle releases the EKV on an intercept trajectory toward a hostile missile's warhead. From there, the EKV seeks out the target using multi-color sensors, a cutting-edge onboard computer, and a series of rocket motors used for independent steering in space.

The EKV homes in on its target with pinpoint accuracy and destroys it using nothing more than the force of a massive collision (hit to kill) without the need of a traditional warhead or explosives. It is like hitting a bullet with a bullet, but these bullets are launched thous- ands of miles apart and are moving at Mach 33. It is ferociously complicated, but it works. Here's why. The GBI is just the most visible aspect to the cutting-edge GMD system. GMD is a "system of systems" involving shooters, sensors, and Command, Control and Communication systems.       Satellite communication ground station at the Missile Defense Complex, Fort Greely

While the GBIs comprise the shooter portion of the system, the sensors are the eyes and ears of GMD. These sensors consist of space-based infra-red satellites, upgraded early warning radars (UEWRs) and COBRA Dane operated by the Air Force, transpor-table X-band radars (AN/TPY-2), AEGIS radar on board select U.S. Navy warships, and the massive sea-based X-band Radar. These sensors provide information to the GMD Fire Control system in order to calculate precise intercept points for the GBIs and EKVs.

The Army National Guard Soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade in Colorado and California, and 49th Missile Defense Battalion in Alaska operate the Command, Control and Communication portion of GMD system and are the essential human element of GMD. Missile Defense Element crews from the 100th and Fire Direction Center crews from the 49th man the system 24/7/365. They are responsible for the strategic and tactical level execution of the GMD mission and provide security forces to defend the assets at Fort Greely, Alaska.

The Soldiers of the 100th Missile Defense Brigade are part of a very unique multi-component organization. The brigade headquarters is located in Colorado Springs, Colorado and consists mainly of (full-time) Active Guard and Reserve, Colorado Army National Guardsmen. The unit also includes a small contingent of Active Component (Regular) Army Soldiers. The 100th is tasked with conducting a presidentially-directed national security mission to defend the United States against the threat of ICBM attack.

At Fort Greely, Alaska, the Alaska Army National Guard AGR Solders of the 49th Missile Defense Battalion are charged with the same ballistic missile defense mission as the 100th but have the additional mission essential task for their Military Police to secure the Missile Defense Complex at Fort Greely. The small contingent of California Army National Guard Soldiers of 100th MDB Detachment 1 at Vandenberg AFB are tasked with performing liaison and asset management of the GBIs located there in support of the brigade and battalion.

In order to perform their federal mission, all 100th MDB National Guard Soldiers ope-rate in a "dual status" allowing them to automatically transition between Title 10 fede-ral Active Duty and Title 32 National Guard status. The Soldiers seamlessly transition between these two statuses depending on the duties they are performing or location. When on-duty at GMD operational sites performing their federal mission they serve in Title 10 and are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. When off-duty or in an administrative status away from GMD operational sites they are in a Title 32 status and are administratively controlled (ADCON) to their respective States' National Guard.

Digital Phase Shift Control for Phased Array Radar Invention by Harvey G. Cragon and Henry N. Peterson

This invention relates to control of a radar involving microwave modular an-tenna, and more particularly to digital phase shift control of a multielement phased array antenna. This invention is particularly advantageous in connection with the construction and operation of airborne radar, but also has important application in ground based and ship based systems.

Thule Phased Array Radar Greenland

Areas of application include radars used for ground mapping, search and detection, fire control, tracking, navigation, terrain following, and terrain avoidance. With this invention, the radar may be operated in any one of the above modes or in several of such modes on a time-sharing basis.

Airborne radar systems inherently have a problem of generating high power microwave energy and processing the transmitted and received signals while maintaining high reliability and minimum weight. Major reliability problems in radars have been concerned with components such as rotary joints, servomotors for the antennas, and the like. Restrictions imposed by such components on reliability exist in the most contemporary transistorized radars. Further, the use of magnetrons for transmitting, klystrons for local oscillator service, and use of high power transmit-receive (TR) protection devices, all have been found to restrict the reliability of the system.

The present invention is directed to an improved radar which may employ solid-state circuitry so constructed that major obstacles heretofore encountered in the development of solid-state radar may be overcome. A solidstate functional electronic module has been developed for construction of a modular antenna array responsive to beam steering control disclosed in application Ser. No. 397,491 of Harry E. Cooke, et al., filed Sept. 18, 1964, now abandoned in favor of continuation application.

The Principle of Digital Phase shift 

1. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a line of elements in a phased antenna which comprises:

(a) separate selectively variable delay means in each of said elements through which radar signals must pass,

(b) a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of elements in said line,

(c) a source of clock pulses,

(d) means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time gate proportional to the desired radiation angle of said line of elements,

(e) separate counter and switch means for control of each of said delay means,

(f) circuit means for transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first counter to said separate counter means with correspondence between the locations of elements in said line and the positions of outputs of said first counter, and

(g) 'means operative following application of said clock pulses to said first counter for actuating said switch means to vary the effective lengths of said delay means in dependence upon the counts in their respective separate counters preparatory to transmission of signals through said elements.

2. The combination set forth in claim 1 in which said first counter is a binary rate counter.

3. The system of claim 1 wherein modulo-360 generators are included in each output of said first counter.

4. The system of claim 3 wherein each modulo-360 generator includes means to introduce a present count therein with selected reset pulses applied thereto.

5. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a two-dimensional multimodule antenna which comprises:

'(a) separate selectively variable delay means within each said module through which radar signals must pass,

(b) a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in one dimension of said antenna,

(0) a second counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in a second dimension of said antenna,

(d) a source of clock pulses,

(e) means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time interval proportional to the desired azimuth angle,

(f) means for applying said clock pulses to said second counter during a time interval proportional to the desired elevation angle,

(g) separate switching counters and switch means for each of said delay means,

(h) circuit means for sequentially transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first and second counters to said switching counters with correspondence between the locations of the modules in said antenna and the positions of the outputs of said first and second counters to actuate said switch means to vary the electrical lengths of said delay means in dependence upon the count in their respective counters preparatory to transmission of radar signals therethrough.

6. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of a two-dimensional multimodule antenna which comprises:

(a) separate selectively variable delay means within each said module through which radar signals must pass,

(b) a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in one dimension of said antenna,

(c) a second counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of modules in a second dimension of said antenna,

(d) a source of clock pulses,

(e) means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time interval proportional to the desired azimuth angle,

(f) means for applying said clock pulses to said second counter during a time interval proportional to the desired elevation angle,

(g) separate switching counters and switch means for each of said delay means,

(h) circuit means for transmitting pulses from the outputs of said first and second counters to said switching counters with correspondence between the locations of the modules in said antenna and the positions of the outputs of said first and second counters, and

(i) means operative following application of said clock pulses to said first and second counters to actuate said switch means to vary the electrical lengths of 13 said delay means in dependence upon the count in their respective counters preparatory to transmission of radar signals therethrough.

7. The method of dynamically controlling the directional character of a two dimensional phased array antenna which comprises:

(a) generating a first train of clock impulses of length proportional to the desired azimuth angle,

(b) generating a second train of clock pulses of length proportional to the desired elevation angle,

() from said first train, producing a first set of secondary trains of pulses in number corresponding with the number of elements arrayed along one dimension of said antenna and with the trains of said first set grated in length in dependence upon locations of said elements across said antenna,

(d) from said second train producing second set of secondary trains of pulses in number corresponding with the number of elements arrayed along a second dimension of said antenna with the trains of said second set graded in length in dependence upon location of said elements across said antenna, and

(e) adjusting the electrical length of the radar path leading to each element in response to the sum of pulses in pairs of different trains of said secondary pulses where one train of each pair is derived from said first set and the other from said second set.

8. The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second trains of pulses are produced simultaneously and wherein said first and second sets are employed sequentially.

9. The method according to claim 7 wherein said first and second sets of pulses are each connected to modulo- 360 and are thereafter sequentially applied to each said element.

10. A system for dynamically controlling the directional character of at line of elements in a phased antenna which comprises:

(a) separate selectively variable delay means in each of said elements through which radar signals must pass,

(b) means for varying the effective lengths of said delay means,

(c) a first counter having outputs of decreasing order and in number corresponding with the number of elements in said line,

(d) a source of clock pulses,

(e) means for applying said clock pulses to said first counter during a time gate proportional to the desired radiation angle of said line of elements, and

(f) circuit means for transmitting pulses from the output of said counter to said means for varying with correspondence between the locations of elements in said line and the positions of outputs of said counter to vary the eliective lengths of said delay means.

Block Diagrams

FIGURE 1 diagrammatically illustrates the operation of an aircraft, its antenna array, and the functional electronic block employed to make up the array;

FIGURE 2 illustrates one form of a solid-state antenna module;

FIGURE 3 is a block diagram of the multimode radar of FIGURE 1 in which the present invention is employed;

FIGURE 4 illustrates a phase shift unit which is incorporated in and used with each module of the" antenna;

FIGURE 5 illustrates a phase shift pulse converter employed for the control of the several phase shift elements;

FIGURE 6 is a circuit diagram of a binary rate multiplier forming a part of FIGURE 5;

FIGURE 7 is a line selector and quantizer employed in the system of FIGURE 5;

FIGURE 8 illustrates a preferred embodiment of the invention, taken with FIGURES 9 and 10;

FIGURE 9 is a detailed circuit diagram of a portion of the system of FIGURE 8; and

FIGURE 10 illustrates time relationships in FIGURES 8 and 9.

         KWAJALEIN ATOLL                   REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

Construction is underway on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to build Space Fence, a sophisticated system that will dramatically improve the way the U.S. Air Force identifies and tracks objects in space. The new system’s initial operational capability is scheduled for 2018.

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Below is an aerial view of the U.S. Air Fence under construction on Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Island. The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the survellance fence. Pic: Lockheed Martin.

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With critical design review completed, the Space Fence team is focused on production of technology that will bring the system online. Space Fence will use Gallium Nitride (GaN) powered S-band ground-based radars to provide the Air Force with uncued detection, tracking and accurate measurement of space objects, primarily in low-earth orbit. Lockheed Martin engineers and U.S.

Air Force personnel are testing and training on a scaled-down version of the system in Moorestown NJ known as the Integration test Bed.  The ITB provides the operational context to integrate and test end-item hardware and software prior to installation in the new Space Fence facility on Kwajalein.

The locations and higher wave frequency of the new Space Fence radars will permit the detection of much smaller microsatellites and debris than current systems. Additionally, Lockheed Martin’s Space Fence design will significantly improve the timeliness with which operators can detect space events, which could present potential threats to GPS satellites or the International Space Station.  The flexibility and sensitivity of the system will provide coverage of deep space geosynchronous orbits while maintaining the surveillance fence.

 Kwajalein atoll Peacekeeper missile testing

          THE ALTAIR RADAR                  THE KWAJALEIN ATOLL

Below, four SSN radars at Kwajalein. The ALTAIR antenna is the large dish at upper center, viewed partially against the lagoon.  The antenna for TRADEX, which backs up ALTAIR in the Space Surveillance Network SSN, is the dish antenna on top of the build-ing near the center of the picture.  The antenna for the ALCOR imaging radar is in the dome at lower left, and the antenna for the MMW imaging radar is in the dome in the center of the picture be-tween the ALTAIR and TRADEX antennas.

 THE TRADEX ALTAIR RADARS ON THE KWAJALEIN ATOLL

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EGLIN Air Force Base

THE FPS-85 EGLIN RADAR

The FPS-85 has been described as the workhorse of the SSN, and is the largest, most sensitive and most important for space surveillance purposes of the SSN’s LPARs.  It is one of the three dedicated radar sensors in the SSN the others are the Air Force Fence and the GLOBUS II dish antenna radar in Norway.  The radar is located in Eglin, Florida and thus sometimes referred to as the Eglin Radar at about 30.6° N (30.57N, 86.22 E) and points directly south. 

The FPS-85 was the world’s first large phased-array radar.   Its construction began in 1962, but it was destroyed by fire in 1965 before becoming fully operational.  It was rebuilt and began operations in 1969.  The radar was originally intended only for space surveillance, but in 1975 it was also assigned a submarine-launched ballistic missile warning mission.  In 1987, corre- sponding to the activation of two south-facing PAVE PAWS early warning radars in Georgia and Texas both since deactivated, it returned to full-time space surveillance. 

The FPS-85 has separate receive and transmit antennas contained within the same building, with boresites pointing due south at a 45º elevations.  It can scan ±60˚ in azimuth and from the horizon to 15˚ beyond zenith in elevation. It was built with two separate antennas because at the time of its construction it was less costly to do this than building a single transmit/receive antenna.  This choice also facilitated simultaneously obtaining multiple narrow receive beams for more precise tracking and a broader transmit beam more suitable for surveillance.

Technical Characteristics

The transmitter is a 72×72 rectangular array, with 5,184 transmit modules with 0.55 λ spacing.  Its center frequency is 442 MHz, with a 10 MHz bandwidth. Its wavelength is thus about 0.68 m, and the antenna’s diameter is about 26.9 m with an area of 724 m².  The transmit antenna is uniformly illuminated and has a 1.4 degree beam width for comparison, λ/D = 0.68/27 = 1.44 degrees.

Each of the 5,184 transmitter element is rated for a peak power of 10 kW and a 0.5% duty cycle. These give an array peak power of 52 MW and an average power of 260 kW.  However, according to a 1994 paper the average power of individual elements individual elements varied from 2.5 to 10 W, with an average of about 6 W.  This is consistent with a number of sources that give the radar’s peak power as about 30-35 MW. Assuming a peak power of 35 MW, the radar’s average power would then be about 175 kW.

The receive antenna is a tapered array with a diameter of 58 m containing 19,500 crossed dipole elements on a square grid, forming a circular aperture 152 elements in diameter.  There are 4660 active receive modules.  Its receive beam width is 0.8º (in comparison, 0.68/58 = 0.0117 = 0.67 degrees).  It receives using a 3×3 cluster of receive beams, with a 0.4º spacing, giving a 1 db crossover and thus a low beam-shape loss. The combined beam width is therefore 0.4+0.8+0.4 = 1.6º.  All nine receive beams are used in search, but only five in track.

The FPS-85 operates in time blocks called resource periods, each of which is 50 ms long.  During a resource period, the radar can transmit up to eight pulses for a maximum total transmit time of 250 μs (corresponding to duty cycle of 0.5%).

Pulse lengths are 1, 5, 10, 25, 125, and 250 μs. Its maximum bandwidth is 10 MHz.  The pulse compression used to obtain greater better range resolution ratio may be as large as 1,600.  In its long-range surveillance mode, it emits a single 250 μs frequency-modulated compressed pulse every 50 ms. 

Operations

The FPS-85 initially conducted surveillance using several different radar fences. A 1994 software upgrade left the FPS-85 with only relatively low-elevation radar fences, as the software needed for a higher-elevation fence intended for detecting lower RCS space objects was not funded. 

Figure 1 below shows a fence described as the existing SPACETRACK fence in a 1996 paper. This fence begins at an azimuth of 142˚ at an elevation of 15˚, reaches an elevation of 23˚ at 180˚ degrees azimuth along the boresite direction and continues on to an azimuth of 218˚ at an elevation angle of 15˚. This total azimuth extent of 76˚ used 76 beam positions.  An additional 24 beam positions were used to extend coverage directly down to an elevation angle of 3˚ at each end of the fence.

A 2004 report describes a previously existing fence, the S-1 fence, as scanning between the same endpoints, but reaching a maximum elevation angle of 25˚, as shown in figure 2 below.  Another source describes a low-elevation fence which was not leak-proof for all altitudes and elevations with a peak elevation of about 23˚ extending 120˚ in azimuth, dipping down to the horizon at its ends.

In 1999, the radar’s software was upgraded to provide a higher-elevation fence.  This new “debris” fence was scanned at a maximum of about 35˚ in elevation and ±25˚ degrees in azi-muth from the radar’s due south azimuth boresite.

Following tests May 2000, this new debris fence was apparently put into operation, although at the time it was expected that it would be operated in a “background” mode, that is, only when time was left over from its normal space surveillance tasks. However, another source indicates that the FPS-85 was using a 35˚ elevation fence with a length of ±40* for detecting low-earth orbit objects as early as 1997.

By integrating large numbers of pulses, the FPS-85 is capable of tracking previously detected objects at least out to geosynchronous orbit range.  It is the only phased-array radar in  the U.S. Space Surveillance Network capable of tracking objects in geosynchronous orbit the next two largest phased arrays are not oriented so as to be able to view geosynchronous orbit.  The FPS-85 assumed a deep space role in November 1988 after receiving a range-extension upgrade enabling integration of many pulses.

PHASED ARRAY RADAR

A THEORETICAL MODEL OF INSTANT DETECTION AND RESPONSE

        SPACE AND NAVAL                      WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND SAND DIEGO

U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

THE MILLSTONE HILL RADAR

  MASSACHUSETTS, USA

The Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is made up of sensors, communications links, proces sing centers, and data distribution channels. The sensors are a conglomeration of capabil- ities mostly derived from and shared by other missions. Few of the sensors were developed for the express purpose of conducting space surveillance.

The Air Force has recognized that providing warfighters with effective Space Situational Awareness (SSA) requires a coordi-nated architecture-based approach to establishing and maintaining sensor capabilities. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has established pro-grams to acquire new capabilities such asSpace Based Space Surveillance (SBSS)  and Space Fence, has partnered with other agen-cies to acquire the first Space Surveillance Telescope (SST), and has begun to modernize legacy capabilities such as the Eglin FPS-85 radar, the Haystack radar, the GLOBUS II radar, and the Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) system. 

The Air Force has also recognized that protection of space systems must become a priority, and has established a program to do this through Self Awareness Space Situational Awareness (SASSA). Space Based Space Surveillance The first SBSS satellite is expected to launch into a sun-synchronous low-Earth orbit in October 2009. The satellite was built by a team made up of Boeing (prime) and Ball Aerospace (space vehicle). The development and production contract provides for satellite design, fabrication, delivery, and launch, as well as ground station delivery and post-launch support. Launch will be on a Minotaur IV from Vandenberg AFB.

INCHOHRENT SCATTERING RADARS

SPACE BASED SPACE SURVEILLANCE 

The satellite is ready for launch. The mission of SBSS is timely detection, identification, and tracking of resident space objects (RSOs). SBSS will track objects primarily in deep space (orbital period greater than 225 minutes). However, SBSS will also have the capability to track objects with shorter periods, illumination permitting. SBSS will provide position, man-euver setection, and space object identification data to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and the Alternate Space Control Center (ASCC).  The SBSS payload consists of a visible sensor assembly, a gimbal, and payload deck electronics.  

The visible sensor assembly consists of:

• Optical bench

• Telescope

• CCD focal plane array

• Cryoradiator • Video Interface Box

• Elevation electronics box

• Filter wheel mechanism

• Focus mechanism

• Aperture door mechanism

• Electrical harness The gimbal consists of:

• Beryllium yoke

• Azimuth and elevation drives

• Azimuth launch lock

• Electrical harness for interface with payload electronics.

The payload deck electronics package consists of:

• Payload electronics box

• Gimbal amplifier segment

• Solid state recorder

• On-board mission data processor

• Electrical harness for interface with visible sensor assembly, gimbal, and bus Space Survei-llance Telescope SST is a ground-based system using the latest in optical technology to in-crease SSA capability.

THE SST DARPA PROGRAM

The SST program is a DARPA technology demonstration providing a 3.5 meter f/1.0 tele-scope. SST has the potential to become an Air Force Space Command AFSPC dedicated sensor pending successful outcome of a demonstration in 2011- 2012. MIT Lincoln Laboratory is providing program management, integration, supervision of facility construction, and the telescope camera. L-3 Integrated Optical Systems is building the telescope.

NAVAL E. HOLT COMMUNICATON STATION

EXMOUTH WESTERN AUSTRALIA

The telescope achieved first light in February 2011. In 2013, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Australian Minister of Defence signed an MOU agreeing to relocate the Space Surveillance Telescope from the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico to Harold E. Holt Naval Communication Station in Western Australia.

Australia offers a uniquely beneficial vantage point for operational testing and demonstrat-ion of SST’s enhanced algorithms and camera. After the move, SST will be owned by the United States Air Force, but operated and maintained by Australia. It will be a dedicated sensor in the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN).

The SST will detect small objects in deep space, and provide a rapid, wide-area search capa-bility, significantly increasing optical surveillance capacity. The tele-scope is designed to find, fix, track, and characterize faint objects. It will be more sensitive than GEODSS. SST will be the first large telescope to employ a curved CCD focal plane array. It is the most dynamically agile telescope of its size ever built. It provides the first major technology push for deep space surveillance in over three decades.

The Defence Minister says a new telescope planned for Western Australia will not be used to spy on other countries, even though it will have the capability to do so. The powerful device will be built in Exmouth as part of an agreement between Australia and the United States. It will contribute to the US global Space Surveillance Network, which provides warnings to all satellite operators of potential collisions with other satel-lites or debris. A US Navy communication station already exists in the town, in West Australia's north-west.

David Johsnton, Defense Minister Australia

The construction costs of the telescope will be shared and it will be located at the Harold Holt naval communications facility. Defence Minister David Johnston says the telescope will focus on protecting satellites from space junk and will be operating in 2016.

"The US indicated they needed some southern hemisphere coverage," he told AM. "They came to us and we said 'well, why don't we put it at Exmouth? "And they said 'that's a good idea'. And here we are. Below is transcript of the radio talk with Defense Minister David Johnston.

The potential exists to acquire and deploy additional SST installations in the post-2012 time frame. AFSPC will publish an architecture that includes SSTs in late 2009. Eglin FPS-85 Radar Service Life Extension Pro-gram (SLEP) The FPS-85 is the work-horse of the SSN in the near-Earth regime. It provides timely and accurate metric tracking and space object identification data. Although primarily a near-Earth sensor, it is the only dedicated, high-capacity phased array radar with both near-Earth and deep-space capability. It is the primary tracker of low-inclination objects, and of objects that transit the manned-spaceflight regime. It has the capability to track most near-Earth objects once per day. 

View of the solar array, the U.S. Army's largest solar photovoltaic system, located at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, USA.

GEODSS SLEP GEODSS

GEODSS SLEP GEODSS is the key provider of deep space metric observations. It produces 70% of all geosynchronous tracks and 50% of all deep space tracks. GEODSS tracks over 200 objects not tracked by any other sensor. The GEODSS SLEP funds replacement of aged and unsustainable Sensor Controller Group and Data Processing Group with modern compo-nents. Without the SLEP, GEODSS will soon experience degraded operations, and eventual mission failure.

Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System on Diego Garcia

The FPS-85 routinely tracks 50-60 manned spaceflight objects that are not tracked by any other sensor, and 220-230 manned spaceflight objects that are tracked by at most one other sensor. This makes the operation of the FPS-85 critical to the safety of manned space-flight. The SLEP will extend the operation of the radar until 2018 and will provide the ground work for future updates to the radar.

The SLEP will replace:

• Computer

• Radar Interface and Control Equipment

• Calibration system

• Signal processor

• Beam steering equipment

Haystack Ultra-Wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) The Haystack radar is a contribut-ing sensor operated by MIT Lincoln Laboratory, and provides imaging of nearEarth and deep space objects. Haystack operates today at X-band, with one GHz of bandwidth. The upgrade will add the capability to operate at W-band with eight MHz of bandwidth. This will enable finer characterization of satellites, and characterization of smaller satellites than possible today.

Operation at W-band requires replacement of the current Haystack antenna. Because of this, Haystack will be down from operations from May 2010 until August 2011. A smaller antenna, which is being used to test the W-band RF components, is producing images and will be available for limited operations during this time.

Space Fence The Space Fence program is a new acquisition that will produce three world-wide-dispersed radar sites. The radars will provide the ability to perform un-cued tracking of small objects at low and medium orbital altitudes. The Space Fence program was begun by the US Navy to replace the current VHF Fence radar system. In 2003, the Navy transferred the program to the Air Force. In the intervening years, the Air Force has refined the require-ments for the program to make the resulting radars more capable than a simple VHF Fence replacement.

The program is in concept development, with an expected IOC for the first site of 2015. GLOBUS II SLEP The GLOBUS II radar is a dedicated sensor that provides metric tracking and imaging of near-Earth and deep space satellites. It provides the only all-weather, 24/7 space track capability covering 0-90 degrees east longitude. The radar is located in Vardo Norway. It is one of five wide-band imaging radars in the SSN.

It provides the most accurate tracking of any space surveillance radar. Radar development began in 1992. The radar was fielded in Norway in 2003, making it 11 years old at IOC. As a result, the radar’s reliability has been deteriorating since it was fielded. Extended down-times for emergency maintenance are expected in the 2010 time frame. AFSPC will begin a SLEP in 2010 to extend the service life of the radar to 2030.

SASSA II

Self-Awareness Space Situational Awareness (SASSA) US space systems are increasingly su-sceptible to a wide variety of threats. The US needs to provide effective protection for space systems. The first step in doing this is to provide effective tactical and strategic situ-ational awareness. The SASSA program will support this first step by providing a com-mon, stand-ards-based solution. This is the most effective and efficient way to integrate a variety of sen-sors and other instruments on a broad set of satellites.

SASSA will begin with a tech-nical demonstration and will proceed with methodical risk re-duction activities over the subsequent several years. SASSA I will be a prototype and techni-cal demonstration activity going through the 2013 time frame. It will produce an integrated set of flight hardware that will be operated on-orbit, providing a test bed to allow continued interface testing with new instruments. The interface specification will be developed to enable future technology investments.

Lessons learned will be integrated into SASSA II. SASSA I characteristics are:

• A two-year development, followed by a one year on orbit demonstration on an operational host

• A common interface unit that can handle six instruments such as radar warning receivers

• Low technical risk in components

• Moderate technical risk in software and interfaces

• Define common interface standards for instruments and bus connections

• Leave-behind test bed capability SASSA I is not intended to address the full spectrum of threats.

SASSA II will be a risk reduction program in the 2010 – 2015 time frame. It will establish policy for future space protection activities. Instruments and interfaces developed in SASSA I will be matured to provide more effective protection. SASSA will end with a finalized busi-ness strategy to guide future activities. An eventual SASSA acquisition program (2014 and beyond) will encompass full-scale production of a standardized protection capability. The goal is integrated on-board awareness and protection capabilities for all US space systems. 

SPACE SITUATION AWARENESS

Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is knowledge of all aspects of space related to ope-rations. As the foundation for space control, SSA encompasses intelligence on adversary space operations; surveillance of all space objects and activities; detailed reconnaissance of specific space assets; monitoring space environmental conditions; monitoring cooperative space assets; and conducting integrated command, control, communications, processing, analysis, dissemination, and archiving activities.

Program Element 0305940F, Space Situational Awareness Operations, fields, upgrades, operates and maintains Air Force sensors and information integration capabilities within the SSA network while companion program element 0604425F, Space Situation Awareness Systems, develops new network sensors and improved information integration capabilities across the network. Activities funded in the SSA Operations program element focus on surveillance of objects in earth orbit to aid tasks including satellite tracking; space object identification; tracking and cataloging; satellite attack warning; notification of satellite flyovers to U.S. forces; space treaty monitoring; and technical intelligence gathering.

The Sensor Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs)in this program element fund efforts to upgrade and extend the life of operational Space Situation Awareness (SSA) sensors, as needed. These SLEPs include, but are not limited to, programs that extend the serviceable life of assets and maintain critical capability by replacing aging and increasingly unsustain- able components with modern equipment. SLEPs may incorporate equipment which inher-ently includes technological advances resulting in enhanced or increased capabilities.

In addition, the SLEP itself may be designed to increase certain capabilities.  The current efforts of Eglin, Haystack Ultra-wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR), Ground-based Electro Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS),  and Globus III are representative of sensor systems upgraded in the SLEP project.  As the need arises in the execution year, funds in this project may be used to begin sensor life extension programs on additional efforts.  These efforts are in Budget Activity 7, Operational System Development, because they develop modifications for operational SSA sensors.

Originally known as HAVE STARE AN/FPS-129, the radar became operational in 1995 at Vandenberg Air Force base in California. While there, it observed several intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM flight tests a as well as two non-intercept tests of the kill vehicle for U.S. national missile defense interceptor then under development IFT-1A and IFT-2.

Beginning in late 1998, HAVE STARE was dismantled and moved to Vardo, and renamed Globus II and appears to have become operational in about 2003.  A radar named Globus, had been operated since the 1960s by Norway at Vardo, in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, and was used to monitor Soviet and Russian ballistic missile flight tests.

Outside observers have argued that Globus II is likely to be used to gather information on Russian ballistic missile tests, and that such information could be useful for ballistic missile defense.  However, official Norwegian government statements stated that the radar would be used operated by only Norwegian personnel and would be used to track and monitor objects, including space debris in space, research and development, and “Surveillance of the Norwegian area of interest, including the technical gathering of intelligence.”

RUSSIAN DEFENSE

STRATEGIC LAUNCHERS AND WARHEADS

In January 2017 Russia was estimated to have 528 strategic launchers and about 1800 nuclear warheads. In its March 2017 New START data exchange Russia reported 523 deployed launchers with 1765 New START-accountable nuclear warheads.

 STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

The Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to have 286 operational missile systems that include missiles that can carry 958 warheads. These include 46 R-36M2, SS-18 missiles, 30 UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles, 36 road-mobile Topol, SS-25 systems, 60 silo-based and 18 road-mobile Topol-M, SS-27 systems, and 96 RS-24 missiles.

  STRATEGIC AVIATION

The Russian strategic aviation consists of 66 bombers that carry an estimated 200 longrange cruise missiles and bombs. The bombers are 11 Tu-160, Blackjack and 55 Tu-95MS, Bear H. The bombers can carry various modifications of the Kh-55, AS-15 and Kh-101 cruise mis-siles and gravity bombs. Russia operates two satellites of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS, and a network of early-warning radars.

   STRATEGIC FLEET

The Russian strategic fleet includes 12 operational strategic missile submarines with SLBMs, whose missiles can carry 176 missiles with 752 nuclear warheads. Five operational Project 667BDRM submarines are based in the Northern Fleet. These submarines carry 80 R-29RM, SS-N-23 launchers. One Project 955 submarine with 16 Bulava SLBMs on board is also bas-ed in the Northern Fleet. The only remaining Pacific Fleet base hosts three 667BDR (Delta III) submarines, which carry 48 R-29R, SS-N-18 missiles and two Project 955 submarines with 32 Bulava SLBMs.

RUSSIAN INSTANT-warning systemS

The system that are traditionally considered part of the strategic missile defense, the early-warning system, space surveillance and anti-satellite systems are currently included in the Air and Space Defense Forces, a separate branch of Russia's Armed Forces, subordi-nated directly to the General Staff.

INSTANT-WARNING SATELLITES

In November 2015 Russia launched the first satellite of the new-generation early-warning system, EKS. The satellite, Cosmos-2510, is currently undergoing tests. Second spacecraft, Cosmos-2518, was launched in May 2017.

The early-warning satellites were transmitting information in real time to the Western command centers at Serpukhov-15, near Kurilovo, Kaluga oblast and Eastern center near Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The information is processed there and transmitted to the command center in Solnechnogorsk.

RADARS

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Russia's Modern Weapon Rearmament Program: The 21st Century Insurance Policy 

The Daryal radar in Pechora

As of 2017, the land-based component of the instant-warning system included the following radar systems:

In addition to the dedicated early-warning radars, the Don-2N radar of the Moscow missile defense system and the Dunay-3U radar near Chekhov are also used for early-warning and space surveillance.

MISSILE DEFENSE

The Moscow missile defense system A-135 is operated by a missile defense division. The main command center of the system and the battle-management radar are located in Sofri-no (Moscow oblast). The command center of the system and its radar are undergoing a soft- ware upgrade.

The system includes the Don-2N battle-management phased-array radar, command center, and 68 short-range interceptors of the 53T6 (Gazelle) type. The 32 long-range 51T6 Gorgon interceptors have been removed from the system. The short-range interceptors are deployed at five sites -- Lytkarino (16 interceptors), Sofrino (12), Korolev (12) Skhodnya (16), and Vnukovo (12). Long-range missiles used to be deployed with two units with headquart-ers in Naro-Fominsk-10 and Sergiyev Posad-15. The system was accepted for service in 1995.

Space surveillance

Space surveillance system is operated by the Main space-surveillance command center. To monitor objects on low earth orbits and determines parameters of their orbits, the system uses the the early-warning radar network.

The space surveillance network also includes the Krona system at Zelenchukskaya in the North Caucasus, which includes dedicated X-band space surveillance radars. Another system of this type is being deployed near Nakhodka on the Far East.

To monitor objects on high-altitude orbits, the space-surveillance system uses optical obser-vations. The main optical observation station, Okno, is located in Nurek, Tajikistan. Its tele-scopes allow detection of object at altitudes of up to 40,000 km. The station began operat-ions in 1999. Space-surveillance tasks are also assigned to observatories of the Russian Aca-demy of Sciences.

NO GAPS IN RUSSIAN INSTANT-WARNING COVERAGE

DON-2N IN PUSHKINO

The Don-2N radar is a large missile defence and early warning passive electronically scan- ned array radar outside Moscow, and a key part of the Russian A-135 anti-ballistic missile system designed for the defence of the capital against ballistic missiles. Located in the Push- kino district of Moscow it is a quadrangular truncated pyramid 33 metres (108 ft) tall with sides 130 metres (427 ft) long at the bottom, and 90 metres (295 ft) long at the top. Each of its four faces has an 18 metres (59 ft) diameter Ultra high frequency band radar giving 360 degree coverage. The system is run by an Elbrus-2 supercomputer. It has a range of 3700 km for targets the size of a typical ICBM warhead.

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VORONEZH-M IN KALININGRAD

 Voronezh radars are the current generation of Russian early-warning radar, providing long distance monitoring of airspace against ballistic missile attack and aircraft monitoring. The first radar, in Lekhtusi near St Petersburg, became operational in 2009. There is a plan to replace older radars with the Voronezh by 2020. The Voronezh radars are described as highly prefabricated meaning that they have a set up time of months rather than years and need fewer personnel than previous generations. They are also modular so that a radar can be brought into (partial) operation whilst being incomplete.Russia has used the launch of these new radars to raise its concerns about US missile defence in Europe. At the launch of the Kaliningrad radar in November 2011 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was quoted as saying "I expect that this step [the launch of the radar] will be seen by our partners as the first signal of our country's readiness to make an adequate response to the threats which the missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces."

THE NUCLEAR TRIAD

 Excerpts from DOD Directive - DoDD 3150.02, April 24, 2013

A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which consists of three components:

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),

and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

traditionally strategic bombers (B-52 Stratofortress, B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit)

The purpose of having a three-branched nuclear capability is to significantly reduce the pos-sibility that an enemy could destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation's nuclear deterrence.

U.S. Marines training in Okinawa Japan

 The Department of Defence Policy

The President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, is the sole au-thority for the employment of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act.

Assured nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance.  Nuclear command and control safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S-5210.81

Enclosures

DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICES (DIRNSA/CHCSS).

Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelli-gence, the DIRNSA/CHCSS provides information assurance products and services for those systems used to transmit, process, store, or display in-formation related to the control and authorized use of nuclear weapons in accordance with DoD 8500.01 REF: DoDD 3150.02, April 24, 2013

   Trident II, black re-entry vehicles containing the warheads on the D5 sub-launched missile

The National Security Agency (NSA) is a cryptologic intelligence agency of the United States Department of Defense responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign communi-cations and foreign signals intelligence, as well as protecting U.S. government communi-cations and information systems, which involves information security and cryptanalysis  and cryptography.

The NSA is directed by at least a lieutenant general or vice admiral. NSA is a key com-ponent of the U.S. Intelligence Community, which is headed by the Director of National Intelligence. The Central Security Service is a co-located agency created to co-ordinate intelligence activities and co-operation between NSA and other U.S. military cryptanalysis agencies. The Director of the National Security Agency serves as the Commander of the United States Cyber Command and Chief of the Central Security Service.

By law, NSA's intelligence gathering is limited to foreign communications, although domestic incidents such as the NSA warrantless surveillance controversy have occurred. The National Security Agency is divided into two major missions: the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), which produces foreign signals intelligence information, and the Information Assur-ance Directorate (IAD), which protects U.S. information systems.

The Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit, also known as the Stealth Bomber, is an American heavy penetration strategic bomber, featuring low observable stealth technology.

U.S. INTERCEPTORS

The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is designed to deal with the threat posed by Iranian short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles to U.S. assets, personnel and allies in Europe. It is flexible, initially using mobile radars and interceptors mounted on Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. According to the Obama administration, the new plan uses technology that is both “proven” and “costeffec-tive,” and will be able to adapt as threats evolve.

This new direction for European missile defense broke with the plans pursued by the Bush administration. The Bush plans had called for deployment of a ground-based missile defen-se system in Europe, similar to the system deployed in California and Alaska. This included bilateral agreements to station ground-based interceptors in Poland and a radar installation in the Czech Republic.

The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty is a fundamental element of U.S. arms control policy. This fact sheet reviews the basic purposes of the ABM Treaty, describes recent ABM Treaty developments, and lists the central elements of the Clinton Administration's approach to the ABM Treaty.

President Clinton is strongly committed to the viability of the ABM Treaty. Efforts on the part of this Administration to reaffirm the significance of the Treaty are described below. First, however, it is important to recall the basic framework of the Treaty

Basic Framework of the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty, which was signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibits deployment of a nationwide defense against strategic ballistic missile attack. In the Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that each may have two precisely limited ABM deployment areas (later limited by mutual agreement to one): to protect its capital or to protect an ICBM launch area.

To promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty, the Parties established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which meets at least twice a year. Also the terms of the Treaty specify that a review of the Treaty shall be conducted every five years.

In 1974, the Parties to the Treaty agreed by means of a Protocol to reduce the number of permitted ABM deployment areas to one for each side. The Soviet Union chose to maintain (and Russia continues to maintain) an ABM defense of its national capital, Moscow. The United States chose-Lose to complete its Safeguard ABM system designed to defend its ICBM silo launcher area near Grand Forks, North Dakota; however, this system was operational for a very short time and has been inactive since 1976.

Recent ABM Treaty Developments

In 1993, the Clinton Administration conducted a review of U.S. policy towards Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of the ABM Treaty The Administration made a deter-mination that the "traditional" or "narrow" interpretation of the Treaty is the correct one. The Administration therefore reaffirmed that the ABM Treaty prohibits the develop-ment, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arose. The United States has made clear its position that it is willing to accept as Treaty Parties any of the New Independent States (NIS) that want to be Party to the Treaty.

At the same time, the growing threat posed by theater ballistic missiles, and the need to combine effective protection against such threats while avoiding development of an ABM capability, has prompted the U.S. to propose that the demarcation between ABM and non-ABM defenses be clarified. The ABM Treaty itself does not provide clear guidance on this question. This clarification is being negotiated in the Treaty's imple-menting forum, the Standing Consultative Commission.

The Fourth Review of the ABM Treaty

During the regular five-year ABM Treaty Review that took place from September 27 October 1, 1993, in Geneva, the United States explored the issues of ABM/non-ABM demarcation and succession with Russia and the other participating states, Ukraine and Belarus. The United States was reassured during this review that other states shared the view of the Treaty's principal obligations and of the need to strengthen the Treaty. In the Joint Communique that was adopted at the Treaty Review, the partici-pating states concluded that:

Commitment to the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed and it was agreed that maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes remains important. The delegations at the Review advocated continued efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty

The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

In the past, many issues related to theater and strategic defenses have been vigo-rously debated within a number of different fora, including the Standing Consultative Commission. The Standing Consultative Commission, established by the ABM Treaty, remains the forum for negotiation of and agreement on ABM Treaty issues. The United States and Russia, along with other potential successor states, are working together to develop an effective ABM Treaty regime that will provide for multilateral succession to the ABM Treaty, as well as clarify the dividing line between ABM and non-ABM defenses.

At recent sessions of the SCC, which were held in Geneva from November 29 - December 17, 1993, January 24 - February 4, 1994, and March 21 - April 21, 1994, the United States presented proposals designed to preserve the viability of the Treaty in light of the political and technological circumstances of the present day The other participating delegations have also introduced their own positions and ideas.

Despite some differences of view, the negotiations have demonstrated that there exists a significant degree of commonality in the approach to theater missile defense among SCC participants. There is general agreement (1) that the threat of ballistic missile proliferation is real; (2) that there is a shared interest in being able to defend against this threat; and (3) that the ABM Treaty must be clarified to allow for the field-ing of adequate theater missile defenses.

The Clinton Administration's ABM Policy

The central points of the Administration's ABM policy are as follows:

President Clinton has reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty. The Administration considers it indispensable to stability, to the START I and START II reductions, and to longer-term reductions in strategic offensive arms.

The Clinton Administration has reaffirmed the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty as the correct interpretation, i.e., the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, airbased, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

The Administration has withdrawn the broad revisions to the Treaty previously pro-posed in the SCC which were intended to permit expanded deployment of strategic ABM defenses.

The Administration has recognized the need to specify a dividing line between ABM systems limited by the Treaty and non-ABM systems. When the Treaty was nego-tiated, both parties understood that this demarcation was left undefined. The time has come to define it. This will be accomplished by agreement in the SCC, not unilaterally. How the final agreement is formalized, as a legal matter, must properly await the out-come of the negotiations. Finally, the President has directed the Administration to con-sult closely with Congress on these issues.

CHRONOLOGY

July 13, 1993: Narrow Interpretation of the ABM Treaty Endorsed by the Clinton Administration

On July 13,1993, Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provided Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with the Clinton Administration's reaffirmation of the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty: the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of Sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

September/October 1993: Fourth Review of the ABM Treaty

The Fourth Review of the ABM Treaty, held between September 27 and October 1 of 1993, reaffirmed the participants' commitment to the ABM Treaty and advocated efforts to strengthen the Treaty.

December 1993: U.S. Decision on ABM Treaty Succession

 The Clinton Administration announced its acceptance of multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and directed that negotiations begin on procedures to implement a multilateral succession.

December 1993: U.S. Position on Theater Missile Defense

The Clinton Administration announced its goal to seek a clear, negotiated, demarcation between ABM and non-ABM systems in order to clarify the ABM Treaty provisions.

November 29 - December 17,1993; January 24 - February 4, 1994; and March 21 April 21, 1994:

Sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission were held in Geneva, Switzerland, where Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States discussed proposals to provide for multilateral succession to the ABM Treaty and to clarify the demarcation between ABM systems limited by the Treaty and non-ABM systems.



DIEGO GARCIA

WHITE SANDS

EXMOUTH W AUSTRALIAVARDØ GLOBUS IIIFYLINGDALE

THULE GREENLANDEGLIN USATHREAT AND DEFENSEPATRIOTTHAADNORADW135VLOOKING GLASSAWACS SENTRYUSS JOHN WARNER SUBTRACKERSUS BAND RADARUS PACIFIC COLLECTOR

DIEGO GARCIA

WHITE SANDS

EXMOUTH W AUSTRALIAVARDØ GLOBUS IIIFYLINGDALE

THULE GREENLANDEGLIN USATHREAT AND DEFENSEPATRIOTTHAADNORADW135VLOOKING GLASSAWACS SENTRYUSS JOHN WARNER SUBTRACKERSUS BAND RADARUS PACIFIC COLLECTOR

DIEGO GARCIA

WHITE SANDS

EXMOUTH W AUSTRALIAVARDØ GLOBUS IIIFYLINGDALE

THULE GREENLANDEGLIN USATHREAT AND DEFENSEPATRIOTTHAADNORADW135VLOOKING GLASSAWACS SENTRYUSS JOHN WARNER SUBTRACKERSUS BAND RADARUS PACIFIC COLLECTOR



DIEGO GARCIA

WHITE SANDS

EXMOUTH W AUSTRALIAVARDØ GLOBUS IIIFYLINGDALE

THULE GREENLANDEGLIN USATHREAT AND DEFENSEPATRIOTTHAADNORADW135VLOOKING GLASSAWACS SENTRYUSS JOHN WARNER SUBTRACKERSUS BAND RADARUS PACIFIC COLLECTOR



DIEGO GARCIA

WHITE SANDS

EXMOUTH W AUSTRALIAVARDØ GLOBUS IIIFYLINGDALE

THULE GREENLANDEGLIN USATHREAT AND DEFENSEPATRIOTTHAADNORAD